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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to examine how the Lebanese Sunni political actors frame 
intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon. The research draws on Max Weber’s 
“interpretivist” approach of understanding (Verstehen), which denotes that reality is 
socially constructed. The research does not offer a causal explanation of the Sunni 
politics. Rather, it seeks to interpret the subjective understandings and socially 
constructed ideas articulated by the Lebanese political actors on the political 
contestations of Sunnis. The operationalisation of framing theory in this research 
aided an understanding of how intra-Sunni political divides are constructed, 
manifested and narrated by the Lebanese political actors. The research used a single 
case study research design with a qualitative approach. The data were collected from 
Lebanon using semi-structured interviews and analysis of documents. A purposive 
sampling was employed to select twenty-three respondents including party and 
religious leaders, rank-and-file members, ministers and MPs. 
The findings of this research suggest the interconnectivity between external and 
internal factors in shaping the framing construction of Sunnis. Externally, the rivalry 
between Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Syria and Iran on the other hand is 
essential for shaping Sunni narratives on intra-Sunni contestations. Regional players 
namely (Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia) have been able to break through Sunnis either 
through financial or political support or through propagation of slogans such as 
resisting Israel and defending Palestine. Internally, the research reveals that Sunnis 
differ in their frames of identity politics, Lebanon’s confessional politics, Islamisation 
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of Lebanon, the stance on Hezbollah and the leadership of Sunnis. This research is the 
first theoretical-based study involving framing theory on intra-Sunni political 
contestations in Lebanon. The thesis concludes with some recommendations that 
collective national efforts are needed to enact laws that strengthen state institutions, 
prevent foreign funding and abolish confessionalism in order to reduce political 
tensions.    
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Chapter One 
Introducing Sunni Politics in Lebanon 
1.0 Introduction  
In this chapter, the background and rationale of this research will be presented. 
Following will be an illustration of the research’s question and argument as well as the 
justification or proposed contribution of this research to knowledge. In addition, the 
chapter will provide a review of the literature on the Sunni politics and thereafter the 
confessional political system in Lebanon as it helps to understand the context under 
which Sunni groupings and organisations frame intra-Sunni political division in 
Lebanon. The chapter will end with an outline of the structure of this research. 
1.1 Background and Rationale of this Research 
The state of Greater Lebanon was established in 1920 (Salibi 2003). Within its 
boundaries various religious communities exist, all with different cultures, different 
political affiliations and different identities (Khalidi 1979; Gilmour 1987). Lebanon as a 
nation is made up of plurality of sects and sub-sects (see figure 1.1). Though Lebanon 
had been an example for co-existence between Muslims and Christians for long time, 
external influences, internal disputes and opposing identities have often intensified 
religious and political divides in Lebanon (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008). 
Lebanon has suffered from long-standing political tensions which have affected its 
national cohesion since its independence in 1946 and indeed prior to this. This 
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situation has raised the question of the intent of the way in which colonial powers and 
other actors shaped and mapped Lebanon (Owen 2004; Fieldhouse 2008). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The 18 Officially Acknowledged Religious Groupings in Lebanon. 
Source: (Salamey 2014). 
 
The aim of this research is to examine the issues that politically divide the Lebanese 
Sunnis, externally and internally, during the period from 2005 to 2016, and how they 
are understood, framed and narrated by the Lebanese political actors. The research 
draws on Max Weber’s interpretivst approach of “understanding” (Verstehen) (see 
Hollis and Smith 1991; Bryman 2008), which denotes that reality is socially 
constructed. For the purpose of this research, the focus is on “understanding” not on 
“explanation” of the political contestations of the Lebanese Sunnis. The research does 
not aim at offering a causal explanation of intra-Sunni political divides in Lebanon but 
aims at understanding it from the stand point of the Lebanese political actors. It seeks 
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to interpret the subjective understandings, perceptions and frames of the Lebanese 
Sunni political actors engaged in the Sunni politics on issues of intra-Sunni political 
divides in Lebanon. The operationalisation of framing theory (see Goffman 1974; Snow 
and Benford 2000) as a theoretical tool will enable this research to understand better 
how the Lebanese Sunni political actors differ in their frames and articulations of the 
political division of the Sunni community in Lebanon. 
 
By Sunnis, this research refers to “the orthodox sect in Islam, so-called after the 
“Sunna” or lifestyle and rules of conduct of the Prophet Mohammad” (Khalidi 
1979:26). As the intra-religious disunity within the Sunni community in Lebanon is 
deepening, it is threatening Sunni solidarity, national cohesion and security in Lebanon 
(see Abdel-Latif 2008; Rabil 2014). In a multi-confessional society like Lebanon (see 
figure 1.1), the state is often characterised by deep political, religious and cultural 
divisions, having confessional affiliations divided based on representative groupings 
rather than being embedded in a single national identity (Lust 2011; el-Husseini 2012). 
Arguably, the Sunni community in Lebanon represents an exceedingly complex case in 
an extremely divided region, as they are religiously, socially and politically divided. The 
Middle East region itself is extremely divided along religious, ethnic and ideological 
lines and Lebanon therefore represents an extreme case in an extreme region. The 
Lebanese Sunnis find themselves in a political structure through which confessional 
divisions as well as contested identities and ideological affiliations are embedded in 
the political structure, including the constitutional order (Lust 2011). 
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Whilst it is important to understand the political divides within the Sunni composite in 
the light of the domestic sphere and interest, it is equally important to understand it 
from the perspective of Sunni ties with regional actors (e.g. Iran, Syria and Saudi 
Arabia) (Osoegawa 2013:149). Salamey (2014) indicates that the post-Rafik Hariri era 
from 2005 marked a growing confessionalism in Lebanon at inter- and intra-
confessional levels, making it difficult to comprehend the compartmentalisation of 
Sunni groupings in Lebanon without referring to the ideological and geopolitical 
competition between Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Iran and Syria on the other 
hand; and their frequent interferences in the Lebanese domestic affairs. Lebanon has 
been described by Zubaida (2009:170) as “a stage for forces and allegiances of other 
regional states and ideologies”. Indeed, regional states (e.g. Iran, Syria and Saudi 
Arabia) have played an influential role in backing their respective Sunni allies in 
Lebanon against other Sunnis to increase their dominance in Lebanon and equally 
importantly, to shape the framing construction of their Sunni allies.  
 
The intra-Sunni division in Lebanon is also a reflection of the perceptual failure of 
Sunni political and religious leadership to identify with the Sunni community, to 
improve their socio-economic conditions and to counter Hezbollah’s supremacy in the 
Lebanese state (Zelin 2016; Meier and Di Peri 2017). It is also a reflection on the 
perceived inability of the Lebanese government to completely protect the sovereignty 
of the state, dismantle armed militias, control non-state actors and maintain its legal 
authority on the whole Lebanese territories (see Salloukh et al. 2015). It is arguable 
that the various Sunni movement organisations and leaders in Lebanon receive 
support from external players, and that this support is often not confined to financial 
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funding, but includes political-cum-theological support. This is in turn could arguably 
shape the narratives of Sunni movements; in effect reinforce separation rather than 
integration and undermine the influence of Sunnis on the political arena (see Khashan 
2013). The present research therefore has not only academic interest but immediate 
policy implications as well. 
1.2 Research Question 
In this thesis, I pursue the following research question relating to intra-Sunni political 
contestations in Lebanon with the hope to examine issues of political divides within 
Lebanon’s Sunni demographic: 
 How do the Lebanese Sunni political actors frame intra-Sunni political 
division in Lebanon?   
This research question offers “framing” as a way to understand, not to explain the 
political division of the Sunni community in Lebanon.  It aims at understanding how 
the Lebanese political actors frame and articulate intra-Sunni political divides within 
Lebanon’s Sunni demographic through two key dimensions: domestic dimension and 
foreign dimension. At the domestic dimension, the research includes themes such as 
multiplicities of Sunni politicised identities, the stance on the state of Lebanon, the 
stance on Hezbollah and the stance on the political and religious leadership of the 
Sunni community in Lebanon; and how they are understood, framed and contested 
between Sunni groupings and leaders in Lebanon. At the foreign dimension, the 
research examines how the role of external players (e.g. Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia) is 
framed, understood and articulated by the Lebanese political actors.  
6 
 
1.3 The Overarching Argument of this Research 
For many decades, the Sunni community in Lebanon has been at the core of the 
Lebanese politics, as demonstrated by its involvement in the 1943 National Covenant, 
which laid the foundation for Lebanon’s independence from France, and the 1989 Taif 
Accord, which ended the Lebanese civil war (Salem 2011). It has been at the heart of 
the Lebanese political game by virtue of it being granted the position of Lebanon’s 
Prime Minister, which was captured in the 1943 National Covenant between Muslims 
and Christians (el-Husseini 2012; Meier and Di Peri 2017). The position of Sunnis as a 
community weakened during the devastating Lebanese civil war (1975-1990). The 
defeat of Sunni militias (e.g. the Tawheed Movement and the Independent Nasserite 
Movement) by Syria and its proxies and the assassination of key Sunni figures such as 
the Mufti of Lebanon Hassan Khalid and the former Prime Minister Rashid Karami, left 
the Sunni leadership in a much weaker position than at the beginning of the civil war 
(Sovgaard-Petersen 1998; Rougier 2007).  
Even though the Sunni politics witnessed the emergence of various Sunni groupings, 
leaders and prime ministers, the emergence of Rafik Hariri signalled a change in the 
status of the Lebanese Sunnis. Promising to reconstruct the conflict-ridden state and 
to embark on state-building, Hariri presented himself as a trans-confessional leader for 
all the Lebanese people irrespective of their political and religious affiliations (Khashan 
2013). Hariri’s presence in the Lebanese politics marked the creation of a new socio-
political phenomenon known as “Harirism” (Meier and Di Peri 2017:40). Harirism 
rested upon the establishment of moderate and unified Sunni political leadership in 
Lebanon in hand of the Hariri family. Rafik Hariri as Sunni Prime Minister and 
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billionaire with close ties to Saudi Arabia was able to solidify the role of the Sunni 
community in the Lebanese politics (Meier and Di peri 2017). His assassination in 2005 
altered the situation dramatically (Lefevre 2014; Rougier 2015). With Hariri’s 
assassinations, the Sunni community in Lebanon was left without unifying, strong and 
charismatic Sunni leader with influence at the top level of the Lebanese state. Sunnis 
in Lebanon were unable to fill in the vacuum left by the death of Rafik Hariri and to 
accept their gradual disempowerment within Lebanon, which is also resulted from the 
rise of their main Lebanese opponent: Hezbollah (Meier and Di Peri 2017:48).  
The absence of strong and credible Sunni leadership to unify Sunnis, to counter-
Hezbollah and to preserve the political legacy of Rafik Hariri have significantly 
weakened Sunni power positions within the Lebanese political system and contributed 
to their perceptual marginalisation and disenchantment (see International Crisis Group 
2010; Daher 2015; Khashan 2015). Hezbollah’s attack on Sunnis in 2008 and the 
subsequent Doha Agreement signalled a shift in the balance of forces in Lebanon in 
favour of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah (Osoegawa 2013). In addition, Hezbollah’s decision 
to militarily support the Syrian regime in the on-going Syrian conflict against the 
mostly Sunni Syrian rebels has produced a new wave of confessionalism, which has 
spilled over to Lebanon and deepened the inter-confessional division between Sunnis 
and Shias (Khashan 2015). The perceptions (among some Sunnis) that the Lebanese 
army cooperates with Hezbollah and mainly hunts Sunni radicals whilst turns a blind 
eye on Hezbollah’s activism in Lebanon and abroad, highlighted a transformation of 
Sunni perceptions as “victims and threated category within Lebanese society” 
(Ranstorp 2016:40; Meier and Di Piri 2017:49). 
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In reality, these recent developments affected the unity of the Lebanese Sunnis. 
Arguably, mainstream (pan-Arab, religious and national) Lebanese Sunni political 
actors and official religious institutions, such as Dar al-Fatwa, the highest religious 
Sunni office in Lebanon, have failed to channel rising Sunni discontents (see Lefevre 
2014). The eclipse of Dar al-Fatwa has been linked to its politicisation and financial 
scandals (Lefevre 2015). In addition, the Future Movement (the largest Lebanese Sunni 
grouping, which was set up by Rafik Hariri, and is currently led by his son Saad) has 
been criticised for not doing enough for the Sunni community in Lebanon (Lefevre 
2014). This gradual disempowerment of the inheritors of Rafik Hariri (i.e. the Future 
Movement) and their loss of power to Hezbollah and their regional patrons resulted in 
Sunnis to abandon moderate narratives and left space for the rise of Sunni radicalism 
and anti-statist sentiments (Haddad 2017).  
Collectively, the weakness of the Lebanese Sunni leadership, both political and clerical, 
created a vacuum within the Sunni environment, and resulted in some Sunnis to drift 
apart and resort for other political alternatives (Haddad 2017). This situation 
encouraged regional players with interest in Lebanon such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and 
Iran to fill in the gap in the Sunni leadership either through financial or political 
support or through advocacy or propagation of slogans such as pan-Arabism, resisting 
Israel or supporting Palestine to break through the Sunni politics and to maintain their 
influence on Sunni power dynamics (see Goodrazi 2009; el-Husseini 2012; Pall 2013).  
The interconnectivity between domestic and regional developments associated with 
the Sunni politics in the aftermath of Rafik Hariri’s assassination in 2005 has deepened 
the disunity amongst Sunnis, but more importantly, shaped the ways in which they 
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construct their narratives on issues of intra-Sunni political divides in Lebanon. 
Therefore, the main focus of this research is to understand better how the political 
division of the Sunni community in Lebanon is interpreted, framed and manifested by 
the Lebanese political actors during the period from 2005 to 2016. The research is a 
theorised one, and hence, in constructing the theoretical basis of this research, the 
framing theory is operationalised, with the hope to gain nuanced and deeper 
understanding of internal and external dynamics associated with the Sunni politics in 
Lebanon. The use of framing theory enables this research to understand better how 
the Lebanese political actors differ in their articulations of the political contestations of 
Sunnis. It shows how the “politics of representation” and politicised identities of the 
Lebanese Sunni political actors shape their framing construction.  
1.4 Justification/Contribution to Knowledge 
This thesis has the potential of making a contribution to knowledge because of the 
scarcity of literature on intra-confessional political divides in Lebanon as compared to 
inter-confessional political divides. Secondly, it brings into analysis the key roles of 
regional players such as Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia in shaping the framing 
construction of the Lebanese Sunni political actors. Thirdly, it challenges the 
assumptions that the Lebanese Sunnis are undifferentiated monoliths and hence, the 
operationalisation of framing theory will allow the research to look deeply into how 
the Lebanese Sunni political actors are divided in terms of their understandings and 
narratives of the Sunni politics and the Lebanese politics as a whole. Fourthly, this 
thesis, whose theoretical foundation relies on framing theory, has the potential of 
becoming the first theoretical-based research on the political division of the Sunni 
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community in Lebanon since the bulk of researches on the Sunni politics in Lebanon 
are not theory-based (see for example Abdel-Latif 2008; Imad 2009; Meir and Di Peri 
2017). Finally, this study is relevant to policy makers, since it would provide them with 
information on the perceived division of the Sunni community and how to mitigate the 
challenges. The study will contribute to the knowledge base in the area of academia 
and hence serve as a guideline for scholars who intend to carry out similar researches 
in the future. 
1.5 Literature Review 
In this section, the literature is reviewed to provide a contextual definition of Sunni 
Muslims, Sunni politics and Sunni groupings in Lebanon in an effort to contextualise 
their framing construction. Following the research reviews literature on the Lebanese 
confessional political system and the Taif Accord in order to understand the political 
structure under which the Lebanese Sunni political actors operate in Lebanon.      
1.5.1 Contextual Definition of Sunni Muslims in Lebanon 
Sunni Muslims are the branch of the religion of Islam that follows the orthodox 
tradition and acknowledges the first four Caliphs (Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman and Ali) as 
legitimate successors of the Prophet Mohmmad (Khalidi 1979). The term “Sunni” is 
derived from the word “Sunnah”, which means the exemplary behaviour or rule of 
conduct of the Prophet Mohammad (Khalidi 1979). Sunni Muslims constitute the 
majority of all followers of Islam and differ from Shia Muslims in their understanding 
of the Sunna, their conception of religious leadership and their recognition of the first 
three caliphs (see Rabil 2014). Sunnis are the largest religious community in Lebanon 
11 
 
(see figure1). They constitute 26.5% of the Lebanese population (see Najem 2012; 
Salamey 2014). In addition, they are key players in the Lebanese politics as evidenced 
by the 1943 National Covenant and the 1989 Taif Accord, which indicated that the 
Lebanese president would be a Christian Maronite, the prime minister would be a 
Muslim Sunni and the speaker of the parliament would be a Muslim Shia (Lust 2011). 
The Lebanese Sunnis have two leaderships: the first one is the political leadership, as 
represented by the Prime Minister Office, the highest political Sunni position in 
Lebanon. The prime minister is the head of the Lebanese government and is the 
operational head of the executive branch (Salem 2011). The other one is the religious 
leadership, as represented by a state institution known as Dar al-Fatwa, the highest 
religious Sunni position in Lebanon (Skovgaard-Petersen 1998). Dar al-Fatwa is 
responsible for managing Sunni religious and legal affairs (Skovgaard-Petersen 
2004:89). In the following, the research maps out the various Sunni groupings in 
Lebanon and their political activities.   
1.5.2 Mapping out Sunni Groupings and Organisations in Lebanon 
In Lebanon, there are Sunni groupings and organisations which aim at leading the 
Sunni politics (see Imad 2009; Rabil 2014; Rougier 2015). The Future Movement is the 
largest Sunni grouping but there are other Sunni groupings which do not want to 
operate under the leadership of the Future Movement (see Abdel-Latif 2008:1). These 
groups are divided in terms of their identity and political stance. The following 
headings and sub-headings will provide an outline of the literature on the dynamics of 
the main political Sunni groupings in Lebanon and their political activities. The 
literature of groupings within the Sunni community in Lebanon will focus on Sunni 
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groupings, which are politically active in the Sunni politics in Lebanon. These groupings 
include: the Future Movement, the Arab Liberation Party, the League of Muslim 
Scholars, the Lebanese Salafists (Purist, Haraki and Jihadist), al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, the 
Islamic Action Front, the Tawheed Movement, Hizb ut-Tahrir, al-Ahbash, the Union 
Party and the Popular Nasserite Organisation. All the dynamics of these Sunni 
groupings will help shaping the focus of this research by providing an entrancing lens 
to the analysis of data on intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon and how it is framed 
by the Lebanese political actors.  
1.5.2.1 The Future Movement 
The Future Movement is a national Sunni grouping founded by the Hariri family  in 
Lebanon (Cammett and Issar 2010:400). The former Sunni Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri  established the political machine of the Future Movement in the 1990s but it 
was not until  2007 that the political party was formally established (Cammett and Issar 
2010:400). The Future Movement is currently led by Rafik Hariri’s son, Saad Hariri, 
the  current Prime Minister of Lebanon and is considered as the largest Sunni grouping 
in Lebanon (Cammett and Issar 2010:400). The movement pursues anti-Syria and anti-
Iran policies in Lebanon (Osoegawa 2013:155). This includes its support for the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1559, which calls for the withdrawal of 
foreign troops (i.e. Syria) from Lebanon and the disarmament of non-state militias (i.e. 
Hezbollah) (Fakhoury 2015). In addition, the Future Movement strongly supports the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) on Rafik Hariri’s killing (Osoegawa 2013:155). The 
STL is regarded by Syria and Iran as a means to reduce their influence on Lebanon 
(Osoegawa 2013:155). The Future Movement holds good relations with Saudi Arabia, 
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whose support for the movement is understood in the context of countering Iran and 
Syria’s role in Lebanon (International Crisis Group 2010; Osoegawa 2013:155). The 
movement is an ally with the United States and France (Osoegawa 2013:155). The 
relations between the Future Movement and these states are legacy of the former 
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who established deep relations with the Arab states, 
especially Saudi Arabia and the West, especially France (International Crisis Group 
2010; Osoegawa 2013:155).  
1.5.2.2 The League of Muslim Scholars  
The League of Muslim Scholars is a scholarly committee which was established in 2012 
(the League of Muslim Scholars 2012a). ‏‏It consists of approximately 500 Sunni religious 
scholars, who are categorised as  independent or representatives of religious-based 
Sunni groupings in Lebanon such as al-Jama’a al- Islamiyya and the Lebanese Salafists 
(the League of Muslim Scholars 2012b). The main objective of the League of Muslim 
Scholars is to strengthen the role of Sunni religious  scholars in Lebanon and to play an 
influential role in issues pertinent to the Lebanese Sunnis (Lefevre 2015). The League 
of Muslim Scholars’ policy line is anti-Syrian and anti-Iran whereby it vocally supports 
the  revolution against the Syrian’s president Bashar al-Assad and opposes Hezbollah’s 
military  intervention in Syria to protect him (Lefevre 2015). While  the League of 
Muslims Scholars consists of diverse members with various  worldviews, it is unified in 
its opposition to Syria, Iran  and Hezbollah (Lefevre 2014:10). 
1.5.2.3 The Arab Liberation Party 
The Arab Liberation Party, which is also known as (Hizb Taharrur al-‘Arabi), is a 
national Sunni grouping, which is associated with the Karami family, the well-known 
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traditional political leaders (zuama) of Tripoli, north Lebanon. The Arab Liberation 
Party was established in 1952 by the former Prime Minister Abdul-Hamid Karami and 
is currently led by the Sunni Member of Parliament Faisal Karami, the heir to the 
Karami family (see Lefevre 2014). The Arab Liberation Party’s influence on the Sunni 
politics in Lebanon is based on the political legacy of its founder Abdul-Hamid Karami 
and his two sons Rashid and Omar, the former prime ministers of Lebanon. The party 
is highly critical of the Future Movement and is politically affiliated with Syria, Iran and 
Hezbollah as the latter relies on its support in its political struggles with Sunni 
opponents in Tripoli (the Arab Liberation Party’s stronghold) (see International Crisis 
Group 2010; Osoegawa 2013). 
1.5.2.4 Salafism in Lebanon 
The term Salafism was coined from the Arabic expression “the virtuous ancestors” (al-
‎salaf al-salih), who lived in the first three centuries of Islam, “namely companions of 
the  Prophet Muhammad (Sahaba) and the first two generations of their followers” 
(Pall  2013:17). It refers to the  orthodox trend of Sunni Islam, which strictly abides by 
the Quran and the Sunna of the  Prophet Mohammad and rejects human reasoning 
and all other types of innovation  (bid’a) (Wiktorowicz 2006;  Lauziere 2010). In 
Lebanon, Salafism is considered as the oldest religious-based Sunni movement in 
Lebanon (see Abdel- Latif 2009). In 1947, the Salafist movement was established in 
Tripoli, northern  Lebanon, by shaykh Salim al-Shahhal, a Lebanese Salafist, under the 
name of the  Association of Muslims (al-Jama'a Muslimun) (Khashan 2011a: Rabil 
2014:4). The Salafist Movement in Lebanon is labelled as a network of organisations 
and educated clergy (sheikhs) who run Islamic centres and charity endowments in the 
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pursuit of spreading the creed of the virtuous ancestors (al-salaf al-salih) (Imad 2009). 
In the 1980s, Lebanese Salafists maintained their presence following the spread of 
Salafism in the Islamic world (Pall 2013). Salafist clerics, who have the support of Saudi 
Arabia and some Gulf states, launched various Islamic and social centres in Lebanon, 
particularly in Tripoli (Rougier 2015). Yet, many of those centres were closed by the 
government, as they were suspected in endorsing sectarian narratives (Khashan 2011). 
In 1995, the Lebanese judiciary prosecuted and arrested dozens of Salafists‏after being 
accused of the assassination of Nizar Halabi, the pro-Syrian head of the Sunni grouping 
al-Ahbash (Khashan 2011).‏In 2000, the Dinniyeh Mountain (east of Tripoli) witnessed 
bloody clashes between the Army and radical Salafist group, who had aimed at 
establishing an Islamic emirate (Zelin 2016).  The army uprooted the group, killed its 
leader and arrested dozens of Salafists (Khashan 2011). As a result, the vibrancy of 
Salafists remained seriously weakened until the withdrawal of  Syria’s troops from 
Lebanon in 2005.  Following the Syrian’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Salafists re-opened 
many of their  institutes and regained some freedom to practise their Salafist preaching 
and to engage in political activism (al-Shahhal 2010).  
Classification of Salafism in Lebanon 
Salafist factions in Lebanon can be classified in terms of their political orientations 
into  three categories: purist apolitical, haraki political and jihadists (see Wiktorowicz 
2006; Pall 2013). These classifications are discussed in turn. 
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Purist Salafists 
Purists concentrate on teaching Muslims the authentic creed (‘aqidah), eschewing 
politics and submitting an unconditional obedience to the Muslim rulers unless they 
are apostates (Rabil 2014). Pall (2013:26) identifies two purist categories within the 
framework of the Lebanese Salafists. The first pertains to the “rejectionist” faction, 
which rejects any kind of political participation and forbids taking part in the 
parliamentary elections because they may corrupt Muslims’ creed (‘aqidah) (Pall 
2013). The second category pertains to the “purist-politically oriented” (Pall 2013:59). 
A clear example of this category is Jam'iyyat Waqf al-Turath al-Islami, which was 
founded in 2004 by shaykh Safwan al-Zu’bi in Lebanon (Shayya et al. 2009). These 
Salafists are supported by the Kuwaiti foundation Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami, 
which primarily supports purist Salafists (Shayya et al. 2009; Pall 2013). This category 
believes that the state of Lebanon is not repressive in that all the Lebanese religious 
communities are allowed to practise their own beliefs and therefore, it is not in the 
interest of the Salafist preaching (da’wa) to oppose the Lebanese state (Pall 2013:60). 
This types of Salafism urges Muslims to participate in the Lebanese political system 
and does not reject supporting non-Muslim candidates as long as they serve the 
interests of the Muslim community (Pall 2013:60). In addition, this category is less 
hostile to Shias, as compared to haraki Salafists. 
Haraki Salafists 
The Haraki or political brand of Salafism believes in the importance of engaging 
in  politics as a means to disseminate the Salafist’s creed (Wiktorowicz 2006). Haraki 
Salafists,  unlike their purist counterparts, believe that Muslims need to engage in 
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political affairs and  openly criticise rulers who do not govern in accordance with Islam 
and its principles  (Wiktorowicz 2006; Pall 2013). A clear example of this category is 
Jam’iyyat al Hidayah wa al-Ihsan, which is led by shaykh Da’i al-Islam al-Shahhal 
(Shayya et al. 2009). Whilst abiding by Salafism, this category is of the view  that Islam 
should not be restricted to matters of purification and opposing bid’a. Rather,  political 
affairs pertinent to Muslims should be thoroughly discussed (Wiktorowicz 2006;  Pall 
2013). Haraki Salafists criticise purists’ emphasis on matters of ‘aqida and 
da’wa,  whilst avoiding comments on key political issues that have a huge influence on 
the  Muslim community (see Lacroix 2005). In Lebanon, this type of Salafism 
concentrates on two key elements: first, promoting unity  among Muslims at the 
external level; second, resisting the  Syrian-Iranian alliance and the rising influence of 
Hezbollah and their Sunni allies on Lebanon at the internal level (Pall 2013:54).  
Jihadist Salafists  
The term jihad or “struggle” has different meanings depending on the context in which the 
term ‎is ‎used. In the contemporary context, the term jihad refers to those who seek “to 
change the ‎reality ‏by force” (Pall 2013: 38). In Saab and Ranstorp’s (2007:826) 
expression, Salafist jihadists are ‏‎a “small ‎minority strand within Salafist thought”. This 
type of Salafism holds the view that ‎peaceful strategies ‏of Islamic ‏da’wa and political 
reforms are not viable; only jihad will result in the formation of an ‎Islamist state (Saab 
and ‎Ranstorp 2007:‏‎826). ‎In Lebanon there are different jihadist groupings but it is 
‏difficult to determine whether or not ‎these groupings are truly Salafists. Care should 
be taken in ‎classifying particular groupings as a ‎Salafist jihadist, since not all Salafist 
groupings are jihadist and ‎vice versa. Yet, there are jihadist ‎groupings, which are 
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perceived to have links with Salafism. A clear ‏example of this trend is the ‎radical 
Salafist grouping the League of Partisans (Usbat al-Ansar) (see ‎Haddad 2010). This 
grouping was accused of assassinating the political leader of ‏al-Ahbash shaykh Nizar al-
‏‎Halabi in response to the intra-Sunni disputes between Salafists and al-‏Ahbash 
which ‎overshadowed the Sunni politics in the mid-1990s (see Haddad 2010). ‎Another 
example of Salafist jihadists ‎is the grouping of al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah, which emerged in 
the ‎late 1990s (see Pall 2013). The aim of this grouping was to establish an Islamic 
state in Lebanon but ‎they were ‎defeated by the Lebanese ‏army in 2000 (Rougier 
2007). This incident had ‎negative ‎impacts on haraki Salafists, many of whom were 
arrested by the Lebanese authorities due ‏to ‎suspicion of collusion with al-Takfir wa al-
Hijrah (Rougier 2015:16). A third example is the case ‎of ‎Fatah al-Islam grouping, which 
was thought to have links with al-Qaeda and some Salafist ‏networks in ‎Lebanon 
(Abdel-Latif 2008). This grouping recruited hundreds of Sunni ‎fighters from ‎Lebanon 
and abroad, operated in Lebanon from 20‏‎06 to 2008 and was perceived as one ‎of 
the ‎most dangerous militias operating in the domestic arena in Lebanon (Zelin). The 
‏grouping ‏‎was defeated by the Lebanese army after a long battle, which lasted for 
approximately ‏three ‎months (Zalin 2016:51).‎ 
1.5.2.5 Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya 
The Islamic Group (al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyya) is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt and Syria and it is influenced by their teachings (Hamzeh 1997). It proposes an 
“Islamic order based on the Shari'a (Islamic sacred law) through jihad of the heart 
(spiritual struggle), jihad by word (education and propaganda), and jihad by hand 
(economic, political and military action)” (Hamzah 1997). The origins of al-Jama’a al-
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Islamiyya go back to 1956 when it launched its mission under the name of 
“Worshippers of the Most Merciful” (Ibad al-Rahman). Later on, in 1964, it was 
transferred into the name of The Islamic Group (al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya) (el-Husseini 
2012; Imad 2013). In principle, the group began as an apolitical and charitable 
movement. Nevertheless, the ramifications of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the rise 
of political Islam and the Lebanese civil war, pushed the movement towards political 
activism (Imad 2006). The movement was officially recognised by the Lebanese state 
after it was issued with a license from the then Lebanese Minister of Interior Kamal 
Joumblat (Imad 2013). It became the first religious-based Sunni grouping to be 
officially recognised by the Lebanese state (Imad 2009:144). Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya is 
centrist in its political affiliations (see Shayya et al. 2009). Following the assassination 
of Rafik Hariri in 2005, the grouping cooperated with the Future Movement in the 
parliamentary elections in 2005 and 2009 (Rabil 2014). The purpose was to maintain 
the unity of the Sunni front in the face of internal and external threats. Yet, unlike 
other Sunni groupings such as Salafists or the Future Movement which engaged in 
political struggles with Hezbollah, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s approach has been less 
hostile towards Hezbollah. The grouping strongly affirms the role of Hezbollah’s 
resistance against Israel but decries its military involvement in Syria and its 
involvement in domestic conflicts in Lebanon (El-Husseini 2012:81; Choucair 2015). 
1.5.2.6 The Islamic Action Front 
In 2006, the Islamic Action Front was established by Fathi Yakan, the former secretary 
general of al-Jama’a al- Islamiyya (Shayya et al. 2009). Yakan withdrew from al-Jama’a 
al- Islamiyya because of his disagreement with its political alliance with the Future 
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Movement (Abdel-Latif 2008; Shayya et al. 2009). The Islamic Action Front is a Sunni 
coalition consisting of the Tawheed Movement and other smaller religious-based 
Sunni groups such as the Down Forces, Islam without Borders, and al-Imam Ali 
Association (Abdel-Latif 2008; Imad 2009; Shayya et al. 2009). The Islamic Action Front 
is a pro-Syria, pro-Iran Coalition (Imad 2009). It was established in order to mobilise 
the Lebanese Sunnis against the Future Movement (Rougier 2015:250). Soon later, the 
Islamic Action Front faced two serious challenges. In 2008, several members defected 
from the front and joined a rival grouping with almost the same name: “the Islamic 
Action Front-Emergency Committee” (Imad 2009; Rougier 2015:75). The defection was 
attributable to their opposition to Hezbollah’s influence on the Islamic Action Front. 
Hezbollah managed to recruit a number of the Lebanese Sunnis who had thought that 
they were trained to fight against Israel. Later on, it seemed that that they were used 
as a tool by Hezbollah in their internal conflicts in Lebanon (see Rougier 2015). The 
unmasking of these military trainings undermined the influence of the Islamic Action 
Front on Sunni power dynamics and led to frequent defections (see Imad 2013; 
Rougier 2015). The second challenge was the death of the Islamic Action Front’s 
founder Fathi Yakan in 2009 (Imad 2013). Much of the Islamic Action Front’s influence 
was based on Yakan’s network, charisma and organisational and political experience 
(Imad 2009). The Islamic Action Front capitalised on Yakan’s high profile as an 
influential Sunni political leader to appeal to Sunni followers (Abdel-Latif 2008:10). 
Following Yakan’s death, the front’s influence on the Sunni politics considerably 
weakened despite Hezbollah’s support (Imad 2013).  
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1.5.2.7 The Tawheed Movement  
The “Unification” or Tawheed Movement was established in Tripoli in 1982 under the 
leadership of Said Sha’ban, a famous yet controversial figure in the Islamic arena in 
Lebanon (Deeb 1986). It is thought as a “more of a coalitional setting than an 
organizational one” (Deeb 1986). During the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), Tripoli 
witnessed the existence of diverse leftist, pan-Arab, Islamists and Palestinian militant 
groupings with different ideologies, objectives and indeed, political orientations. These 
groupings included among others Soldiers of God (Jund Allah), the Arab Lebanese 
Movement (Harakat Lubnan al-Arabi) and the Popular Resistance (al-Muqawwamah 
al-Sha’bia) (Deeb 1986; Imad 2009). The erstwhile three groupings held various 
meetings with shaykh Said Sha’ban whereby they agreed to “unify” their armed 
activism under the rubric of the Tawheed Movement and the leadership of Said 
Sha’ban. The purpose was to fight Syria and Israel’s presence in Lebanon. In 1985,‏the 
movement was militarily destroyed by Syria and its proxies, following a massacre of 
hundreds of Sunni in Tripoli (Hanf 1993). This instance resulted in a perpetual schism 
between Tripoli and Syria and served as an impetus for the subsequent rise of radical 
Sunni groups in Lebanon (Khashan 2011:87). Following the death of Sha’ban in 1998, 
the movement was split up into two wings: “Board of Trustees” (majlis al-Umana) and 
“Leadership Council” (majlis al-qiyadah) (Imad 2009). It is thought that the split up was 
for logistic rather than ideological motives (Imad 2009). However, the movement does 
not hold a clear-cut Islamic project and its agenda remains ambiguous. Indeed, in post-
2005 era, the movement was affiliated with the Iranian-Syrian axis in Lebanon; a 
decision seems to contradict the general ethos of the Sunni community in Lebanon 
(Imad 2009).  
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1.5.2.8 Hizb ut-Tahrir 
Hizb ut-Tahrir is a transnational political party (Osman 2012; Karagiannis 2013) 
whose  ideology is based on Islam and whose main objective is to re-establish 
the  historical state of the Caliphate (dawlat al-Khilafah), which existed during the 
leadership of the four Caliphs (Abu  Bakr, Omar, Othman and Ali) (Rashid 2003; 
International Crisis Group 2003). This era is perceived by many Muslims as “the only 
time in Islamic history  when a true Muslim society existed” (Rashid 2003:116; Osman 
2012:90). In Lebanon, Hizb ut-Tahrir was established by Taquldin al-Nabhani (1909-
1977), an Islamic scholar and judge in the Islamic law in 1953 (Karagiannis 2006; 
Yilmaz: 2010; Hanif 2012). Following al-Nabhani’s settlement in Lebanon, particularly 
in 1959, Hizb ut-Tahrir applied for a licence often known as “Appraisal and 
Notification” (‘ilm‎wa‎khabar) from the Lebanese state and informed the Ministry of 
Interior about its intention to commence its modus operandi (Ghareeb 2014). The 
movement got a licence to practise its activities in 1959 but in 1961, the movement 
was banned by the Lebanese authorities on the ground that its ideology “contradicts 
the Lebanese Constitution” (Shayya et al. 2009:116). In the aftermath of the Syrian’s 
withdrawal from Lebanon in  2005, Hizb ut-Tahrir gained more freedom to practise 
their activities. The turning point occurred  in 2006 when the Lebanese government 
legalised Hizb ut-Tahrir and was no longer banned (Abd- Latif 2008; Shayaa et al. 2009). 
Lebanon has been the only state in the Arab world that legalised  Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
Relations with Hezbollah 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s relationship with Hezbollah, the most powerful grouping in Lebanon is 
described as “antagonistic” for several reasons (Karagiannis 2010:53). The first reason 
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pertains to the fact that Hezbollah has a mass following in Lebanon, whereas Hizb ut-
Tahrir has a small but growing membership in the country (Karagiannis 2010:53). The 
second reason suggests that the two groupings have considerably different political 
methodology (Karagiannis 2010:53). Hezbollah, for instance, has a military wing which 
often engages in armed struggle against Israel and simultaneously holds seats in the 
Lebanese parliament while Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects electoral politics except under strict 
conditions and favours peaceful non-violent methods for political change (Chaudet; 
2006; Karagiannis and Mccauley 2006). The third reason indicates that Hezbollah 
“aims at transforming Lebanon into an Islamic state, whereas Hizb ut-Tahrir aims at 
incorporating Lebanon into the proposed Caliphate” (Karagiannis 2010:54). The fourth 
reason is that Hezbollah has been logistically, financially and militarily supported by 
Iran, while Hizb ut-Tahrir is mainly a Sunni grouping with “no state openly providing 
any support to it” (Karagiannis 2010:54). The fifth reason shows that Hizb ut-Tahrir is 
against Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict to support Bashar al-Assad. In 
April, 15, 2011, Hizb ut-Tahrir called for a demonstration in Tripoli to support the 
Syrian revolution against the Assad regime, making the party one of the earliest 
Lebanese groupings to publicly support the Syrian revolution against the Assad’s 
regime (Ghandour 2014).   
Re-establishment of the State of the Caliphate  
Hizb ut-Tahrir clarifies the required three stages for the revival of the state of the 
Caliphate. The first stage is known as the stage of culturing (tathkeef) (Osman 
2012:97), which involves finding and cultivating people who are really convinced and 
influenced by the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir. This stage is essential in order to establish 
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a group of people who are able to carry out the movement’s ideology. The second 
stage is known as the stage of interaction (tafa’oul) (Osman 2012:97), which involves 
interacting and engaging with the Muslim umma in order to convince them to 
embrace the religion of Islam, hence they work to Islamise state, society and life. The 
third stage is known as the stage of “accepting power and ruling” (istilamu al-hukm) 
(Osman 2012:97), which involves re-establishing an Islamic state, the state of the 
Caliphate, which implements the religion of Islam not only generally but 
comprehensively and carries out its message to the whole world in the forms of 
military struggle (jihad) against the disbelievers or revolutionary takeovers (Hizb ut-
Tahrir in Britain, 2000: 32 as cited in Karagiannis 2006: 266).  
1.5.2.9 Al-Ahbash 
It is commonly known as al-Ahbash “the Ethiopians”, due to the ethnicity of its 
founder shaykh Abdullah al-Habashi, a Sufi leader from Ethiopia (Rougier 2007). Al-
Ahabsh is a Sufi-oriented Sunni movement, which belongs to the Rifaiyya Sufi order 
(Kabha and Erlich 2006; Pierret 2010). The creed of al-Ahabsh is based on 
acknowledging the teachings of the virtuous ancestors (al-Salaf al-Saleh) with 
particular emphasis on theology (Ilmu al-Kalam); a tradition of the Mu'tazila sect, 
which puts an emphasis on dialectical reason (‘aql) over literal interpretation of the 
Islamic holy texts (naql) (Hamzeh 1997). Indeed, al-Ahbash’s understanding of Islam 
has been widely criticised by other Sunnis because of its emphasis on critiquing the 
discourse of other Sunni groupings rather than formulating a thorough, clear-cut 
project to unify them (Imad 2006). In addition, the movement often indulges in the 
analysis of some complex and dialectical theological issues that the mainstream Sunnis 
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in Lebanon tend to avoid due to its sensitivity such as the thorough engagement in the 
exegesis of the divine attributes (ta’wil‎al-sifat) of God (Allah) (El-Husseini 2012).  
Al-Ahbash began as a charitable movement and did not engage in confessional 
conflicts during the civil  war. In the 1980s, al-Ahbash became popular in the Islamic 
arena by advocating pluralism, political  passivity and tolerance (Hamzeh 1997). 
However, in the 1990s, al-Ahbash engaged in political activism,  supporting the Syrian 
regime and their allies as well as fiercely opposing anti-Syrian Sunni groupings  such as 
Salafism (Imad 2006). Al-Ahbash, during the 1990s, was an important player amongst 
Sunnis  but did not maintain good relations with neither Dar al-Fatwa, the highest 
religious Sunni office in  Lebanon, nor with the Lebanese Salafists and al-Jama’a al-
 Islamiyya due to political and ‏religious differences (Pall 2013).‏ 
Disagreements with Dar al-Fatwa 
In the 1990s, al-Ahbash attempted to take over Dar al-Fatwa in order to religiously 
lead the Sunni community (Rabil 2011). This coincided with an absence of an elected 
grand Mufti in Lebanon following the assassination of the Grand Mufti Shaykh Hassan 
Khalid in 1989 (Rabil 2011). Al-Ahbash, given its ties with Syria and its allies, believed 
that its political leader Nizar al-Halabi could exercise power over Dar al-Fatwa, hence 
being the Mufti of the Republic (Skovgaard-Petersen 2004). However, the problem was 
that al-Ahbash has carried out a different interpretation of Islam making its theology 
unacceptable by mainstream Lebanese Sunnis. Moreover, the movement maintained 
bad relations with Dar al-Fatwa as the latter did not provide it with a licence to 
officially operate (Abdel-latif 2008). The rivalry between the two-sides deepened as al-
Ahbash took over several important mosques in Beirut some of which were said to be 
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belonging to Dar al-Fatwa (Pall 2013). Al-Ahbash justified its actions on the ground 
that Dar al-Fatwa was unable to virtually protect mosques from what it called 
“extremist” groupings referring to al-Jama’a al- Islamiyya and the Lebanese Salafists 
(Pall 2013).  
Disagreement with Salafists and al-Jama’a al- Islamiyya 
Not only did the al-Ahbash engage in an intra-Sunni struggle against Dar al-Fatwa but 
also against political Islam groupings such as Salafisst and al-Jama’a al- Islamiyya.  In 
principle, the movement was identified with political passivity and religious 
spirituality, portraying itself as a moderate Sunni voice in the face of what it often 
describes as radicalism or extremism affected by political Islamism (Hamzeh and 
Dekmejian 1996; Kabha and Erlich 2006). Whilst the movement was initially perceived 
as religiously quietist, given its Sufi–oriented background, its practises with Sunni rivals 
were the antithesis of its mottos based on moderation. Al-Ahbash repeatedly 
described specific Sunni counterparts as infidels thus excluding them from Islam 
(Kabha and Erlich 2006). These groupings were influenced by the writings of various 
Muslims figures such as Ibn Taymyya, Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahhab and Hassan al-
Banna. The movement rejected their thesis by stating that their philosophies were 
contradictory to the Holy Quran, the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad (Nassif 2001; 
al-Ahbash official website 2015). 
Al-Ahbash in the aftermath of Syria’s Withdrawal from Lebanon 
Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005  gradually weakened the political influence of 
al-Ahbash on the Sunni politics  (Imad 2006). Following Hariri’s assassination, more 
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Sunnis tended to have intolerable  sentiments toward al-Ahbash because of its 
identification with the Syrian intelligent agency (Kabha and  Erlich 2006: 523). The 
severe blow that al-Ahbash received was in October 2005, when the United Nations 
released reports alleging that members of al-Ahbash were implicated in Hariri’s 
assassination; hence two members of al-Ahbash were arrested before they were 
released in 2009 (see Report of the International Independent Investigation 
Commission Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595: 2005). This led 
to al-Ahbash’s reputation being damaged to a very great extent. Whilst the movement 
was described as one of the major Sunni parties in the pre- Hariri’s assassination 
period, it hardly has had any political influence on the Sunni spectrum much  less the 
national spectrum in the post-Hariri’s assassination period. 
1.5.2.10  The Union Party 
It is commonly known as Hizb al-Ittihad. The Union Party is a pan-Arab based Sunni 
grouping, which adheres to pan-Arabism. It was established in the late fifties under the 
name of Baath al-Thawra before it was officially metamorphosed into the name of the 
Union Party in 1990. Much of the influence of the Union Party on the politics of the 
Sunni community in Lebanon is based on the charisma, financial capacity and regional 
links of its leader, the former Minister Abdul-Rahim Mourad, who served as a minister 
of education and higher studies (1995-1998) and (2000-2003), minister of state (2003-
2004) and minister of Defence (2004-2005) in the Lebanese government. He also 
served as member of the Lebanese parliament in 1991, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2018. 
The Union Party, under Mourad’s leadership established several universities and 
charity centres in Lebanon, which improved Sunni conditions, especially in West Bekaa 
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(the Union Party’s stronghold) and strengthened its influence on the politics of the 
Sunni community in Lebanon.  The Union Party is aligned with Syria, Iran and 
Hezbollah its leader is known to be a Sunni rival of the Hariri family and one of Syria’s 
key Sunni allies in Lebanon (see International Crisis Group 2010:6).  
1.5.2.11 The Popular Nasserite Organisation 
The Popular Nasserite Organisation was inaugurated in 1970 in Sidon, under the 
leadership of Maarouf Saad (The Popular Nasserite Organisation 2014). Initially, 
Maarouf Saad established the Popular Forces Organisation in Sidon (Tanzim al-Qiwa 
al-Sha’biya‎ fi‎ Sayda), which later metamorphosed to the Popular Nasserite 
Organisation (Tanzim‎ Asha’bi‎ Annasri) in 1973 (The Popular Nasserite Organisation 
2014). The core objectives of the Popular Nasserite Organisation have been to support 
the Palestinian cause, pursue pan-Arabism and help deprived communities in Sidon 
(Arnaout 1981; El-Khazen 2000; Khalaf 2002).  The organisation’s involvement in the 
civil war (1975-1990) shaped its trajectory and constituted its political identity and 
alliances, making it one of the domestic actors in Lebanon (The Popular Nasserite 
Organisation 2014). In 1975, following the assassination of Maarouf Saad, his son, 
Mostafa (1951-2002) succeeded him. Mostafa was elected as the general secretary of 
the Popular Nasserite Organisation, through which he pursued his father’s legacy. 
During the civil war, the organisation engaged in frequent struggles against the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982 respectively. Presumably, the organisation’s 
role, under the leadership of Mostafa, infuriated Israel and thus he was detained 
(twice) by them (Fisk 2001). He was subjected to several assassination attempts; in 
one attempt, he lost his daughter and lost his sight (Fisk 2001). In addition, the 
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organisation engaged in inter-confessional struggles against Rightist Christians. In 
2002, Mostafa passed away and was succeeded by his brother Osama, who pursued 
the family’s conviction entrenched in its pro-Palestinian, pro-Nasserite political 
orientation; an on-going legacy, which made them popular in Sidon (Soussi 2007). 
Ossama Saad is currently the general secretary of the Popular Nasserite Organisation 
and is allied with Syria, Iran and Hezbollah (Soussi 2007).  
1.5.3 Confessionalism in Lebanon  
In the following, a review of the literature on confessionalism is presented as it is the 
current political system operating in Lebanon. This is important to understand the 
context of the political activities of the Lebanese Sunni actors.  
Confessionalism is a system of government that proportionally distributes political 
power among a state’s communities, whether ethnic or religious, according to their 
percentage of the population (Harb 2006). It is often perceived as a solution for 
multiple religious and deeply divided communities like Lebanon (see figure 1.1). Since 
1943, the political system in Lebanon has been confessional, the purpose of this kind 
of confessionalism has been to ensure representation to all the religious communities 
in Lebanon (Khalaf 1987; Faour 2007). The Lebanese political system has also been 
considered as semi-presidential because it holds elections for three office bearers: the 
president, the prime minister and the speaker of the parliament (Salamey and Payne 
2008; Mollica and Dingley 2015). Both confessionalism and semi-presidentialism are 
often criticised as systems that cannot work in highly divided societies (Lust 2011).  
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The political system in Lebanon has emerged as a result of the National Covenant 
between Muslims and Christians, which laid the foundations for Lebanon’s 
independence from France in 1946 (Lust 2011; Salamey 2014). The covenant 
reinforced the confessional system of governance, which operated under the French 
rule in Lebanon by “formalising the confessional distribution of the highest public 
offices and top administrative ranks according to the proportional distribution of the 
dominant communities within Lebanon” (Salamey 2014:30). The covenant indicated 
that the president of Lebanon would be a Christian Maronite, the prime minister 
would be a Muslim Sunni and the speaker of the Parliament would be a Muslim Shia 
(Khalidi 1979). In addition, it mentioned that the seats in the Lebanese parliament 
would be distributed by six-to-five ratio, which favoured Christians to Muslims, as they 
were the dominant religious community in the last census, which occurred in 1932 (el-
Husseini 2012). 
Rather than protect the interest of the Lebanese religious communities, the 
confessional arrangements intensified political tensions between them (Lust 2011). 
During the 1960s and thereafter, the Shia community had increased in size to become 
the largest, but not the prevailing community, equivalent to one-third of the 
population, but this increase was not coincided with political power; rather, Muslims, 
especially the Shias remained underrepresented (see figure 1.2). Whereas Muslims 
demanded a new census to accommodate new demographic realities in Lebanon, 
Maronites refused to conduct another census or to amend the constitution to reduce 
their share of power (Barakat 1979; Evron 1987). In addition, the Israeli existence in 
Palestine resulted in the displacement of approximately 700,000 Palestinians into 
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neighbouring states including Lebanon (Salamey, 2014). The Palestinian presence in 
Lebanon, predominantly Sunnis, changed the demographic balance in favour of 
Muslims and intensified confessional tensions between Muslim advocates of pan-
Arabism and Christian nationalists, and this is one of the reasons why the Christians 
Maronites refused to conduct another census  (Salamey 2014). 
The seeming failure of the confessional political system and power-sharing had 
aggravated confessional tensions and led to a devastating civil war in Lebanon 
(Salamey 2009). Milton-Edwards (2011:130) notes that the “civil war in Lebanon was 
the product of the failure of confessional and consociational arrangements in state 
and politics to account accurately and fairly for *the interests of+ religious minorities”. 
Yet, she understates the problem, in that all communal groupings are minorities in 
Lebanon, which is a country that has no overall majority (see figure 1.1). Rather, the 
essential conflict derived from larger minorities being more disadvantaged relative to 
smaller minorities that were privileged. Undeniably, the civil war (1975-1990) proved 
the vulnerability of the confessional political system. The civil war was not 
predominantly an internal affair; it was triggered by the Palestinian armed existence, 
which deepened confessional tensions and attracted the external intervention by Syria 
(1976-2005), Israel (1982-2000) as well as Iran and other state and non-state actors 
each pursuing domination over Lebanon (Cleveland 2004). 
1.5.4 The Taif Accord 
In October 1989, the Taif Accord which was convened in Saudi Arabia, under the 
support of the Arab League and the United Nations led to the end of the Lebanese civil 
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war which started in 1975 and eventually ended in 1990 (Osoegawa 2013; Salamey 
2014:70). The accord approved a decrease in the power of the Lebanese (Maronite) 
president, placing it on equivalent ground with the government and the parliament 
(Osoegawa 2013). It empowered the power positions of the Sunni and Shia 
communities in Lebanon.  The privileges that the Maronites held in pre-civil war era 
were reduced so that Muslims (Sunnis and Shias) would hold equal positions in the 
parliament and more powerful positions in the Prime Minister Office and parliament 
speakership (see figure 1.2). Therefore,  instead of the Lebanese president having a full 
power as it was the case in the pre-civil war  period, the Taif Accord maintains that 
power and decision-making are to be shared  between the Lebanese religious 
communities. 
 
Figure 1.2: Pre- and post-Taif division of seats in parliament 
Source: (Krayem 1997 as cited in Salamey 2014). 
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1.5.4.1 Abolition of Confessionalism 
The Taif Accord stipulates that the abolition of confessionalism is a national goal (see 
The Taif Accord 1989; Shields 2008). A number of works (see el-Hoss 2008; Salloukh et 
al. 2015; Di Peri 2017) suggests that the Lebanese political system should move 
beyond confessionalim in order to maintain the national cohesion and unity between 
the Lebanese religious communities. The former Prime Minister of Lebanon Salim el-
Hoss (2008:155) indicates in his article “Peace in Lebanon and the Middle East” that 
“stability [in Lebanon] will be consolidated and the recurrence of national crises will 
cease permanently once the ill of sectarianism is remedied”. In Lebanon, 
confessionalism often reinforces confessional identities at the expense of national 
identities and exposes Lebanon to geopolitical contests, perpetual crises and external 
manipulations (Weiss 2009). Despite its shortcomings, the confessional political 
system in Lebanon is still largely functional and efforts to go beyond the self-
perpetuating confessioanlism in Lebanon have been defeated (Salamey and Payne 
2008:461). Confessional politics remains enshrined in the Lebanese political system 
(Milton-Edwards 2011:130-1).  
1.5.4.2 Disarmament of Non-State Actors 
The Taif Accord called for disarmament of Lebanese militias, restoration of order and 
imposition of state’s power throughout Lebanon (Osoegawa 2013). Under the 
influence of Syria, some non-governmental actors such as Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian 
Shia movement, which was established in 1982, were exempted from the accord’s 
disarming order on the ground that it is an anti-Israel’s resistance (Norton 2007; Salem 
2011:538). Hezbollah refused to hand over its guns until the full liberation of Lebanon 
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from Israel was achieved. Moreover, Hezbollah prevented the Lebanese army from 
deploying its troops to south Lebanon near Israel and therefore, Lebanon’s sovereignty 
was not completely established after the Taif Accord (Salem 2011). In 2000, the Israeli 
troops withdrew from Lebanon in what was considered as a victory for Hezbollah 
Haddad 2005). Hezbollah remained armed despite the Israeli withdrawal from 
Lebanon (el-Husseini 2010). It has become the most powerful political party in 
Lebanon by virtue of its military might and its alliance with Iran and Syria (Shanahan 
2008; DeVore and Stähli 2015).  
1.5.4.3 Legitimisation of Syria’s Role in Lebanon 
The Taif Accord formalised Lebanon’s “special” relations with Syria, which permitted 
the latter to maintain the presence of its army in Lebanon (Lust 2011). By the end of 
the Lebanese civil war, Syria managed to neutralise its rivals in Lebanon (e.g. Israel and 
the Palestinian Liberation Organisation), leaving it as the sole arbitrator in Lebanon 
(see Hinnebusch 1998). The accord identified the role of Syria’s army in helping the 
Lebanese state to maintain its authority in Lebanon (Najem 2012). Therefore, the Taif 
Accord, which was endorsed by the Lebanese government, the United Nations and the 
Arab League, enabled Syria to gain an internationally and regionally recognised formal 
basis for its existence in Lebanon (Osoegawa 2013). Syria’s position in Lebanon was 
further solidified by the Taif Accord. In the post-civil war period, Lebanon was under 
Syria’s control. Syria maintained the presence of its troops in Lebanon as well as a 
“heavy hand” on the Lebanese politics. 
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 In 1991, Syria signed the “Treaty of Brotherhood, Coordination and Cooperation” and 
the “Agreement of Defence and Security” with the Lebanese state (Harik 1997). These 
agreements institutionalised Syria’s influence on Lebanon in the areas of foreign 
policy, defence, security and economic affairs (Harik 1997). From 1990 to 2005, the 
organs of the Lebanese state were under the influence of Syria. Lebanon's pro-Syria 
policy was felt in the parliamentary and presidential elections, which brought many of 
Syria’s allies to power (el-Husseini 2012). Syria did not hesitate to request from its 
allies in Lebanon to adjust the Lebanese constitution in order to enable pro-Syria 
candidates become presidents (el-Husseini 2012). Collectively, Syria’s role in Lebanon 
brought stability but it was at the expense of Lebanon’s sovereignty, unity and 
national cohesion. The Syrian troops remained in Lebanon until 2005. 
1.6 Structure of this Thesis 
As outlined above, the main focus of this research is to understand better how the 
Lebanese Sunni political actors frame and articulate intra-Sunni political division in 
Lebanon. The thesis itself is organised into five chapters. The first chapter has laid out 
the background and rationale of this research with the resultant research question, 
argument and statement of justification/potential contribution of this research to 
theory and practise. It has also provided a review of the literature on groupings within 
the Sunni community in Lebanon and thereafter the confessional political system in 
Lebanon in order to contextualise the framing activities of the Lebanese Sunni political 
actors.  
Chapter two discusses the research’s approach, which relies on Max Weber’s 
interpretivist notion of “understanding” (Verstehen), and provides the procedures 
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employed by the researcher to collect and analyse the data. The research draws on 
the Webarian approach to interpret the subjective understandings, perceptions and 
frames of the Lebanese political actors on the political division of the Sunni community 
in Lebanon because the aim of this research is to “understand” not to “explain” the 
Sunni politics in Lebanon. In addition, the chapter examines the theoretical 
underpinning of this research, which relies on framing theory. The thesis deploys 
framing theory in order to understand better how the Lebanese political actors 
construct their narratives on intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon.    
Chapter three examines how the Lebanese political actors understand and frame intra-
Sunni political division in Lebanon at the domestic level. The operationalisation of 
framing theory concepts such as “frame alignment processes”, “counter-framing” 
“frame credibility” and “frame consistency” enables the research to interpret 
contested frames among the Lebanese political actors on key domestic issues 
including identity politics, the Lebanese confessional politics, Islamisation of Lebanon, 
the stance on Hezbollah and the political and religious leadership of Sunnis. The 
concepts of “injustice frames”, “supply and demand” and “collective action frames” 
aided an understanding of how the Lebanese Sunnis differ in their claims and 
attribution of blames for the problematised Sunni state of affairs and accordingly, the 
solution to the problems facing the Sunni community in Lebanon. 
Chapter four examines how the Lebanese political actors understand and frame the 
role of external players (e.g. Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia) in intra-Sunni political 
division in Lebanon. The concepts of “frame salience” are operationalised in this 
chapter to show how Sunnis interpret the role of external players in the political 
37 
 
division of Sunnis. External players (e.g. Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia) have been able to 
shape the framing construction of various Sunnis through financial and political 
support or through advocacy of popular slogans among Sunnis such as pan-Arabism, 
defending Palestine and resisting Israel. The chapter shows how some of the Lebanese 
Sunni political actors capitalise on these slogans to appeal to the Sunni public and to 
justify their alliance with external players. Concepts such as alliance-building, 
competition, ‏cooperation and conflict in the context of framing theory are also 
featured in this chapter.  
Chapter five, the final chapter, provides an overview of the summaries of this 
research, conclusions and recommendations. It contextualises the findings of this 
research in relation to the research question, research methodology and the role of 
the Sunni community in the Lebanese politics. In addition, the chapter explores 
avenues for reducing intra-Sunni political tensions and promoting unity among Sunni 
groupings and organisations in Lebanon. These avenues include the call for 
maintaining the solidarity of Sunnis and managing intra-Sunni political dissensus, as 
well as the need for enactment of laws that strengthen state institutions, prevent 
foreign funding and abolish confessionalism in order to minimise intra-Sunni political 
tensions. 
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Chapter Two 
Research Method and Methodology: 
An Interpretivist Approach to the Analysis of Intra-Sunni 
Political Division in Lebanon 
2.0 Introduction  
In this chapter, the research methods and the procedures employed by the researcher 
for the collection and analysis of the data will be presented. Following will be a 
description of the research’s methodology, namely the framing theory, and how it will 
be operationalised in the context of this research. 
2.1 Research Method and Research Design 
Research design is a framework within quantitative, qualitative and mixed method 
approaches that offers a direction for the collection and analysis of data (Bryman 
2012; Becker, Bryman and Ferguson 2012; Creswell 2014). This research uses a single 
case study research design with a qualitative approach. The use of case study as a 
research design is justified when an empirical analysis is required to investigate “a 
contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context” 
(Yin 2014:16). The case that this research seeks to investigate is the political division of 
the Sunni community in Lebanon and how it is understood, narrated and framed. 
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A single case study like this one helps the researcher to deeply engage with the roots, 
understandings and frames of a particular phenomenon (e.g. the division of the Sunni 
community in Lebanon) and the context under which the phenomenon occurs (see 
Bryman 2012; Yin 2014). It enables the researcher to incorporate various perspectives 
and opinions (Nueman 2011) ranging from the responses of political and religious 
leaders to those of political and religious groupings and organisations. Also, a single 
case study allows the researcher to use multiple sources of evidence such as interview 
materials and analysis of documents, hence, enhancing the research reasoning and the 
development of a thorough understanding of the case (Creswell 2014). In addition, a 
single case study allows the researcher to investigate in-depth political affiliations and 
issues of identity within the Sunni community in Lebanon. It also enables him to look 
deeply into the Sunni politics from various perspectives and help him to construct his 
understanding of how intra-Sunni political divides in Lebanon are framed. 
2.2 Research Approach  
This research uses the Max Weber’s interpretivist approach (see Hollis and Smith 
1990; Baert 2005). Interpretivism is a dominant philosophical approach that requires 
researchers to understand “the subjective meaning of social actions” (Bryman 
2012:30). It seeks to understand how people, through their involvement in social 
processes, enact their realities and endow them with meaning, and to interpret how 
these meanings help them to constitute their action (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991:13; 
Bryman 2012; Chowdhury 2014:436).  
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Interpretivism asserts that reality is a social construct and therefore, it is difficult to be 
understood independently from social actors who construct and re-construct reality 
and make sense of it (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). Social reality cannot be portrayed 
or captured objectively because there are competing and different understandings and 
perceptions among social actors (Ormston et al. 2014:12). Meanings are often formed, 
negotiated and used; hence, peoples’ interpretation of social reality might change over 
time in line with shifting contexts and circumstances (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). 
An interpretivist researcher would therefore interpret the social world by accessing 
the subjective meaning that people assign to it (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991:5; 
Goldkuhl 2012:138). 
 
The intellectual heritage of interpretivism includes the “hermeneutic 
phenomenological  tradition”, “symbolic interactionism” and Max Weber’s notion of 
“Verstehen” (Bryman  2012:30). Of relevance to this research is the Max Weber’s 
notion of Verstehen. Verstehen is a  German expression for “interpretivist 
understanding” (Flick 2009:475). It refers to a philosophical approach to  understanding 
a particular phenomenon more comprehensively than limiting it to a 
single  explanation in the form of “cause-effect” relationship. Verstehen, to put it in the 
description of Havorka and  Lee (2010:3), is “the interpretive understanding of the 
subjective understanding” of  acting individuals. Interpretivist ‏researchers employ the 
notion of Verstehen in order to ‏understand the subjective meaning expressed or 
intended by people (Chowdhury 2014:435). ‏‏ 
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The goal of understanding the subjective meaning of people in social sciences is 
important in ‏the ‏interpretivist philosophical paradigm ‏‏  (Goldkuhl 2012:137). Indeed, 
this is the fundamental  claim of the Max Weber’s notion of Verstehen (Goldkuhl 
2012:137). For Max Weber, social  actors are “purposive individuals”, in the sense that 
they are able to assess and understand  information, and reflect on different 
possibilities (Baert 2005: 48-49).  People  may get involved in certain actions, which are 
not the resultant of their own making. However,  this does necessarily mean that they 
are passive receivers to external elements. Rather, they  often assess the situation and 
use information to select between various options (Baert 2005: 48-49). 
 
Weber, in this context, distinguished between two philosophical approaches which are 
referred to in the native German as “Erklären” (causal explanation) and  
“Verstehen” (interpretivist understanding) (Hollis and Smith 1990: Bransen 
2001:16165). Erklären is associated with the positivist approach to the study of social 
sciences, while Verstehen is associated with the interpretivist approach to the study of 
social sciences (Bryman 2012). Erklären focuses on the explanation of peoples’ 
behaviour and the laws that govern it, while Verstehen focuses of the understanding of 
peoples’ behaviour and the ways in which a phenomenon seems to be relevant and 
meaningful (Bransen 2001:16165; Bryman 2012:28). The adoption of Erklären for the 
study of social sciences implies that the description of an action is to be inferred from 
the description of the behaviour. On the contrary, the adoption of Verstehen implies 
that the description of an action is to be understood from the subjective 
understanding that acting individuals attach to it (Hollis and Smith 1990: 78). 
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Individuals select among different alternatives in accordance with their calculations, 
interpretations and understandings (Hollis and Smith 1990). Hence, the main concern 
of Weber’s appeal for Verstehen or interpretivist understanding is to understand 
actions and decisions from the stand point of acting individuals, by re-constructing 
their reasoning, and understanding how they analyse and perceive different situations 
(Hollis and Smith 1990; Bryman 2012). The Webarian notion of Verstehen or 
understanding has two key ingredients (see Hollis and Smith 1990; Baert 2005). First, 
Verstehen has a sense of direct or empathic understanding, which informs the 
researcher about what kind of actions are being performed (Hollis and Smith 1990), 
and how these actions are understood or interpreted by people. Second, Verstehen 
offers an “explanatory understanding” through which the inquirer attempts to attach 
actions to the correct “complex of meanings” (Hollis and Smith 1990:78).  
This thesis uses the Max Weber’s interpretivst lens of Verstehen. Ontologically, reality 
is socially constructed. Hence, this research is not offering a causal explanation of the 
Sunni political division in Lebanon but a way to understand socially constructed ideas 
about the Sunni political division in Lebanon. Epistemologically, the research attempts 
to understand the main issues of intra-Sunni political divides in Lebanon from the 
stand point of the Lebanese Sunni political actors. The aim of this research is to 
interpret the subjective understandings, perceptions and frames of Sunni political 
actors engaged in the Sunni politics on intra-Sunni political divides in Lebanon. In line 
with this Webarian approach, the experiences and views of Sunni political actors are 
relevant for the understanding of intra-Sunni political divides and their ways of making 
sense of their political actions (see Giddens 1993; Outhwaite 1975; Chowdhury 2014).  
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 2.3 Research Sampling and Selection Criteria 
Purposive sampling was used to select twenty three (23) participants including party 
leaders and political leaders as well as ministers, members of the Lebanese 
parliament, Islamic clerics, politicians, lawyers, academics and movement supporters. 
The main goal is to sample participants strategically so that the unit of analysis is 
relevant to the research question, goals, focus and criteria (Bryman 2012). Purposive 
sampling is a non-probability sampling technique that enables researchers to 
investigate a particular case of a specific population for a specific purpose (Neuman 
2011). Drawing on Bryman (2012:416), the development of research objectives and 
questions offer the researcher a guideline on the selection criteria of the participants. 
 
The 23 participants were selected strategically to reflect the variety of political 
alignments among the Lebanese Sunnis. One criterion used in this research was 
derived from where the participants stood on the issues of intra-Sunni political divides 
in Lebanon both internally and externally. The sampling strategy allowed the 
researcher to select his participants “purposively” to ensure that they reflect the 
diversity of opinions within the Sunni politics in Lebanon. The participants are 
representatives of key national, pan-Arab, religious and centrist Sunni groupings and 
organisations in Lebanon. These groupings are divided in terms of their identity and 
political alignments. The researcher also selected representatives of the two main 
opposing alliances in Lebanon: the pro-Syria, pro-Iran the Eighth March Alliance and 
the anti-Syria, anti-Iran the Fourteenth March Alliance. The diversity of participants 
and their ostensible groupings enabled the researcher to address contested framings 
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among the Lebanese Sunnis. In addition, the researcher selected non-Sunni 
participants to examine the framing of intra-Sunni political divides from a national 
perspective, as the intra-Sunni political divides in Lebanon do not only have an impact 
on the Lebanese Sunnis but on the national cohesion of Lebanon as a whole. In table 
2.1 below, the researcher provides a description of the participants’ affiliations and 
the coding used to  identify them. 
 
 
Table 2.1: The Respondents’ Affiliation List 
Source: Field Work, 2015 
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 2.4 Data Collection Method 
Using a qualitative approach, this research collected data from the field by the use  of 
semi- structured interviews and analysis of documents. In the  following, the 
researcher  will ‏provide a summary of the use of interview materials, the pitfalls of 
using interviews and how they are remedied in the  context of this research. 
2.4.1 The Use of Interview Materials  
Semi-structured interviews are thought to  be vital sources in gathering evidence and 
data about a particular phenomenon (Yin 2018).  They help the researcher to uncover 
perceptions, frames and discourses which might not be accessible  through other 
techniques such as observations, questionnaires and documents (De Vaus  2001; 
Blaxter, Hughes and Tight 2006). Highly informative respondents can  provide key 
insights into the issues that divide the Lebanese Sunnis. Such responses help 
the  researcher to identify contested frames among the Lebanese Sunnis and gather 
relevant information and evidence (Yin 2014).  
In this research, the use of interview materials enabled the respondents to voice their 
opinion on the Sunni politics in Lebanon and to clear any misconceptions surrounding 
their activism and political choices. Interviews provided the Lebanese Sunni groupings 
and leaders with a platform to correct these misconceptions, to convey their 
messages, to rationalise their political stance and to express their views on intra-Sunni 
political dynamics in Lebanon. Interviews showed how the research respondents are 
deeply divided in terms of their perceptions, affiliation and identities. Moreover, they 
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showed how intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon is understood, and how it is 
framed and counter-framed.  
The field work in Lebanon (from April to September 2015) helped the researcher to 
closely examine the lines of fissures within the Sunni body politics in Lebanon. 
Working on the ground enabled the researcher to learn more about the Sunni cultural, 
religious and political milieu. It helped him to interview the key political actors and 
decision makers in the Sunni community including Sunni movement leaders, rank-and-
file members and movement supporters. The opportunity to conduct these interviews 
in Lebanon was significant for the contextualisation of how Sunni groupings 
understand, interpret and frame intra-Sunni political divides, how they counter-frame 
their Sunni opponents, how their actions resonate with the Lebanese Sunnis, how they 
draw on their own experiences and concepts, and what issues were at stake for them 
when they construct their narratives on intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon.  
Interviews were a useful strategy for the articulation of differences among the 
Lebanese  Sunnis and how these differences are politicised. These frames would not 
have been easily accessible or obtainable had the researcher relied solely on one data 
collection method (e.g. documents), hence missing the opportunity of gaining a 
nuanced understanding of the research problem. Sunni groupings and leaders are key 
players in the Sunni politics, and hence, it is essential to understand intra-Sunni 
political division from the stand point of these Sunni groupings and leaders. Their 
views might not have revealed the actual problem facing the Sunni politics but they 
surely reflected its contemporary manifestations and how these groups would like 
intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon to be framed, narrated and understood. Their 
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framing of intra-Sunni political division is at large a reflection of their political 
affiliation, experiences, perceptions and direct engagement in the Sunni politics in 
Lebanon. 
The purpose of conducting semi-structured interviews, as opposed to fully 
structured  interviews, is to widen the opportunity of getting further information and 
asking further  questions in response to interviewees’ comments (Savin-Baden and 
Major 2013). Indeed, some interviewees did not hesitate to provide the researcher 
with important information on the research topic. Other respondents, however, 
seemed to obscure some information. This is arguably because they did not want to 
have a political dispute with other Sunni parties or they did not have the willingness to 
upset their internal and external allies. This might also be attributable to the 
awareness of the interviewees that they were being recorded hence they did not feel 
comfortable to reveal their honest perception on the interview topic. The 
characteristics of the researcher (e.g. religious and cultural background) were cause 
for concern for some research respondents. For instance, in one interview, the 
researcher was asked about his religious background, whether he is Muslim or 
Christian or whether he is a Muslim Sunni or a Muslim Shia. On other occasions, some 
research respondents asked the researcher about his motives behind conducting a 
research about the Lebanese Sunnis and whether or not his motives were purely 
academic. This kind of questions may indicate that some of the responses of the 
respondents might be shifted or manipulated depending of the identity and 
background of the researcher. In the following, the researcher provides a summary of 
the pitfalls of interviews. 
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2.4.2 Pitfalls of Using Interview Materials  
The responses of the research respondents might be manipulative or subjected to 
misinterpretation,  misunderstanding, self-censoring or bias (Neuman 
2011:347;  Edwards and Holland 2013:91; Yin 2018:121). Some respondents may 
provide manipulative views to suit their goals, frames, desires or  political agenda on 
the one hand (see Hoyle et al. 2002:102; Neuman 2011:347), and on  other hand, they 
may build their responses on the basis of what the interviewer expects or  would like to 
hear (Hofisi, Hofisi and Mogo 2014). Moreover, the traits of interviewers such as  race 
or religious background could have an impact on the responses of the respondents 
(Bryman 2012). In any case, the validity and reliability of such responses may 
be  questionable (Alshenqeeti 2014:43; Hofisi, Hofisi and Mogo 2014) and the ability to 
gain a complete  understanding of the situation in question may not be fully achieved. 
Another pitfall related to the use of interviews is that they could be anecdotal 
(see  Edwards and Holland 2013:91). The respondents may potentially express their 
views on  certain issues on the basis of their own personal experience rather than 
serious  examination. Respondents in this instance might have a faulty memory or at 
least  incomplete knowledge of the interview topic (Alshenqeeti 2014:43).  
It is important to mention that there is often a bias element in conducting interviews 
(see  Neuman 2011; Bryman 2012; Yin 2018).  The possibility of  ‏bias in the context of 
this research is  not a big issue because interviews are much  more than  ‏just a data 
collection method .  They  reveal the ways in which the framing construction of  the 
Lebanese Sunni  ‏groupings and  organisations occur. Interview materials are an 
essential  source of framing.  However, the over- reliance on interviews, as the only data 
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collection instrument, would not serve the  purpose of  gaining valid and reliable results 
(Alshenqeeti 2014:43). Interviews, on their own, are  not  sufficient to account for a 
complete interpretation and understanding of how intra-Sunni  political dynamics 
are  framed. It would therefore be useful to incorporate interview materials  with data 
from  other sources (Yin 2018:121). In the following, the discussion  dwells on the 
analysis of documents, which is also an essential component of this research.  
2.4.3 Analysis of Documents 
To remedy the deficiencies in using interview materials, this research did not only rely 
on interviews as a source of  data but also relied on other data sources. These sources 
include press materials,  newspaper materials, documents, published party 
programmes and secondary literature. In this research, the analysis of data was 
systematically  drawn from a comprehensive examination of interview materials and 
documentary sources.  The “triangulation” of data collection methods alongside the 
theoretical reasoning  enhance the research argument, leading to the contextualisation 
and theorisation on how  Lebanese Sunni groupings and leaders frame and understand 
intra-Sunni political divide in Lebanon.  
2.5 Instrumentation and Illustration of the Interview Guide 
Interview guide was used as an instrument to collect data from the field. It refers to 
the “list of questions” and areas which need to be covered during interviews (Bryman 
2012:471). The development of interview guide was helpful for both the interviewer 
and interviewees. It helped the interviewer to plan his interviews and to identify the 
focus of the questions in line with the research question and research methodology. 
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Moreover, it helped the interviewees to know interview questions in advance. This 
was important to establish rapport and to create a relaxed interaction between the 
interviewer and interviewees. It also helped to clear misunderstanding about any 
aspect of the interviews. 
The Interview guide consisted of open and close-ended questions, which aimed at 
understanding how the Lebanese political actors frame, perceive and narrate the 
political division of the Sunni community in Lebanon at the internal and external levels 
(see figure 2.2). At the internal level, the researcher asked the research respondents 
several questions, which pertain to their perceptions on identity politics, the Lebanese 
confessional political system, the stance on Hezbollah and the political and religious 
leadership of the Lebanese Sunnis. At the external level, the questions focused on how 
the research respondents frame the role of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria in the political 
division of the Sunni community in Lebanon. 
2.6 Establishing a Link to and Discussion of Semi-Structured 
Interview Questions   
This section provides a discussion on interview questions and how they are linked to 
framing theory. As the methodological underpinning of this research relies on framing 
theory, it is useful to employ semi-structured interviews to facilitate the 
operationalisation of framing categories and to help unfolding contested frames 
among the Lebanese Sunni political actors. For the purpose of this research, interviews 
were not only considered as an essential source of framing but also as an important 
tool, which shows how the Lebanese Sunni political actors construct their narratives, 
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articulate their differences and manifest their understanding of the Sunni politics and 
the Lebanese politics as a whole. The construction of this link is important to highlight 
the path that led to the successful completion of this research.  
 
The items of the interview guide (24 in number) consisted of 15 open-ended questions 
and 9 close-ended questions (see appendix one). The open-ended questions offered 
the research respondents a free hand to frame their political activities and to justify 
their political stance. Semi-structured Interviews enabled the researcher to extract 
frames, themes and phrases which are essential for analysing the data in line with the 
research question.  
 
For instance, items 1 and 2 in the interview guide highlighted the Lebanese Sunni 
frames on identity politics and their perceptions on the state of Lebanon. Item 1 read 
as follows: “which identity do Sunnis prefer in Lebanon?” Item 2 indicated as follows: 
“what is your perception regarding Lebanese Sunnis loyalty to the Lebanese state?” 
The application of framing categories such as “frame amplification” and “frame 
transformation” or “re-framing” show how the interviewees aimed at constructing/re-
constructing their narratives on identity politics in ways that fit with their political 
affiliation and public agenda. 
 
Another example which establishes the link between semi-structured interviews and 
framing theory is shown in item 6 of the interview guide where the research 
participants expressed their views on the political and religious leadership of the Sunni 
community in Lebanon. The question in item 6 was: “what is your opinion on the 
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political leadership of Sunnis as represented by the Future Movement and the 
religious leadership of Sunnis as represented by Dar al-Fatwa?” This question offered 
the research respondents the opportunity to engage in framing activities such as 
“frame credibility” and “frame consistency” in order to examine the extent to which 
the frames of Sunni leaders “resonate” with the Sunni public. The researcher compiled 
the responses of the research respondents in “framing” and “counter-framing” format 
to contextualise their views and to deepen the understanding of what is “in-frame” 
and what is “out-of-frame” for the interviewees when they construct their narratives 
on Sunni leadership. 
 
The questions on Hezbollah’s role in the Sunni politics, as shown in items 9 and 10 of 
the interview guide, highlighted an aspect of how semi-structured interviews are 
closely interconnected with the theoretical foundation of this research. The questions 
were: “what is your stance on Hezbollah?” and “why do some Sunni groupings support 
Hezbollah?” One the one hand, these questions brought other framing categories such 
as “injustice frames” to light whereby some of the interviewees attributed Sunni 
disempowerment to injustices unleashed on them. On the other hand, interview 
excerpts showed that there are Sunni actors who are strategically allied with 
Hezbollah. These excerpts enabled the researcher to discover the intricacies of Sunni 
relations with Hezbollah. 
 
Furthermore, interview questions examined how the Lebanese political actors frame 
the role of external players specifically Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia in the political 
division of the Sunni community in Lebanon. Questions from 13 to 17 focused on how 
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the role of Syria and Iran in the Sunni politics is perceived by the Lebanese political 
actors whilst questions from 18 to 24 focused on how the role of Saudi Arabia in the 
Sunni politics is perceived by the Lebanese political actors. The substantial 
contribution of interview questions to framing theory is that it showed the variation of 
Sunni accounts on external players. For instance, the use of “frame salience” in this 
research showed how Sunni perceptions on external players may not necessarily 
correspond to the objective reality pertaining to their role in the Sunni politics. Rather, 
it shows that on several occasions the “politics of representation” and Sunni 
affiliations with external players have an enormous impact on their framing 
construction. 
 
In a nutshell, this section has succeeded in establishing a link to and discussion of 
semi-structured interview questions used in this research. The creation of this vital link 
was useful in showing how the interview questions were relevant to the theoretical 
stand point of this research.  Every research, most especially a case study like this 
research, should be anchored on a theory.  Ball (1995: 265-266) stated that “the 
absence of theory leaves the researcher prey to unexamined, unreflective pre-
conceptions and dangerously naïve ontological and epistemological a priories”. 
Drawing on this, this research used selected framing theory and relevant empirical 
works to explore the epistemological and ontological constructions which relate to 
how the Lebanese Sunnis frame their political contestations (Interview questions are 
fully illustrated in appendix one).  
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2.7 Data Analysis and Interpretation  
In the analysis and interpretation of data, framing theory has been helpful in the 
understanding of the dynamics of movement organisations and leaders (Snow and 
Benford 2000). The study of Karagiannis (2009), for example, shows that the framing 
theory provides a useful analytical tool for the understanding of Hezbollah’s 
mobilisation strategies. Using the core framing characteristics (diagnostic, prognostic 
and motivational), Karagiannis (2009) attempted to understand how Hezbollah 
manages to transmit its messages to selected audience. Also, the study of McAdam 
(1996) shows how the processes of frame elaboration and articulation help to 
understand Martin Luther King’s arguments and speeches. The framing activities of 
Luther King included conventional democratic theory, Christian themes and 
philosophy of non-violence. The diversity of themes provided the public with multiple 
points of ideological attachment to King’s civil rights movement (see McAdam 
1996:347-8; Snow 2007). 
In this research, framing theory has been very essential for the analysis and 
interpretation of the data. The data from the field was organised into meaningful 
sections. Firstly, the transcription of the data was done systematically to facilitate data 
management (Bryman 2012(. The transcription was translated from Arabic to English 
by the researcher. Following was the coding of transcription (Bryman 2012(. The 
coding of the data was done based on the categorisation of themes, terms and 
phrases. Thirdly, thematic analysis characterised the analysis of this research. The 
researcher was able to categorise data, to put them in chronological or thematic 
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order, to link them with the research question and methodology, and to build on the 
codes recognised in the transcript (Bryman 2012; Yin 2014(. 
 2.8 Ethical Considerations 
The research involves human participants and hence some ethical considerations are 
likely to emerge. However, key ethical principles such as confidentiality, anonymity 
and privacy of individuals, organisations and information are of crucial importance to 
this research (Denscombe 2010; Neuman 2011). Specifically, there is a moral duty 
upon the researcher to protect participants’ interests and rights by ensuring that their 
contribution will not cause any physical, personal, legal or financial harm (Denscombe 
2010; Neuman 2011; Bryman 2012).  
The data collected was used solely for research/scientific purposes so as to generate 
positive values and to contribute to knowledge base by providing key insights on how 
the Lebanese political actors frame the political division of the Sunni community in 
Lebanon. To be sure, interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim for 
analysis. All responses were coded and anonymised so that participants cannot be 
identified. The destruction of this interview sheets and recorded messages took place 
after the analysis and interpretation of the data. 
This research has been reviewed by Keele University Ethics Review Panel and 
consequently, this research has been granted an ethical approval (see appendix two). 
In addition, the research has also been reviewed by the Center for Arabic and Middle 
Eastern Studies (CAMES) at the American University in Beirut, Lebanon. Accordingly, 
56 
 
the researcher was permitted to conduct interviews as part of his affiliation at the 
American University in Beirut, Lebanon (see appendix three). 
2.9 Framing Theory: Assumptions, Applicability and Method  
In this section, I put forth this thesis’ theoretical framework, namely framing theory 
(Snow et al. 1986; McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 1998; Snow  and Benford 2000). 
Framing theory has been used to examine how Sunni political groupings and leaders 
frame/articulate intra-Sunni political divides in Lebanon. Key among this process has 
been the framing processes, various factors  promoting or constraining framing 
processes, collective action frames and the concept of  political opportunity within 
framing theoretical orientations. All the explanations of these concepts are linked to 
show how they are operationalised in the analysis and interpretation of the data. In 
the following, the research  explains the key concepts of framing theory and how they 
are operationalised in this research to achieve the main  objective of offering a critical 
analysis and interpretation of the data regarding the Sunni politics with special 
emphasis on how intra-Sunni political divides in Lebanon are framed. 
2.9.1 The Concept of Framing Theory 
Goffman (1974) offers a classic understanding of the concept of framing. He indicates 
that frames are observed “as rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless 
aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful” (Goffman 1974:21). The key 
idea behind framing is to contextualise events and to provide a certain understanding 
of a particular phenomenon (Ryan  1991; Snow and Benford 1992; Ihlen and Nitz 
2008:1). In Goffman’s (1974:21) expression, framing allows people to “locate, 
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perceive, identify and label” issues and events within their own world (Goffman 
1974:21). Framing, to put it in the description of Gamson (2007:245), is a thought 
organiser. It organises and makes coherent a seemingly various array of images, 
arguments, symbols by linking them through an organising idea like narratives, 
symbols and artefacts (Gamson 2007:245). When people label a phenomenon, they 
produce a meaning to some aspects of what is observed, whilst omitting other 
aspects, because they seem to be counter-intuitive or irrelevant (Snow and Benford 
1988; Kaufman, Elliott and Shmueli 2003; Soule 2007). 
For the purposes of this research, the concept of framing is used to analyse the 
perceptions, ideas, narratives, events and understandings of key Sunni political actors 
in Lebanon. The nature of the focus of this research, which relies on understanding 
(Verstehen) of the perceptions of Sunni political actors on key political events in 
Lebanon and an understanding of what appears to be a historical circumstance is 
interpreted by these political actors. This framing concept is an essential activity of 
political organisations and movement leaders (Staggenborg 2016:23) as it seeks to 
appreciate the construction of meaning engaged by movement supporters and 
adherents whether they are leaders, rank-and-file members or activists or other actors 
such as media, adversaries and counter-movements (Snow 2013:470). This process is 
pertinent to the goals and interests of political groupings and organisations and the 
challenges they face in the pursuit of those goals and interests (Snow 2013:470). In 
this research, framing has been used to construct deep and nuanced understanding of 
Sunni political events in Lebanon. 
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Framing amount to what is called “structure of expectations” (Ross 1975 as cited in 
Tannen 1993:16). This implies that on the basis of individuals’ experiences and 
perceptions of the social world in a given community, they organise their 
understanding and use it to interpret events, information and experiences (Tannen 
1993:16). Frames are constructed upon a different underlying structure of values, 
beliefs, ideas and experiences, and hence, Sunni disputants in Lebanon, usually 
construct frames, which differ in various ways (Kaufman, Elliott and Shmueli 2003). 
Each Sunni political actor in Lebanon has their own understanding and perceptions of 
their agenda, political alignment/de-alignment, priorities, choices and the 
opportunities and risks associated with their choices (Kaufman, Elliott and Shmueli 
2003). This assemblage of understanding can be considered as filters or possibly, as a 
set of lenses, through which the various Lebanese Sunni groupings and leaders 
perceive and interpret political issues; this is called conceptual frame (Kaufman, Elliott 
and Shmueli 2003; Snow et al. 2007). In the following, the research discusses the 
functions of framing theory. 
 2.9.2 Functions of Framing Theory 
Having established the understanding of the concept of frame in the above, this 
section presents the functions of frames and how they are used in this research to 
analyse the perceptions, articulations and events in the Sunni political arena. The 
following are the core three functions of frames.  
 
First, frames, like a picture’s frame, “focus attention” by punctuating or bracketing 
what in our sensual field is relevant and what is irrelevant, what is “in frame” and what 
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is “out-of-frame” in relation to the issue in question (Snow 2007:384; Snow 2013:470). 
The relevance of the frames in this context is much reliant on the perceptions of Sunni 
political leaders, organisations, supporters and bystanders (Johnston and Noakes 
2005; Tarrow 2011). This key function allows an effective interpretation of what Sunni 
actors deemed relevant/irrelevant in the context of the intra-Sunni political division in 
Lebanon.   
 
Second, frames function as “articulation mechanisms” (Snow 2013:470) in that sense 
of linking together the wide range of punctuated themes and counter-themes of the 
issue in question “so that one set of meanings rather than another is conveyed, or, in 
the language of narrativity, one story rather than another is told” (Snow 2007:384; 
Snow 2013:470). The idea of articulation and how it is framed is essential for 
movement existence to justify its political stance, to convince its adherents and 
potential supporters and to counter-frame and de-mobilise its opponents. This kind of 
articulation mechanism allows for an effective movement coherence, mobilisation 
strategies, counter-framing and collective action.     
Third, frames frequently carry out “a transformative function” (Snow 2013:470) in the 
sense of re-constituting, re-conceptualising or re-interpreting the ways in which 
certain phenomenon is seen or understood (Snow 2007:384; Snow 2013:470). In this 
instance, some political groupings or leaders may transform misfortune, indignation or 
grievances existing in certain communities into mobilising grievances or injustices 
(Snow 2007:384; Snow 2013:470). The contextualisation of this function is seen in this 
research in instances were some Lebanese Sunni political actors attribute their 
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misfortunes into injustices unleashed on them by Hezbollah. In some cases, the 
attribution of issues to Hezbollah is perceptual.  
The direction of the argument in this section is that framing theory assists in 
understanding the collective discourse of the Lebanese Sunnis regarding events and 
how they construct meaning out of them. This is very critical in the construction of 
their identity and assisting their adherents to articulate and frame their activism in line 
with their identity. In the following, the research discusses the limitation of the 
framing theory.  
 2.9.3 Limitations of Framing Theory 
This section engages with the limitations of framing theory, while explaining how it 
seeks to mitigate them. Some researchers, for example Benford (1997) Fisher (1997) 
and Steinberg (1999) offer a disturbing critique of framing theory. It is significant to 
recognise these limitations of frame as a theory for analysis. This is what this section 
seeks to achieve. The study of framing theory enables researchers to understand a 
certain phenomenon but does not enable them to make “prescriptive suggestions” 
(Fisher 1997:21) regarding this phenomenon. Indeed, framing enables researchers to 
examine how people understand and perceive an issue, and to comprehend the ways 
in which their understanding may change over time (Fisher 1997:21). It is a tool to 
understand the actions, articulations and discourses of groups as well as the context 
under which their actions take place.  
Another shortcoming in the framing theory concerns issues of “reification” (Benford 
1997:418). Reification in this research refers to “the process of talking about socially 
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constructed ideas as though they are real, as though they exist independent of the 
collective interpretations and constructions of the actors involved” (Benford 
1997:418). Indeed, framing is criticised of creating an ambiguity between what reality 
is, and what its representations are (Steinberg 1999:738).  
Framing theory has the tendency to deal with frames in a “singular fashion as though 
there is a single reality” (Benford 1997:422). In the context of this research, Sunni 
political actors in Lebanon have different versions of what reality is and how it is 
constructed and negotiated. They differ in their perception and framing of intra-Sunni 
political division in Lebanon. Each Sunni political actor brings a repertoire of contested 
identities and socially constructed frames to movement encounters with the hope to 
fit it within their own “constructed versions of reality” (Benford 1997:422).  “Reality” is 
never simply there. It has to be mediated, interpreted and framed. As such and for the 
purpose of this research, what count is not what “reality” is regarding intra-Sunni 
political division in Lebanon, but how the key Lebanese Sunni political actors interpret 
it. 
Another limitation in the framing theory is the tendency to concentrate on framing of 
movement leaders and to neglect the framing of rank-and-file members, potential 
adherents and bystanders (Benford 1997:421).  This top-down bias approach partly 
reflects the ways in which some researchers study movements (Benford 1997:421). 
They often over-rely on interviews with movement leaders and analysis of media 
accounts and movement-generated documents to study social and political 
movements (Benford 1997:421). Yet, the data they obtain tend to only reflect the 
perceptions of movement leaders (Benford 1997:421).  
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Frame researchers also assert the need for movements and leaders to develop frames 
which are empirically credible; that is they can be tested and verified by current and 
potential supporters (see Snow and Benford 1988; Fisher 1997; Snow and Benford 
2000). However, they often overlook the question of how to test the validity and 
reliability of frames (Fisher 1997).  
 
Despite the limitation in framing, it has the potential to contextualise events and to 
conceptualise the construction and reception of meaning (see Carragee and Roefs 
2004). Frame theory depicts framing processes as a kind of “representational contest 
between actors” (Steinberg 1999:739). Frames are usually depicted and understood in 
cognitive terms (Benford 1997). However, we need to keep in mind that frames are 
“modes of interpretation that are socially constructed” (Benford 1997:418). Hence, 
this research uses the framing theory’s “interpretivist” lens to understand the views of 
movement members, events and issues regarding intra-Sunni political division in 
Lebanon. The research did not only rely on the views of leaders and newspaper 
analysis but also relied on the views of the rank-and-file members, current and 
potential adherents of Sunni groupings in Lebanon. This has been very essential in 
understanding how these issues are framed in the context of the Sunni politics in 
Lebanon. In keeping with these principles, the framing theory is very important for this 
case study research. As a qualitative case study research, a theory is very fundamental 
to aid in the issues of generalisability of their frames to this specific theory (see De 
Vaux 2001; Bryamn 2012; Yin 2018). In the following, the research examines the 
framing processes in the context of this research. 
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2.9.4 Framing Processes 
In this section, the research examines the framing processes within the context of this 
research. Framing processes result in the identification, development and operation of 
frames (Snow and Benford 2000). Drawing on Snow and Benford (2000), three framing 
processes have been identified. In the following, the research presents these 
processes and how they have been operationalised in this research to analyse how 
Sunni political groupings and leaders frame intra-Sunni political divides in Lebanon. 
2.9.4.1 Discursive Processes 
 
In this part, the first type of framing processes is examined in the light of its relevance 
to this research. This process is used in the analysis as critical part of the process of 
connecting movements’ frames to the present and potential supporters (Snow and 
Benford 2000; Johnston and Noakes 2005). Discursive processes include the oral 
discourse and textual documents (e.g. placards, pamphlets, books, and speeches) of 
movement members and leaders (Snow 2007:400) in the context of movement 
activities (Snow and Benford 2000). These discursive processes are in two part; frame 
articulation (Snow and Benford 2000; Snow 2007; Snow 2013) and frame amplification 
(Snow and Benford 2000) or frame elaboration (Snow 2007; Snow 2013). Of relevance 
to my analysis is the frame amplification (Snow and Benford 2000) or frame 
elaboration (Snow 2007). This kind of discursive processes refers to the processes 
whereby various ideas, beliefs or happenings are accented or highlighted as being 
more important than others (Snow and Benford 2000; Johnston and Noakes 2005; 
Snow 2007; Snow 2013). This framing process involves carrying out some sort of 
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meanings, symbols, images or catchphrases, which are essential to be used in order to 
effectively and successfully garner public support and guide collective actions 
(Johnston and Noakes 2005). This framing process facilitates the process of 
communication between the movement and its present or potential adherents. 
Amplifying a frame in this context could be seen in framers using certain symbols, 
slogans or metaphors that are linked with peoples’ glorious history or congruent with 
their beliefs, cultures, struggles, social conditions or conventions (see Ryan 1991; 
Johnston and Noakes 2005).  
In the context of my research it is used to analyse the various ideas, slogans and 
activities of Sunni groupings in articulation of their views to win public support and 
sympathy. For example, the national-based Sunni grouping the Future Movement used 
the slogan “Lebanon First” as a tool to win public support.  These discursive processes 
would help the researcher to unmask the agenda and appreciation behind these 
slogans, metaphors, symbols and ideas of these organisations.  
2.9.4.2 Strategic Processes 
 
Strategic processes are described by Snow and Benford (2000:624) as “framing 
processes that are deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed”. That is their goal is to 
convince potential adherents, to gain public support and to mobilise audience 
(Williams 2016). Strategic processes are key concepts used in the analysis of this 
research to understand the framing processes, which Sunni groupings and leaders 
employ to organise public support and audience regarding their interest and activities. 
These strategic processes can be achieved through the development of the concept of 
“frame alignment processes” (Snow et al. 1986), which seeks to understand how 
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claims are formulated by movement leaders and activists to mobilise adherents and 
gain public support (Williams 2007). In the following, the framing alignment processes 
are examined in the way they are operationalised in this research.  
Frame Alignment Processes  
 
The frame alignment processes (frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, 
re-framing or frame transformation) (Snow et al. 1986; Bneford 1993a; Snow and 
Benford 2000; Tarrow 2001; Smith 2007; Williams 2007; Coley 2015) in the context of 
this research are used to analyse the ideologies, claims, beliefs, activities and 
interconnected individual, organisational and external (i.e. Syria, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia) interests associated with Sunni movement organisations in Lebanon. Frame 
alignment processes encompass the effort of these political organisations and leaders 
to link their goals and interests with those of potential supporters and resource 
providers with the hope to gain their contribution and support (Snow 2013:472). 
These processes link organisations and individual interpretive orientations so that 
some set of individual values, beliefs, interests and movement activities, ideology and 
goals are complementary and congruent (Snow et al. 1986:464).  
2.9.4.3 Contested Processes 
 
Snow and Benford (2000:625) indicate that researchers in framing agreed that the 
identification and development of collective action frames are contested processes. 
Contextually, collective actions do not only appear from the interactions of members 
within a certain movement organisation, but also from the interactions and 
contestations between protagonists, antagonists and bystanders (Hunt and Benford 
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2007). These interactions are conceptualised as “counter-framing” (Hunt and Benford 
2007:447) which is essential in this type of framing processes (Snow and Benford 
2000). Counter-framing is the process to counter opponents’ frames (Gallo-Cruz 2012). 
A number of Sunni political forces engage in the process of counter-framing against 
other Sunni movements in order to challenge their existing frames, weaken their 
influence, damage their reputation and de-mobilise their adherents (Hoyle 2016). In 
the following, the research discusses the concept of collective action frames. 
2.9.5 Collective Action Frames 
In this section, the research examines the collective action frames and their 
applicability to the research context. It shall combine the above mentioned framing 
processes to deal with the collective interest and mobilisation strategies of Sunni 
movements in Lebanon with the hope of helping to understand the construction of 
values, ideology alignment and development of slogans and their articulation. In the 
following, the research provides the understanding of the concept of collective action 
frames as espoused by framing researchers. 
 
The resultant outcomes of framing processes are known to be “collective action 
frames” (Snow and Benford 2000:614). Collective action frames are “action-oriented 
sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of 
a social movement organization” (Snow and Benford 2000:614). The objective of 
collective action frames is to enable movements to identify their problems, attribute 
responsibility for these problems and construct “vocabularies of motive”, that provide 
rational for collective action (Snow and Benford 1988; Snow and Benford 2000; 
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Williams 2007; Snow 2013:472). This frame will be used to analyse aspects of Sunni 
movements in Lebanon that deal with how constituents are mobilised and inspired to 
achieve their objectives. 
 
Contextually, there are three important mobilisation functions of collective action 
frames. First, they mobilise followers or adherents to achieve their goals, or 
metaphorically, as Snow (2013:471) puts it, to move “from balcony to the barricades”. 
This function is often referred to as “action mobilization” (Klandermans 1984:586). 
Second, they broaden movements’ base by converting bystanders into followers or 
adherents (Snow 2013: 471). This function is often referred to as “consensus 
mobilization” (Klandermans 1984:586). Third, they demobilise or neutralise opponents 
(Snow 2013:471). This function is often referred to as “counter mobilization” (Snow 
2013:471). Consensus mobilisation, action mobilisation and counter mobilisation 
strategies will be significant in this analysis so as to appreciate the framing activities of 
Sunni groupings and leaders in Lebanon. 
 
The variable features of collective action frames (diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational) framing (Snow and Benford 1988; Gamson 1992; Snow and Bnford 2000; 
Allen 2000; Mcveigh et al. 2004) will be featured in the analysis to examine the 
distinguishing features of Sunni movements and their approach to mobilisation issues. 
Of great importance to this research is the concept of diagnostic framing, often 
referred to in this research as “injustice frames” (Gamson et al. 1982; Gamson 1992; 
Snow and Benford 2000). The operationalisation of injustice frames in this research  
will enable the research respondents to construct their narratives on “what is or went 
68 
 
wrong?” and “who or what is to blame?” regarding the perceived Sunni 
disempowerment in Lebanon (Snow 2013:472).  
2.9.6 Political Opportunity in the Context of Framing Theory 
The concept of political opportunity (McAdam et al. 1996; Gamson and Meyer 1996; 
Tarrow 1998; Stanbridge 2000; Tarrow 2011) is examined in this section in the light of 
framing theory. Political opportunities constitute one of the key factors that help to 
facilitate or constrain framing processes (Snow and Benford 2000). Hence, it might be 
difficult to treat framing processes such as discursive, strategic and contested 
processes without taking into account the inherently various political contexts or 
political opportunity structures that determine, shape or influence the way in which 
framing processes are embedded (Stanbridge 2000; Snow 2007). Stanbridge 
(2000:513) drawing on McAdam (1996) notes that linking both political opportunities 
and framing processes help to account for the impact of political environment on 
frame processes and framers. At the same time, it prevents what Stanbridge 
(2000:531) calls a “static, reifying, monolithic interpretations” of frames by means of 
exploring the dynamic interaction between framing processes and political 
opportunity structures.  
 
The dynamics of the Lebanese Sunni groupings and leaders’ mobilisation and 
development is a critical aspect of this analysis. This is because as my methodological 
approach is interpretative in nature, critical consideration of key dynamics will help in 
this direction. For instance, the Sunni grouping al-Ahbash’s alignment with Syria and 
their activities in the Sunni politics in Lebanon will be part of the instances where the 
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concept of political opportunity will be used to analyse the critical dynamics associated 
with framing their mobilisation strategies.    
 
McAdam (1996:32) identifies political opportunity structures as “changes in either the 
institutional features, informal political alignments, or repressive capacity of a given 
political system that significantly reduce the power disparity between a given 
challenging group and the state”. Moreover, political opportunities provide “the 
incentive for collective action by affecting expectations for success and failure” 
(Gamson and Meyer 1996 as cited in Tarrow 2011: 163). They could either facilitate or 
constrain collective actions (Stanbridge 2000). The linkage, relationship and interaction 
between framing processes and political opportunities offer an understanding of the 
way in which frames are constructed, developed and mobilised (McAdam et al. 1996). 
2.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the research’s methodology and methods were examined to 
demonstrate the actual steps the researcher has taken in order to answer the research 
question. In the following chapter, chapter three, the research examines how the 
Lebanese political actors frame and understand intra-Sunni political contestations in 
Lebanon at the domestic levels. 
 
 
 
70 
 
Chapter Three 
Intra-Sunni Contestations: 
Understanding and Framing of Intra-Sunni political Division in 
Lebanon at the Domestic Level 
3.0 Introduction 
The research focuses on how the Lebanese Sunni political actors understand and 
frame intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon. There are overlapping internal and 
external factors, which contribute to the political division of the Sunni community in 
Lebanon. It is therefore difficult to understand the framing of intra-Sunni political 
divides in Lebanon without taking into consideration the interconnection between 
external and internal dimensions. The role of external players especially Iran, Syria and 
Saudi Arabia is essential for understanding the ways in which Sunni political actors 
frame and narrate issues of political affiliation, contested identities and rival 
leadership among the Lebanese Sunnis. The classification of data into external and 
internal does not imply that they are isolated from each other. Rather, the 
classification is employed for analytical purposes so as to simplify data analysis and to 
help the researcher unfold the main frames emanating from each level. In this chapter, 
the research presents the frames and understandings of the research respondents 
regarding the main issues that divide the Lebanese Sunnis at the domestic levels and 
how they are perceived, interpreted and narrated by Sunni actors in Lebanon.    
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3.1 Identity Politics 
The discussion in this part focuses on issues of identity politics and the politicisation of 
Sunni multiple national, religious and pan-Arab identities. The contextual 
understanding of the concept of identity politics  (see Bernstein 1995; Alcoff and 
Mohanty 2006;  Hunt and Benford 2007) will be useful to appreciate the dynamics 
of  this kind of politics in the Sunni context and its impact on the political division of the 
Sunni community in Lebanon. The multiplicity of Sunni  (pan-Arab, religious and 
national) identities, on their own, do not constitute a threat to the Lebanese state but 
the politicisation of these Sunni identities could lay the foundation for external 
influences on Sunnis thus affecting their unity and loyalty to the Lebanese state.  
Identity politics is deep-rooted in the politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon 
(Rabil 2011; el-Husseini 2012; Rabil 2014; Salamey 2014). It has a strong attraction 
because it appeals to the desires of some Lebanese Sunnis for meaning, recognition 
and belonging (Orjuela 2014:754). It is also an essential component for the formation 
of Sunni groupings as it provides them with the toolkit for mobilisation and collective 
actions (Alcoff 2000:263; Bernstein and Taylor 2013:580). The need to understand 
identity politics is critical in multi-confessional societies like Lebanon where identity 
politics have taken violent expressions. Most especially in situations where people 
hold multiple identities and the options for politicisation are many including domestic 
dynamics and foreign interferences. These identities are often the contextual 
expressions of the masses in many societies which political activists rely on for 
framing, mobilisation and collective actions. 
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Yet, identity politics has not been viewed as a positive concept as critics deem it 
“reverse racism” (Lloyd 2005 as cited in Bliss 2013:1013), risky political activity (Giugni 
2007) and “harmful institution” (see Knouse 2009:761-2; Samek 2016). It inhibits the 
making of “politics of commonality” among diverse Sunni groupings and leaders in 
Lebanon (see Gitlin 1994; Kimmel 1993; Phelan 1993; Bernstein 2002:84). On several 
occasions, identity-based Sunni groupings in Lebanon were labelled as having an 
“agenda” and their leaders were often portrayed as “opportunists uninterested in, 
even opposed to, the common public good” (Alcoff and Mohanty 2006:2). What is 
worrying about identity-politics is the tendency of identity-based Sunni groupings in 
Lebanon to overemphasis on the politicisation of Sunni differences at the expense of 
their solidarity. Hence, the Sunni politics could fail to appreciate diversity and the unity 
of the Lebanese Sunnis could be sacrificed for narrower political gains (Bernstein 
2002:84). 
 
In this research, the data shows the research participants’ awareness of how Sunnis 
position themselves in terms of their identity in the Lebanese multi-confessional 
political system. The variation in Sunni perceptions regarding their preferred identities 
is often contingent on the existing political environment, which influences Sunni 
decisions to carry out national, pan-Arab or religious identities. By national identity, 
this research refers to Sunni groupings, which claim that their national Lebanese 
identity is more important that their Sunni or pan-Arab identities (see International 
Crisis Group 2010). By pan-Arab identity, this research refers to Sunni groupings, which 
call all the Arabs to establish one single nation united in one Arab state (see Salamey 
2014). It refers to the foundation of an Arab nation that advocates Arab unity and 
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espouses solidarity against perceptual enemies of Arabs (see Salamey 2014). By 
religious identity, this research refers to Sunni groupings, which embrace Islam as the 
cornerstone for their recruitment, activism, mobilisation and collective actions (see 
Abdel-Latif 2008).  
This research argues that Sunni multiple identities could be a reflection of almost 
irreconcilable ideological divides but they could also be a reflection of Sunni 
understanding of the Sunni politics as a “game”, in which their identity may be shifted 
or manipulated in line with the prevailing political environment. As one of the research 
participants (Non-Sunni3) puts it, the predominant political mood in Lebanon 
determines which identity prevails: sectarian or national. On several occasions, the 
politicisation of Sunni identities resulted from the perceived intimidation practised by 
dominant groupings in Lebanon (Taylor and Raeburn 1995:269). For instance, 
Hezbollah’s (Shia) armed supremacy on the Lebanese politics made sectarian Sunni 
identities significant, contributed to identity transformation (from national to 
sectarian), triggered collective action frames and paved the way for the politicisation 
and radicalisation of Sunnis (see Klandermans 2014).  
Given the multiplicity of Sunni identities in Lebanon, the main concern is to unmask 
which identity among pan-Arab, religious and national identities is able to correspond 
with Sunni personal identities and the way in which these identity correspondences 
are understood, narrated and contested (Hunt and Benford 2007; 445). A former 
minister (Non-Sunni1) and one of the research participants, argues that in times of 
political crises in Lebanon, sectarian identities prevail over national identities. Another 
respondent from the Fourteenth March Alliance (FOMA1) indicates that when the 
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Lebanese Sunnis feel that their Sunni identity is threatened and the state is unable to 
protect them they resort to sectarian identities. Collectively, all these respondents are 
of the view that identity politics especially Sunni identity is manifested when Sunnis 
perceive themselves as being abandoned by the Lebanese state and feel that they are 
threatened by dominant groupings/communities in Lebanon. Some of the views of the 
respondents are shown in the following quotes.  
Non-Sunni3 “The‎predominant‎political‎mood‎would‎determine‎which‎identity‎prevails:‎
sectarian‎or‎national.” 
Non-Sunni1 “We‎ hold‎ multiple‎ identities.‎ We‎ are‎ Lebanese,‎ Arabs,‎ Christians‎ and‎
Muslims. In times of political crises, sectarian identity prevails over national identity. In 
times‎of‎peace,‎national‎identity‎prevails.” 
FOMA1 “In‎ case‎ Lebanon‎ is‎ unable‎ to‎ protect‎ Sunnis‎ and‎ wants‎ to‎ abolish‎ their‎
autonomy, Sunnis will prefer their Sunni identity to their Lebanese‎identity.” 
The above excerpts show that narratives on identity and constructing an identity that 
corresponds to the Lebanese individuals may be debated and contested not only at 
the inter-confessional levels (e.g. Muslims and Christians or Sunnis and Shias) but also 
at the intra-confessional levels (e.g. Sunnis and Sunnis). Intra-Sunni contests may have 
implications for and influence on these national narratives. The Sunni community in 
this context engages in frequent frames and counter-frames about how they 
“perceive”, “imagine”, “construct” and “identify” the Lebanese nation and the place of 
pan-Arabism and Sunni identity in it (see Amin 2014).  
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Collectively, Sunni movements in Lebanon that aim at sustaining commitment over a 
certain period of time  need to make the construction of a “collective identity” one of 
their most central tasks (Gamson  1991:27). Frame alignment processes (frame 
bridging, frame amplification, frame extensions and frame transformation or re-
framing) (Snow et al. 1986) are essential tools for bringing together shared identity 
and  group focus to specific collectivity at specific historical times (Cerulo 1997:394). 
The resultant  outcomes are collective identities, which are then considered as a source 
of mobilisation and  movement participation (Cerulo 1997). 
3.1.1 National Identity Mantra among the Lebanese Sunnis 
The bulk of the Lebanese Sunnis, regardless of their affiliations, consider the Lebanese 
national identity as their preferred identity. This is the stance of Dar al-Fatwa, the 
highest religious Sunni office in Lebanon and the Future Movement, the largest Sunni 
grouping in Lebanon. One of the research respondents from Dar al-Fatwa (DF1) 
indicates that for the first time in the political history of Lebanon, Sunnis put their 
national affiliation over their religious or pan-Arab affiliation. In his opinion, the 
Lebanese Sunnis seek to protect their homeland and to solidify their presence in 
Lebanon.  
Similarly, another research participant from the Future Movement (FM2) states that 
Sunni’s identity is firstly Lebanese. The Future Movement, as part of its “frame 
amplification” strategies (Snow et al. 1986), constructed the slogan “Lebanon First” in 
its manifesto (see the Future Movement 2015) to appeal to non-Sunni communities in 
Lebanon and to demonstrate to the Lebanese public that its national Lebanese identity 
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is more important than its Sunni or pan-Arab identities. The slogan shows that the 
Future Movement appears to portray a national identity and express national 
solidarity with non-Sunni counterparts. This discursive process, as constructed by the 
Future Movement, involves the development of frames and narratives that identify 
with the Lebanese multi-religious society and includes a sense of national solidarity 
and mutuality.  
A former Christian MP (FOMA1), and one of the research participants, perceives the 
Future Movement decision to use the framing “Lebanon First” as a “great step” 
showing how the Lebanese Sunnis are loyal to Lebanon. Likewise, two Christian and 
Shia journalist respondents (Non-Sunni3 and Non-Sunni4) praise the Future 
Movement’s construction of the framing “Lebanon First”. They perceive it as a 
“historic” step made by the Lebanese Sunnis to confirm their national identities. They 
also consider it as a symbolic gesture made by the Lebanese Sunnis to reassure the 
Lebanese non-Sunni communities that Sunnis are loyal to Lebanon. The perceptions of 
the participants are shown below. 
DF1 “For‎the‎first‎time‎in‎the‎history‎of‎Lebanon,‎the‎Lebanese‎Sunnis‎are‎Lebanese‎first‎
and Sunnis second. Sunnis want to protect their homeland and solidify their presence in 
Lebanon.‎This‎is‎happening‎for‎the‎first‎time‎in‎the‎history‎of‎Lebanon.” 
FM2 “Sunni’s‎identity‎is‎firstly‎Lebanese.” 
FOMA1 “When‎the‎Hariri‎family‎propounded‎the‎slogan‎“Lebanon‎first”,‎in‎my‎opinion,‎
it‎was‎a‎great‎step‎showing‎that‎the‎Lebanese‎Sunnis‎are‎loyal‎to‎Lebanon.”‎ 
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Non-Sunni4 “Sunnis‎ since‎ 2005‎ have‎ proven‎ that‎ that‎ their‎ national‎ identity‎ comes‎
before‎everything‎else.‎In‎my‎opinion,‎this‎is‎historic.”‎‎ 
Non-Sunni3 “The‎Future‎Movement‎adopted‎ the‎ slogan‎“Lebanon‎ first”.‎ The‎posture‎
was a clear message to the Christians that Sunnis are loyal to Lebanon. It was a 
message‎to‎confirm‎their‎Lebanese‎identity.” 
Historically, the Lebanese Sunnis were identified with pan-Arabism and used to seek 
external support from Sunni and Arab states (International Crisis Group 2010). They 
sided with the Palestinian armed presence against rightist Christians in the Lebanese 
civil war (Gilmour 1987; Hanf 1993; Salem 2011). The collapse of pan-Arabism in the 
late 1960s eroded its ideal but the desire of the Lebanese Sunnis to belong to a wider 
Sunni and Arab affiliation lingered (International Crisis Group 2010). However, the 
killing of the Sunni Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 changed the perceptions of the 
Lebanese Sunnis. Sunni demands of the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon echoed that 
of the Lebanese Christians, which opposed Syria’s dominance of Lebanon and blamed 
them for the assassination of Hariri (Cammett and Issar 2010). The mutual opposition 
to Syria laid the foundation for an alliance-building between the Sunni community and 
anti-Syria Christian groupings in Lebanon. This re-orientation of the Sunni identity was 
epitomised in the Future’s Movement propagation of the slogan “Lebanon First” to 
emphasis their national credentials and to appeal to the Christian community in 
Lebanon. 
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3.1.2 Examining the Perceptual Stance of the Sunni Community on Issues 
of National Identity 
The discussion (in 3.1.1) shows that the Lebanese Sunnis naturally prefer national 
identity. However, the “Lebanon First” slogan as propagated by the Future Movement 
appears ambiguous in that it does not reflect the opinion of all Sunni groupings and 
organisations in Lebanon. The ambiguity of the slogan is manifest in instances where 
Sunni preference of national identity might be shifted in line with the prevailing 
political circumstance. For example, one of the respondents from the League of 
Muslim Scholars (LMS1) contends that the Lebanese Sunnis do not see the Lebanese 
national identity as contradicting their Sunni identity but if they feel that national or 
regional issues are threatening their Sunni identities, they will prefer confessional 
Sunni identities over national identities. Likewise, another respondent from the Haraki 
Salafists (Haraki Salafist1) indicates that Sunnis believe that Lebanon is their final 
homeland, but there are other Sunnis who would sacrifice everything to protect their 
Sunni identity. Some of the views of the participants are shown in the following 
excerpts.   
LMS1 “Salafists‎ do‎ not‎ see‎ that‎ the‎ Lebanese‎ identity‎ as‎ contradicting‎ their‎ Sunni‎
identity but if they feel that national issues are threatening their Sunni identities, they 
will‎prefer‎Sunni‎identity‎over‎national‎identity.”  
Haraki Salafists1 “Sunnis believe that Lebanon is their final homeland. But there are 
Sunnis who believe that if we ignore the principles of Islam, we will lose our identity. 
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Their main concern is to protect the Sunni identity and that they would sacrifice 
everything‎to‎protect‎their‎identity.” 
The above excerpts show that “protection” from internal and external threats is the 
main element pushing some of the Lebanese Sunnis towards collective Sunni 
identities. Conceptually, the notion of collective identity resides in an interactive and 
shared “sense of "we-ness" and "collective agency” among individuals (Snow 2001:1). 
It is derived from individuals’ solidarity and common interests (Taylor 1989 as cited in 
Gecas 2000). Therefore, collective identity requires individuals’ perceptions of 
themselves as being part of a community and political consciousness that identify their 
aims, means and fields of collective actions (Gecas 2000).   
In light of the perceptual failure of the Lebanese state to counter-Hezbollah and to 
maintain its control over Lebanon (Daher 2015; Zelin 2016), the tendency toward 
national dis-integration will increase among the Lebanese Sunnis. In addition, the 
deepening of Arab divides along the Shia-Sunni lines as signified by the rising 
confessional conflicts in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere will amplify collective Sunni 
identities and enhance the sectarian narratives among the Lebanese Sunnis (see Felsch 
2016). The construction of a collective Sunni identity gradually grows among the 
Lebanese Sunnis as they witness Hezbollah’s perceptual role in the sad conditions of 
their co-religionist in Syria, and Iraq and compare it to their domestic situation in 
Lebanon as Iran and their Shia ally Hezbollah dominate the Lebanese politics (see 
Khashan 2015:4). 
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3.1.3 The Ideological Stance of Religious-Based Sunni Groupings in 
Lebanon 
Another issue, which constitutes a challenge to the “Lebanon First” national slogan, is 
the ideological stance of religious-based Sunni groupings in Lebanon. For instance, al-
Jama’a al-Islamiyya, the largest and most well-organised religious-based Sunni 
grouping in Lebanon, has been influenced by the school of thought of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, whose objective has been to resurrect Islam and to implement it in all 
shades of life (Teitelbaum 2011). One of the research respondents from al-Jama’a al-
Islamiyya (JI1) indicates that their ideology is “Islamic-based” but at the same time 
indicates that the movement is “part of the Lebanese society”. The statement, as it 
stands, does not contradict al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s affiliation with Lebanon. Yet, the 
“duality” of their ideological stance, of being affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and of being affiliated with the Lebanese state, could affect their loyalty to Lebanon 
when their identity is politicised. 
JI1 “Our‎project‎is‎Islamic-based. We are part of Lebanese society. We seek to progress 
the‎entire‎Lebanese‎society‎and‎not‎just‎the‎Sunni‎community”. 
The duality of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s ideological stance was manifest in the aftermath 
of Rafik Hariri’s assassination in 2005. There were two factions within al-Jama’a al-
Islamiyya: One is closer to the pro-Syria, pro-Iran Eighth March Alliance (EMA) and the 
other is closer to the anti-Syria, anti-Iran the Fourteenth March Alliance (FOMA) (see 
Abdel-Latif 2008). The differing ideological stance led to a fracture within the 
leadership of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya. For instance, Fathi Yaken, the primary co-founder 
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of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, was critical of the FOMA’s policies. According to Rabil 
(2014:174), “Yakan has made supporting the Islamic Resistance [of Hezbollah] a 
priority of the association’s political programs”. This ideological stance infuriated some 
members, who expressed sympathy with the FOMA and antipathy with the EMA. Thus, 
intra-organisational ideological contests between al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s leaders led 
to the withdrawal of Yakan from the grouping. Soon later, Yakan established a pro-
Hezbollah movement known as the Islamic Action Front (Jabhat al-‘Amal‎al-Islami). 
3.1.4 The Duality of Affiliation among Sunni Groups  
The duality of affiliation is another issue concerning Sunni national identities. One 
former minister (Non-Sunni1) indicates that Sunni relations with external players (Iran, 
Syria and Saudi Arabia) could serve Lebanon’s national interests on the one hand, and 
on the other hand, could serve the interests of their patrons. The Sunni movements 
are likely to be influenced by their supporters to engage in regional conflicts and 
ideological rivalry (e.g. between Saudi Arabia and Iran) on the Lebanese ground, in 
which they may explicitly or implicitly serve the agenda of their regional supporters at 
the expense of Lebanon’s national identity. The views are demonstrated in the 
following excerpt. 
Non-Sunni1 “There is a difference between those who use relations with external 
players to serve their patrons and those who benefit from these relations to serve the 
interests‎of‎Lebanon.” 
In the process of developing the interest in their survival and progress, Sunnis who are 
aligned with the EMA and Sunnis who are aligned with the FOMA compete against 
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each other for support from external sponsors (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran). In 
this instance, these competing alliances may pursue polarising and inflexible strategies 
that target their constituencies and abandon the prospect to offer understanding 
among Sunnis (see Rucht 2007). These issues demonstrate how Sunni links with 
external players could divide them and affect their solidarity (see Meyer and 
Staggenborg 1996:1656; Miceli 2005:589) 
3.1.5 The Desire to Establish an Islamic Order in Lebanon 
In addition, the challenges facing Sunni preferences of national identity are manifest in 
issues related to the establishment of an Islamic rule in Lebanon. Whilst some 
religious-based Sunni groupings in Lebanon (e.g. Haraki Salafists, the Tawheed 
Movement and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya) expressed a pragmatic receptive attitude 
toward Lebanon, other parties (e.g. Hizb ut-Tahrir) expressed a hostile attitude toward 
the Lebanese state. One respondent from the Haraki Salafists (Haraki Salafists1) 
indicates that it is difficult to establish an Islamic order in Lebanon as longs as Lebanon 
has various religious communities. He clarifies that it is a duty on Muslims to create an 
Islamic order if they can but if they cannot, then, they are not supposed to isolate 
themselves. Sunnis accepted to join Lebanon and to be part of the Lebanese political 
system and in his view, this is not contradicting Islam. Likewise, one respondent from 
al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (JI1) indicates that the principles and rules of Islam have to be 
applied everywhere. Yet, this does not necessarily imply that the political order in 
Lebanon has to be Islamic. In his view, if the principles of Islam are implemented then 
the ruling is Islamic even if it does not carry out the name of Islam. The views of the 
participants are shown in the following excerpts. 
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Haraki Salafists1 “In Lebanon, we cannot establish an Islamic order as long as we have 
various religious communities. Sunnis accepted to join Lebanon and to be part of its 
political system. They share with their fellow Lebanese citizens their concerns, dreams, 
pains and hopes.  This is not contrary to Islam at all. It is a duty to create an Islamic 
order if you can. But if you cannot, then you are not supposed to isolate yourself and 
live‎in‎the‎mountains‎or‎in‎the‎caves.” 
JI1 “The‎ group's‎ definition‎ of‎ Islamic‎ rule‎ is‎ that‎ the‎ rules‎ of‎ Islamic‎ law‎ should‎ be‎
applied. If it is applied under any titles, the ruling is Islamic even if it does not have this 
name and attributes of Islam. We consider that the bulk of the laws governing the 
Lebanese community are not‎contrary‎to‎the‎rules‎of‎Islam.” 
The above excerpts show that some religious-based Sunni groupings in Lebanon 
engage in the process of “frame transformation” or “re-framing” (Snow et al. 1986) to 
win Sunni public support in Lebanon. Frame transformation or re-framing refers to the 
process through which framers change their existing frames and abandon old values or 
meanings, (which may contradict people’s conventions or tradition) in order to get 
their public support (Snow et al. 1986; Williams 2016).  
Prior to the Lebanese civil war, various religious-based Sunni groupings in Lebanon 
most especially  the Tawheed Movement and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya had the desire for 
the establishment of an Islamic order in Lebanon (see Gambil 2007; Imad 2009; Rabil 
2014). For example, during the period from 1983 to 1985, the Tawheed Movement 
established “a crypto-Islamic republic” in Tripoli, north Lebanon, and imposed a strict 
“Islamic rule” on Tripolitan citizens (see Hanf 1993:306; Lefevre 2014:11).  
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Yet, in the post-civil war period, the new political dynamics in Lebanon as exemplified 
by Syria’s control of Lebanon together with the Taif Accord compelled religious-based 
Sunni groupings in Lebanon to engage in the process of re-framing.  
 In this research, the narratives of one research respondent from ‏al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya 
(JI1) show  that the group “consider*s+ that the bulk of the laws governing the 
Lebanese community are  not contrary to the rules of Islam”. This phrase as framed by 
al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya,  demonstrates the grouping’s willingness to de/re-construct its 
prior perspectives and  narratives on the state of Lebanon and among Lebanese 
individuals and collectivities so  that things are understood differently than before. 
The frames of the Tawheed Movement and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya metamorphosed 
from the call for the establishment of Islamic orders and the rejection of non-Islamic 
ones to the call for full engagement and participation in the Lebanese multi-
confessional political system. These groupings realised that participation from within 
the Lebanese confessional political system does not mean approving any legislative 
position contradicting Islam. Rather, it could be seen as a gateway to Islamic preaching 
through dialogue and conversation (Yakan 1996 as cited in Rabil 2014:157). It could 
also enable these groupings to take part in shaping political actions and decisions; 
raising awareness about Muslim issues; and using the parliament as a venue for 
disseminating their ideology (Elsässer 2007). 
The motives of these groupings behind engaging in frame transformation might be 
pragmatic to  reassure their non-Sunni counterparts that their identity is Lebanese and 
that they are part of  the Lebanese society. It could also be attributable to the fact that 
these groupings  aimed at protecting themselves from Syria’s tightened grip on 
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Lebanon by effacing their desire  for the establishment of an Islamic order. Moreover, 
it could be a reflection of the gradual  development of the Lebanese religious-based 
Sunni groupings, which realised the difficulty of  establishing an Islamic order in 
Lebanon due to its impracticality in the Lebanese multi-religious  society (see Hamzeh 
2000; Elsässer 2007; Gambil 2007).  
3.1.6 The Desire to Implement the Islamic Principles in Lebanon 
Hizb ut-Tahrir, on the contrary, explicitly clarifies its aim at establishing an Islamic 
order in the forms of the caliphate. The ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir consists of two main 
principles. The first principle is the prominence of the Islamic law, which is based on 
the conviction that the Islamic laws shall regulate and indeed govern all aspects of 
individuals’ life (Karagiannis 2006; Karagiannis and Mccauley 2006). The second 
principle is the importance of the re-establishment of an authentic state of the 
caliphate (i.e. the Islamic state), which implies that the existence of the ideal Muslim 
society is contingent on the establishment of an Islamic entity, which conjoins of 
politics and religion, i.e. does not separate between the religion (deen) and the state 
(dawla) (Karagiannis 2006:275; Karagiannis and Mccauley 2006).  
 
Hizb ut-Tahrir opposes democracy because in its opinion, democratic systems are 
disbelief (kufr) systems, which are not based on the Islamic divine rules (see 
Karagiannis 2006: 267; Osman 2012). Hizb ut-Tahrir’s argument against democracy is 
built on the basis of its laws, which are considered as “man-made” as opposed to the 
Islamic divine rules, which are ordained by God for all human beings (Osman 2012:94). 
The state of the caliphate that Hizb ut-Tahrir hopes to re-establish would not be 
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democratic because democracy, the movement argues, is un-Islamic (Osman 2012), 
Western and contradicts the Quran (Chaudet 2006:116). In this research, one 
respondent from Hezb ut-Tahrir (HT1) states that “Lebanon is invalid to be a state 
whether Islamic or non-Islamic”. In his opinion, Lebanon is a “failed state”, and his 
party is not working to establish an Islamic state or a caliphate in Lebanon but is 
working to make Lebanon part of the caliphate state that they hope to establish. The 
view of the respondent is shown in the following quote. 
 
HT1 “Lebanon‎as‎an‎entity‎is‎not‎only‎invalid‎for‎the caliphate project; it is invalid to be 
state whether Islamic or non-Islamic. Lebanon is a failed state. We are not working to 
establish an Islamic state in Lebanon or a caliphate in Lebanon. We are working to 
make Lebanon attached to the state of the caliphate which we‎hope‎to‎be‎established.” 
As part of its frame alignment processes, Hizb ut-Tahrir engages in the process of 
“frame amplification” (Snow et al. 1986) to gain Sunni public support. Frame 
amplification refers to the invigoration and clarification of a frame that bears on 
specific  problems, issues and set of events (Snow et al. 1986:469). The ability of frame 
articulators to  amplify and clarify the claims and values of their framing activities could 
facilitate the dynamics  of movement participation (Snow  et al. 1986; Coley 2015; 
Williams 2016). 
 
 
87 
 
 Hizb ut-Tahrir frequently amplifies the frames of the “re- establishment of the Islamic 
state of the caliphate” as a means to garner the support of the Lebanese Sunnis. The 
embellishment of the frame of the “caliphate” as constructed by Hizb ut-Tahrir 
appeals to  some Lebanese Sunnis who believe that Lebanon’s shortcomings could be 
remedied through the  restoration and revival of Islam as a comprehensive way of life 
(see Yilmaz 2010:501). For Hizb ut-Tahrir, the re-establishment of the Islamic state of 
the caliphate is seen as an essential step for  the revival of Islam. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir does not recognise the boundaries within the Islamic and Arab world 
because it strongly believes that these boundaries are colonial constructs which are 
designed to weaken and divide the Muslim’s community of believers (umma) ( Hizb ut-
Tahrir  1997:25 as cited in Osman 2012:95). Hizb ut-Tahrir believes that Lebanon was 
carved up from the Muslim umma in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman 
Caliphate by the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 in order to weaken the 
Lebanese Muslims and empower the Lebanese Christians (Imad 2006; Rougier 2007; 
Imad 2009). It considers nationalism and the nation state to be a source of division 
because they are antithetical to Islam’s concept of a unified umma and Hizb ut-Tahrir’s 
concept of the caliphate (Hanif 2012; 206).  
As for Lebanon, Hizb ut-Tahrir does not take part in the Lebanese political system 
because it is not ruled on the basis of Islam (Shayya et al. 2015). As for the Lebanese 
parliament (legislative), Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects to take part in parliamentary elections 
except under strict conditions (International Crisis Group 2003:6): Hizb ut-Tahrir’s 
candidates consider the current political system in Lebanon as a disbelief system and 
that it is rejected in essence; they neither propose a civil law nor vote for it; they do 
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not take part in the election or vote for the Lebanese president as long as the 
president is a disbeliever (kafir); they do not grant confidence to any Lebanese 
government; and finally, they do not form an alliance with non-Muslims because this 
may result in Muslim voters to vote for non-Muslims (Imad 2009). 
3.1.7 The Pan-Arab Oriented Individuals   
The ambiguity of the Lebanese Sunni affiliation to national identity is also seen in the 
ideological stance  of pan-Arab-based Sunni groupings and leaders in Lebanon. The 
researcher interviewed two members  from the pan-Arab Union Party. The focus of 
these members was on cultivating past or  tradition- oriented narratives (e.g. pan-
Arabism and Arab unity) to appeal to the public masses. These pan-Arab members,  as 
part of their frame amplification activities (Snow et al. 1986), promote the notion of 
“pan-Arabism” as a framing construct and frame their pan-Arab identity as being 
“more  important than their Sunni identity”. They are of the view that that pan-
Arabism is framed as a “unifying  ideology” because it unifies the Lebanese Muslims 
with Christians on the basis of shared culture and  language. The views of the 
participants are shown in the following quotes.  
UP1 “Pan-Arabism partisans would consider themselves as pan-Arab first and Muslims 
second. There is no contradiction between pan-Arabism and Islam. Both unify people. 
Pan-Arabism would unify Muslims with Christians. My pan-Arab identity is more 
important‎than‎my‎Sunni’s‎identity.” 
UP2 “Pan-Arabism is a unifying ideology. It is the solution for Lebanon’s‎ problems‎
because‎it‎unifies‎the‎Lebanese‎people‎regardless‎of‎their‎religious‎affiliation.” 
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Collectively, the understanding of pan-Arab Sunnis is that the long-standing political 
disorder and communal tensions that currently take place in Lebanon is linked to the 
way in which the confessional political system in Lebanon has been constructed and 
shaped, leaving Lebanon inherently riddled with fragility. For these pan-Arabs, the 
solution of the Lebanese problems is for the state to adopt pan-Arabism. The frame 
amplification of pan-Arabism as a collective identity could minimise sectarian tensions 
and factionalism among the Lebanese religious communities. Yet, Pan-Arab Sunnis are 
often criticised of being led by transnational agenda rather than national agenda, of 
being pan-Arab on the exterior and pragmatic on the interior and of using pan-
Arabism as a tool to appeal to Sunnis and to solidify their political status. They often 
manipulate pan-Arabism to capitalise on concerns over some overriding Arab and 
Muslim issues (Hinnebusch 2005; Humphreys 2005).  
3.1.8 Sectarian Perspective Identities 
Sunni perceptions on the confessional political system in Lebanon are another issue 
affecting their national identity. One will notice that Sunni opinions on the 
confessional political system in Lebanon are illiberal. They are to a greater or a lesser 
extent a reflection of their religious background. Some participants interpret the 
political system in Lebanon through a “confessional lens” in the forms of what it has 
given to the Lebanese Sunnis vis-à-vis other religious communities. One of the 
respondents from the Haraki Salafists (Haraki Salafists1) indicates that Sunni political 
status in the post-Taif Accord era is better than their status in the pre-Taif Accord era. 
In his view, the fact that the head of the executive is a Sunni is perceived as an 
advantage for the Sunni community in Lebanon. Likewise, one respondent from the 
90 
 
League of Muslim Scholars (LMS1) frames the Taif Accord as a “good” agreement for 
the Lebanese Sunnis although on the ground, the accord was not in favour of Sunnis 
due to Syria’s influence on Lebanon. The responses of the respondents are shown 
below. 
Haraki Salafists1 “We‎ know‎ the‎ importance‎ of‎ executive‎ posts‎ at‎ any‎ given‎ state.‎
When the head of executive is a Sunni, this would serve Sunnis interest. Sunnis status in 
the pre-Taif era was less than their status in the post-Taif‎era.” 
LMS1 “The‎Taif‎Accord‎was‎good‎for‎the‎Lebanese‎Sunnis,‎ though‎on‎the‎ground‎the‎
balance of forces was not in favour‎of‎Sunnis‎following‎Syria’s‎presence‎in‎Lebanon.” 
The spirit and the latter of the Taif Accord were intended to abolish confessionalism, 
which in fact is the current issue regarding the politics of the Sunni community and the 
Lebanese nation as a whole. Yet, in the Sunni context, “politics of representation” are 
essential in shaping Sunni perceptions on the confessional political system in Lebanon. 
National-based Sunni groups hope to end confessionalism in order to establish a 
secular Lebanese state (The Future Movement 2015). Pan-Arab Sunni groups aim at 
ending confessioanlism for the pursuit of Arab unity, whilst Religious-based Sunni 
groupings aim at ending confessioanlism with the hope of establishing an Islamic rule 
in Lebanon (Rabil 2011; Rabil 2014; the Popular Nasserite Organisation 2015). Yet, 
there are Sunnis, who prefer the confessional political system to remain intact because 
it guarantees a fairer share of power for all the Lebanese communities and does not 
allow the stronger party/community to impose its control over others in Lebanon 
(Shayya et al. 2009). 
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3.2 Leadership of the Sunni Community in Lebanon 
The political and religious leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon is an 
essential complicated phenomenon, which affects not only the origins but also the 
outcomes of Sunni groupings and organisations (see Morris 2004:241). Political 
analysis, which neglects the dynamics of the Lebanese Sunni political and religious 
leadership, fails to shed the light on one of the key sources of intra-Sunni political 
division in Lebanon at the domestic levels. In the following, the political and religious 
leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon and how they are understood, framed 
and counter-framed by the research respondents are presented in the following sub-
headings.  
3.2.1 The Leadership of Rafik Hariri and Issues of Intra-Sunni Political 
Divides 
The emergence of one the most prominent Sunni political leaders in Lebanon, the 
former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and his perceived over-monopolisation of the 
politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon constitute one of the issues that politically 
divide the Lebanese Sunnis. Sunnis in this instance are divided into two opposing 
camps: anti- and pro-Rarfik Hariri camps. The pro-Hariri camp is framed as being 
influenced by Saudi Arabia and Western states especially the United States and France 
due to Rafik Hariri’s close relations with them (see Najem 2012; Salamey 2014). The 
anti-Hariri camp is framed as being influenced by Iran, Hezbollah and Syria. This 
classification is important to contextualise the responses of the research respondents 
regarding the leadership of the Hariri family. 
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In this research, some respondents claim that Rafik Hariri “monopolised” the politics 
of the Sunni community in Lebanon and did not allow any Sunni political grouping or 
leader other than him to lead the Sunni community in Lebanon. The framing of Hariri 
as “monopolising” the Sunni politics, would suggest, as my participants indicate, that 
Hariri either “ignored” or “eliminated” the role of traditional Sunni political leaders in 
Lebanon often known in Arabic as “zaim” (leader) or “zuama”‎(leaders). 
3.2.1.1 The Replacement of Traditional Sunni Zuama in the Sunni Community 
in Lebanon 
In multi-confessional communities like Lebanon, clientelism is frequently considered 
as a common  characteristic of the political process (Collelo 1987). This system existed 
in Lebanon in the pre-independence  era, wherein feudal lords used to permit peasants 
and their family members to use their lands in  exchange for their loyalty (Collelo 1987; 
Gilmour 1987). In the post-independence  era in Lebanon, these pre-existing social 
systems metamorphosed into political systems (Collelo  1987). The feudal leaders 
became political leaders, and the peasants became their constituents (Collelo 1987).  
 
The Sunni community in Lebanon was largely dominated by communal political leaders 
or zuama, who belong to powerful lineage (e.g.  the Salam family in Beirut, the Saad 
family in Sidon, and the Karami family in Tripoli)  (Johnson 1986). The era preceding 
the civil war in Lebanon witnessed  power struggles between two notable traditional 
Lebanese Sunni families (the Salam family and the Karami family) over the political 
leadership of the Sunni community. Sunni  traditional zuama used to have a network of 
clientele often inherited from their descendants to increase the number of 
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their  followers (Collelo 1987; Skovgaard-Petersen 1998). Their leadership was based 
on their ability to manipulate the urban masses through ideological appeal (e.g. pan-
Arabism and the Palestinian cause) and financial support (Najem 2012).  
 
The influence of Sunni traditional zuama on intra-Sunni power dynamics was affected 
by the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in the sense that it led to the collapse of 
state institutions, the defeat of Sunni militias by Syria and its allies (e.g. the Tawheed 
Movement), the rise of religious-based Sunni groupings (e.g. the Lebanese Salafists 
and al-Ahbash) in the late 1980s (el-Khazen 1994; Khashan 2013) and the emergence 
of the Sunni political leader Rafik Hariri. All these factors weakened the influence of 
Sunni zuama regarding Sunni power dynamics (Johnson 1986; Skovgaard-Petersen 
1996; Vloeberghs 2015). 
 
Rafik Hariri’s rise to power came at the expense of Sunni zuama. The fractionalisation 
and power vacuum within the Sunni milieu in the post-civil war period together with 
the financial wealth made by Rafik Hariri in Saudi Arabia enabled the Hariri family to 
dominate the politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon and to build close networks 
with Sunni political and religious establishments in Lebanon and regionally (Cammett 
and Issar 2010:400). Rafik Hariri was originated from a non-political family but had 
become a billionaire businessman in Saudi Arabia and returned to Lebanon to become 
a Prime Minister in 1992 (Abdel-Latif 2008). Hariri’s power was manifest in his media 
empire (e.g. Radio Orient, the Future Channel and al-Mustaqbal‏ Newspaper) 
(Vloeberghs 2015), extensive media networks (e.g. a shareholder in the prestigious An-
Nahar Newspaper), political alliances (e.g. Hariri’s alliance with the Druze leader Walid 
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Jumblatt and the former Sunni Prime Minister Najib Mikati ) (Gambill and Nassif 2000) 
financial capacity (e.g. a billionaire) and external links (e.g. Hariri’s relationship with 
the Saudi Arabia’s royal family and the former French President Jacques Chriac) 
(Vloeberghs 2015).  
 
Hariri’s generous support for Sunni students to pursue their education in Lebanon and 
abroad, and his economic plan to re-construct the war-torn Lebanon and re-develop 
its economy and infrastructures, overshadowed Sunni rival zuama and solidified his 
dominance over public opinion and the politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon at 
large (Vloeberghs 2015). Rafik Hariri gradually established himself in the Sunni politics 
so much so that the identification between Rafik Hariri and the Sunni politics in 
Lebanon became exceedingly stronger (Meier and Di Peri 2017:40).   
 
3.2.1.2 Framing of the Political Leadership of Rafik Hariri 
 
In this research, some respondents hold the view that Rafik Hariri had problems with 
the traditional Sunni zuama in Lebanon. For example, one respondent from the 
League of Muslim Scholars (LMS1) states that it was a “mistake” for Rafik Hariri to co-
opt these Sunni zuama who had a long-standing political history in Lebanon. In his 
view, Hariri could have accommodated them under his leadership. Other respondents 
including a member of the Fourteenth March alliance (FOMA2) and a journalist (Non-
Sunni4) also believe that Hariri could have cooperated with these leaders or gave them 
a political platform so as to make the politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon more 
diverse. Collectively, these respondents are of the view that Rafik Hariri worked in the 
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direction of excluding other Sunni leaders to remain the sole political leader of the 
Sunni community in Lebanon. The views of the research participants are shown in the 
following quotes. 
EMA1 “Hariri‎did‎not‎accept‎any‎Sunnis‎other‎than‎him‎to‎lead‎the‎Sunni‎community.‎
He‎worked‎to‎eliminate‎others.” 
LMS1 “Hariri‎ ignored‎ Sunni‎ families‎ whose‎ political‎ influence‎ was‎ felt‎ prior‎ to‎ his‎
arrival and did not give them a role; this was a mistake. He could have accommodated 
them‎under‎his‎leadership.” 
Centrist2 “Rafik‎ Hariri‎ worked‎ in‎ the‎ direction‎ of‎ eliminating‎ other‎ Sunni‎ leaders‎ to‎
solely remain the leader. Was it his decision? Was it Syria’s?‎I‎do‎not‎know.” 
FOMA2 “Hariri‎ eliminated‎ Sunni‎ traditional‎ Sunni‎ leaders.‎ He‎ eliminated‎ the‎ Salam‎
family.‎He‎could‎have‎left‎a‎place‎for‎them.” 
Non-Sunni4 “In‎politics,‎Hariri‎monopolised‎the‎Sunni‎scene‎because‎he‎was‎the‎most‎
powerful Sunni leader. He could have co-operated with other Sunni leaders. He could 
have‎made‎the‎politics‎of‎the‎Sunni‎community‎in‎Lebanon‎more‎diverse.”‎ 
UP2 “Hariri‎ had‎a‎problem‎with‎all‎ the‎ traditional‎ Sunni‎ zuama‎ in‎ Lebanon.‎Also,‎he‎
opposed the former Prime Minister Salim al-Huss.” 
The above excerpts show that the main focus of some research respondents is Rafik 
Hariri’s perceptual role of dividing the Lebanese Sunnis. This has been understood 
through Hariri’s “monopolisation” of the Sunni politics and his “alliance with the West” 
namely the United States and France. The research participants indicate that prior to 
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the arrival of Rafik Hariri, Sunni zuama used to disagree and compete against each 
other but their disagreements did not lead to intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon. 
What is relevant to these respondents to narrate is that, Hariri’s arrival to the political 
scene laid the foundation for intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon. In their 
understanding, intra-Sunni political division began when Hariri sought to monopolise 
the leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon. In addition, the data of this 
research shows that Hariri antagonists’ critics primarily focus on his alignment with 
Western powers. This is significant to show how Hariri’s opponents would like the 
story of Hariri to be constructed, narrated and understood. One of the strategies that 
Hariri’s opponents employ to de-legitimise Hariri’s supporters is to frame him as a 
“pro-United States” leader and servant of their interests, hence portraying his policies 
as contradicting the Sunni ethos. The views of Hariri’s opponents are shown below. 
UP1 “Hariri‎divided‎the‎Lebanese‎Sunnis…‎Hariri’s‎project‎gradually‎started‎to‎go‎in‎the 
direction of the United States and Saudi Arabia projects, which contradict pro-Syria, 
pro-Arab‎policy‎line.” 
EMA1 “The‎internal Sunni divide was mainly limited between the Sunni Leaders. They 
competed to win the Sunni support as much as they could. Of course, there were other 
disagreements but it did not lead to confrontation. It was an acceptable disagreement 
until‎Hariri‎arrived.” 
Other research respondents, on the contrary, counter-frame the frames that Rafik 
Hariri monopolised the political leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon. In 
their opinion, Hariri did neither impose his leadership on the Sunni community in 
Lebanon nor deliberately eliminate or marginalise the role of Sunni zuama. Rather, the 
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gradual replacement of Sunni zuama is attributable to the dynamics of the Lebanese 
politics, which outweighed their political relevance. The respondents indicate that 
Hariri was a giant leader with a modernised economic vision and was considered as 
the most powerful, dynamic and influential Sunni politician. Collectively, these 
respondents are of the view that Rafik Hariri’s political presence overshadowed Sunni 
zuama’s presence and his role transcended their role. Sunni zuama were unable to 
compete against Hariri as a result of Hariri’s solid political presence. The views of the 
participants are shown in the following excerpts. 
FM3 “Hariri‎did‎not‎impose‎himself‎on‎the‎Sunni‎community‎but‎surely‎he‎was‎the‎most‎
productive,‎dynamic‎and‎influential‎Sunni‎politician.”  
Non-Sunni3 “Some‎ Sunni‎ groupings‎ and‎ leaders‎ were‎ marginalised‎ as‎ a‎ result of 
Hariri’s‎powerful‎political‎presence.”  
Non-Sunni2 “It was the rule of the militias not Rafik Hariri that eliminated the 
influence of Sunni traditional leaders, if we talk about Salam family, the militias ruled 
them‎ out…‎ Rashid‎ Karami‎ was‎ killed‎ by the militias... some may say that Hariri 
eliminated‎other.‎Hariri‎was‎a‎giant.‎Others‎were‎unable‎ to‎be‎ compared‎with‎him…‎
When Hariri arrived, he had a modernised vision. The Sunni community was in the 
process of replacing the old political faces with new‎ ones…‎ It‎was‎ in‎ the‎ process‎ of‎
creating‎a‎new‎political‎class.” 
Non-Sunni1 “Hariri‎ did‎ not‎ deliberately‎ eliminate‎ Sunni‎ za’ims.‎ His‎ presence‎
overshadowed their presence and his role transcended their role. He did not 
marginalise them. He was ready to build relations with them and indeed he managed 
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to do so; other Sunni leaders allied themselves with him because they felt that if you 
cannot‎beat‎him‎then‎you‎should‎join‎him.” 
The above excerpts show that a very significant feature of the dynamics between pro- 
and anti-Rafik Hariri camps is that they often debate each other over the same issues 
from completely different angels of politics. The pro-Hariri camp, in their framing 
activities focus on the national politics, whilst the anti-Hariri camp situate their 
framing activities within the context of morality politics. The discussion shows that 
Sunni groupings often seem to be narrating past each other rather than truly involving 
in political dialogue that leads to the reconsolidation of the Sunni front in Lebanon 
(see Miceli 2005:591). Collectively, when these Sunni rivals argue in their adversaries’ 
political context, they may lose the ideological credibility and mobilisation strength of 
their strategies and hence weaken their political position (Miceli 2005:591). 
3.2.1.3 Rafik Hariri’s Cooperation with the Saad Family in Lebanon 
The data (in 3.2.1) shows that Rafik Hariri was ready to build relations with the Sunni 
zuama and indeed managed to achieve this (see non-Sunni1). Rafik Hariri’s 
cooperative politics was manifest is his relationship with the Saad family. The two 
families later became prominent actors in the local scene. Both are Sunnis but are 
politically and ideologically divided (pan-Arabism and national Sunni groupings). The 
political division between the two families is not only based on ideological ground but 
on securing influence on the political scene in Sidon.  
In the Lebanese parliament, there are two seats allocated to Sidon; both are held by 
Sunni candidates. In 1992, both Mostafa Saad (the former leader of the pan-Arab 
Popular Nasserite Organisation), and Bahia Hariri (sister of Rafik Hariri) swept two 
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seats representing Sidon in the Lebanese parliament. Both sides were seen as having 
the upper hand in the local politics. While the Saad’s family popularity was restricted 
to Sidon to a great extent, Hariri’s popularity and wealth extended beyond Sidon to 
include wider and indeed diverse Sunni spectrum in Lebanon. In 1996, amidst 
overwhelming growing fame of Rafik Hariri, the Saad family was unable to politically 
and financially challenge Hariri. Yet, Hariri’s prominence did not lead him to 
monopolise the politics of Sidon although the Saad family strongly opposed his policy 
line (International Crisis Group 2010; Baumann2017). A gentleman’s agreement was 
reached between the two sides, which led to Sidon being equally represented in the 
parliament by both the Saad family and the Hariri family. The agreement remained 
until the assassination of Hariri in 2005.  
3.2.2 Diversity in Sunni Political Leadership 
The politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon is not exclusively led by the Hariri 
family and the Future Movement although they are the largest Sunni grouping by 
virtue of the  last three parliamentary elections in 2005, 2009 and 2018. Sixteen (16) 
out of twenty-seven (27) Sunni members of the Lebanese parliament are affiliated 
with the Future Movement (Perry, Bassam and Francis 07/05/2018). This implies that 
the Future Movement possess approximately 60% of the Sunni street in Lebanon. Yet, 
the Sunni community in Lebanon is not monolithic but rather diverse and multi-
directional. One former Lebanese minister (Non-Sunni1) holds the view that a key 
feature of the Lebanese politics is pluralism within religious communities. It is difficult 
to assume, the minister indicates, that the Sunni community in Lebanon could be 
represented by one grouping. Even the Shia community in Lebanon, which is perceived 
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as pro-Hezbollah, is not only represented by Hezbollah. Some Lebanese Shias oppose 
Hezbollah’s policy line. The views of the interviewees are presented below. 
Non-Sunni1 “The‎prevalent‎feature‎of‎the‎Lebanese‎politics‎is…‎pluralism‎within sects. 
Some people assume that a whole sect can be reduced to one grouping but this is 
unfair. Some people tended to assume that the Sunni community is monolithic under 
the leadership of the Future Movement. This is untrue. And the first to admit this is the 
Future‎Movement‎itself.” 
JI2 “The‎Sunni‎community‎in‎Lebanon‎remains‎diverse‎and‎multi-directional.” 
Non-Sunni2 “There‎are‎some‎groupings‎and‎leaders‎who‎are‎looking‎for‎political‎role.‎
They cannot be completely under the leadership of the Hariri family such as the Karami 
family‎and‎Najib‎Mikati.‎This‎led‎to‎Sunni‎disagreements.” 
The above quotes show that “diversity” and “pluralism” characterise the politics of the 
Sunni community in Lebanon. There are other Sunni leaders who compete against the 
political leadership of the Hariri family and aim at leading the politics of the Sunni 
community in Lebanon. These leaders include for instance the former centrist Prime 
Minister Najib Mikati, the anti-Iran former Justice Minister Ashraf Rifi and the pro-
Syria former Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Mourad. These leaders do not want to 
operate under the “umbrella” of the Future Movement and the Hariri family (see 
International Crisis Group 2010; Salamy 2014). This kind of competition in the Sunni 
context is manifested between pan-Arab, religious and national Sunni leaders in 
Lebanon in an effort to gain control of the masses in the Sunni community in Lebanon. 
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This has in many instances led to leadership clashes, conflicts between Sunni leaders in 
Lebanon and in some cases has generated some issues of cooperation and alliances. 
3.2.2.1 Framing and Counter-Framing between Najib Mikati and Saad Hariri’s 
Adherents 
 
The competition between the Prime Ministers Najib Mikati and Saad Hariri over the 
leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon is one of the issues that divide the 
Lebanese Sunnis at the domestic levels. One research respondent from the Fourteenth 
March Alliance (FOMA2) states that Najib Mikati could not take over the leadership of 
the Sunni community from the Hariri family. In his view, Saad Hariri is framed as the 
strongest Sunni leader in Lebanon.  
Another senior member from the Future Movement (FM1) indicates that the 
comparison between Najib Mikati and the Hariri family is “illogical”. In his opinion, the 
majority of the Lebanese Sunnis used to rally around the Hariri family but this has 
never been the case with Najib Mikati. He claims that Najib Mikati is only popular in 
the city of Tripoli, whilst the Hariri family is popular in the whole Lebanese territories. 
As part of its framing strategies, the Future Movement frames Najib Mikati as a    “pro-
Syria leader” who was supported by Syria to create intra-Sunni political divides and to 
“counter the leadership of the Hariri family”. In addition, the framing construction 
applied by other interviewees show that Najib Mikati is framed as an “ally” with 
“Hezbollah”. These interviewees think that it was mainly through Hezbollah’s alliance 
with Najib Mikati, the latter was able to counter the leadership of the Hariri family and 
to become the prime minister of Lebanon in 2011. The views of the participants are 
shown below. 
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FM1 “The‎comparison‎between‎Mikati‎and‎the‎Hariri‎ family‎ is‎ illogical.‎All‎politicians‎
and political groupings used to rally around Rafik Hariri, but this has never been the 
case‎ with‎ Najib‎ Mikati.‎ Hariri‎ is‎ popular‎ in‎ all‎ the‎ Lebanese‎ cities,‎ whilst‎ Mikati’s‎
popularity is only limited to Tripoli…‎Mikati‎is‎a‎pro‎Syria‎leader.” 
Non-Sunni3 “There is a power struggle between the Hariri family and Mikati over the 
leadership‎of‎Sunnis.” 
FM2 “Syria‎supported Najib Mikati‎to‎counter‎the‎Hariri‎family.” 
Non-Sunni4 “Hezbollah‎has‎Sunni‎allies‎like‎Najib‎Mikati.” 
FOMA1 “Mikati‎ could‎ not‎ take‎ over‎ the‎ Hariri‎ family‎ leadership‎ of‎ the‎ Sunni‎
community.” 
In 2011, the tensions between the Eighth March Alliance (EMA) and the Fourteenth 
March Alliance (FOMA) over the Special Tribunal of Lebanon Regarding Rafik Hariri’s 
assassination (STL) resulted in the collapse of the Lebanese unity government, which 
was led by the Prime Minister, Saad Hariri (Saab 2013; Fakhoury 2016). Hezbollah’s 
ministers and their allies withdrew from the government as an objection to the way in 
which the STL was operating compelling Saad Hariri to resign (Fakhoury 2016). In June 
2011, Najib Mikati formed a new government largely dominated by Hezbollah and 
their allies (see BBC 2014; Wahlisch and Felsch 2016).  
Collectively, the above frames as constructed by the Future Movement’s adherents 
focus on Sunnis being victims of Shia power as a result of Najib Mikati’s perceived pro-
Hezbollah’s policies but other research respondents are of the view that although 
Najib Mikati was an ally with Hezbollah, he did not abandon the Lebanese Sunnis. On 
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several occasions, Najib Mikati stood against Hezbollah (Centrist 1 and Non-Sunni4). 
For example, in 2005, Najib Mikati, during his first term as a prime minister, oversaw 
the parliamentary elections which resulted in the victory of the Hariri family and the 
Future Movement (Salamey 2014). In 2012, Najib Mikati, during his second term as a 
prime minister, refused to stop the funding for the STL despite Hezbollah’s objection 
to it (Centrist 1).  
In 2012, and within the context of the Syrian conflict, Najib Mikati’s government, 
approved the “Dissociation Policy” and “B’aabda Declaration”, which cement 
Lebanon’s formal stand point to remain neutral regarding the war in Syria (see Baabda 
Declaration 2012; Wahlisch and Felsch 2016:1; Knudsen 2017). These declarations ban 
military support for either side of the Syrian conflict but allow humanitarian solidarity 
and political expression (see B’aabda Declaration 2012 as cited in Hazboun 2016). One 
Sunni political leader (Centrist1) indicates that during Najib Mikati’s premiership, 
Hezbollah could not explicitly declare their military involvement in Syria. Rather, they 
declared it two weeks after the resignation of his government. The responses of the 
respondents are shown in the following quotes.  
Non-Sunni4 “Mikati‎ in the three years he spent as a prime minister stood against 
Hezbollah on many occasions. He did not abandon his Sunni street. We have to be 
fair.” 
Centrist1 “When‎Mikati‎did‎not‎stop‎the‎funding‎of‎the‎STL,‎he‎did‎not‎stab‎Hezbollah,‎
he was honest with himself. Two weeks after the resignation of Mikati government, 
Hezbollah explicitly and officially declared its involvement in the Syrian conflict. In 
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2005m‎in‎the‎aftermath‎of‎Hariri’s‎assassination,‎in‎the‎darkest‎circumstances,‎Mikati‎
oversaw the elections and‎hand‎power‎to‎the‎FOMA.” 
EMA1 “Saad‎Hariri‎is‎like‎his‎father‎Rafik‎Hariri‎who‎thought‎that‎he‎could‎monopolise‎
the political leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon but there are other Sunni 
leaders‎apart‎from‎the‎Hariri‎family.” 
In a nutshell, the above frames and counter-frames are indicative of the competition 
between Najib Mikati and Saad Hariri over the political leadership of the Sunni 
community in Lebanon. As part of its framing construction, the Future Movement puts 
an emphasis on Najib Mikati’s perceived pro-Hezbollah, Syria and Iran policies as a 
means to counter-mobilise and de-legitimise his followers, while Najib Mikati’s 
adherents, as part of their counter-framing activities focus on the Future Movement’s 
perceptual “monopoly” of Sunni politics as a means to de-construct its narratives and 
to challenge its leadership. 
3.2.3 The Political Leadership of the Future Movement 
Rafik Hariri was the most influential Sunni political leader in Lebanon. His assassination 
in 2005 resulted in a shook to the Lebanese Sunnis, who interpreted it as an attack on 
the entire Sunni community in Lebanon (Gambill: 2007; Abdel-Latif 2009; Baumann 
2017). Sunnis, irrespective of their affiliations, felt that their existence was threatened 
and that the assassination was meant to weaken them and to reduce their influence 
on the Lebanese politics. Therefore, they rallied around the Future Movement and the 
Hariri family to maintain Sunni solidarity (Baumann 2018). It is in this context that the 
Future Movement became the largest Sunni grouping in Lebanon and this consensus 
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building in the Sunni milieu happens for the first time in the modern history of 
Lebanon.  
Recently, the support of Sunnis for the Future Movement has decreased. This has 
been mainly attributable to the failure of the Future Movement’s leadership to 
counter-balance  Hezbollah. The rising influence of Hezbollah on state machinery 
following the events of May 2008 (see 4.1.2) together with the overthrow of Saad 
Hariri’s-led government by Hezbollah and its allies triggered the emergence of 
“injustice frames” among the Lebanese Sunnis. Hezbollah’s involvement in the killing 
of Sunnis in Syria together with their perceptual “partisan immunity” (Zelin 2016:62) 
enhance the narratives of Sunnis that they are being targeted by the Lebanese state 
(Van Vliet 2016; Meier  2016; Zelin 2016:50). Some Sunnis criticise the Lebanese state 
of being used to hunt Sunnis whilst turning a blind eye on Shias’ armed activism in 
Lebanon and elsewhere (Daher 2015:219).  
3.2.3.1 Injustice Frames of the Lebanese Sunni Actors 
 
The responses of the research respondents show that Sunni actors use different  
“injustice frames” to attribute what went wrong and who ‏is to blame regarding the 
perceptual grievances of the Sunni community in Lebanon . ‏ They ‏construct injustice 
frames such as Sunni "‏anger ‏"‏  , “oppression”, “frustration”, “vulnerability”, 
“humiliation” and “marginalisation” as modes of interpretation for the gradual 
disempowerment of the Lebanese Sunnis.  
 
Injustice frames are labelled as a “mode of interpretation—prefatory to collective non-
compliance, protest, and/or rebellion—generated and adopted by those who come to 
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define the action of an authority as an unjust” (Gamson 1992; Snow and Benford 
2000:615). As the definition suggests, injustice frames are socially constructed beliefs 
that an identifiable authority (e.g. groupings, states or people) are operating in ways 
that result in suffering and harm to certain community and/or collectivity (Gamson 
1992; Picket and Ryon 2017: 580).  
 
In this research, the operationalisation of injustice frames highlights how the Lebanese 
Sunnis attribute their perceived weaknesses to injustices unleashed on them by 
certain groupings (e.g. Hezbollah) or states (e.g. Iran or Syria). Others might 
occasionally attribute it to the absence of firm and visionary Sunni leadership that is 
able to empower Sunnis and defend them. These Sunni actors attribute their anger 
and frustration to Hezbollah ' s influence on ‏Lebanon and feel vulnerable and 
humiliated because of the perceptual weaknesses of the Future Movement to 
preserve the political legacy of Rafik Hariri and to defend Sunnis in ‏the face of 
Hezbollah . 
 
Contextually, injustice frames result in the Lebanese Sunni actors to adopt mobilising 
frames aimed at rectifying the perceived injustices on them (Gamson 1992; Picket and 
Ryon 2017). It carries personal identification with the Sunni collectivity as being a 
victimised category within the Lebanese society and blames specific domestic and/or 
foreign actors for the perceived unjustifiable suffering of the Sunni community (see 
Gamson 1992). The importance of injustice frames in this research is that they 
collectivise Sunni apparent victimisation and possibly inspire collective action frames 
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(Gamson 1992; Picket and Ryon 2017). The views of the respondents are shown in the 
following excerpts. 
 
Haraki Salafist1 “Sunnis are being oppressed, humiliated and marginalised by 
Hezbollah. Neither Dar al-Fatwa nor the Future Movement rose up against the 
injustices facing the Sunnis community.” 
HT1 “The‎Lebanese‎Sunnis‎are‎in‎a‎state‎of‎frustration‎because‎they‎feel‎that‎they‎have‎
no‎leadership‎to‎protect‎them.” 
JI1 “There‎is‎a‎growing‎anger‎in‎the‎Sunni‎community.‎They‎feel‎like‎they‎are oppressed 
in‎Lebanon.” 
Some respondents go further in their framing construction to describe the Lebanese 
Sunnis, metaphorically, as a “minority” despite being the largest religious community 
in Lebanon (see figure 1.1). The using of the metaphor “minority” might not 
objectively correspond to the situation of Sunnis in the Lebanese political system but it 
shows how some Sunni actors would like the story of the Lebanese Sunnis to be 
manifested and narrated. There is a growing perception among some Sunnis that they 
are threatened and overwhelmed by the influence of Hezbollah on Lebanon. One 
respondent from the Haraki Salafists (Haraki Salafist1) argues that  the policies of the 
Future Movement resulted in Sunni problematized states of affairs and led to a 
‏number of Sunni supporters to leave them . He further indicates that the Future 
Movement is in denial regarding Sunni disempowerment and lacks a comprehensive 
strategy on how to confront Hezbollah.  
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Collectively, some Sunni actors are of the views that the Sunni community in Lebanon 
lacks a credible Sunni leadership that identifies with Sunnis, protects them and lives up 
to their expectations. In their opinion, the Future Movement is losing connection with 
Sunnis by falling “silent” on the perceptual injustices of Hezbollah against Sunnis. The 
views of the respondents are shown in the following excerpts. 
Haraki Salafist1 “The Future Movement practises led to Sunni bad conditions in 
Lebanon. Their inability to defend the oppressed Sunnis, led to a gap between them 
and‎their‎supporters.”‎ 
FM3 “The‎ physiological‎ impact‎ [of May 2008] on the Lebanese Sunnis has been 
massive to the extent that Sunnis, though a major sect in Lebanon felt like they are a 
minority‎sect…‎they‎felt‎frustrated;‎they‎felt‎vulnerable.” 
FOMA2 “Meanwhile,‎there‎is‎no‎leadership‎that‎could‎live‎up‎to‎the‎aspirations‎of‎the‎
Lebanese‎Sunnis.” 
HT1 “The‎Future‎Movement‎are‎silent‎on‎the‎oppression‎against‎the‎Lebanese‎Sunnis.” 
The above analysis shows that some Sunni respondents re-constitute the ways in 
which the political struggle between the Future Movement and Hezbollah is narrated 
and framed. For these Sunnis, the struggle between Hezbollah and the Future 
Movement is not framed in political terms as a struggle between two rival parties 
within the Lebanese political system. Rather, it is framed through “sectarian lenses” as 
a struggle between Sunnis and Shias. This explains why one respondent from the 
Haraki Salafists frames Hezbollah’s project as “targeting the existence of Sunnis”, 
referring to the sectarian nature of Hezbollah’s activism and transforming Sunni 
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political weaknesses into a sectarian threat unleashed on them by Hezbollah. The view 
of the respondent is presented below. 
Haraki Salafist1 “The‎Iranian‎project…‎is‎targeting‎the‎existence‎of‎Sunnis‎in‎Lebanon.”‎ 
Collectively, the great strength of the Haraki Salafists’ framing strategies lies in their 
ability, in times of sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shias to develop a sense of 
Sunni solidarity and to embrace anti-Shia political and religious narratives (Abdel-Latif 
2008). The perceived Lebanese Sunni injustices, as a result of Hezbollah’s dominance 
over Lebanon, might serve as a catalyst for recruitment, mobilisation and collective 
action frames (see Klandermans 1984:586; Johnston 1994). The collective articulation 
of anger could link personal Sunni identity with collective Sunni identity and trigger the 
emergence of a “collectivity-cum- movement” (Johnston 1994:284). For instance, 
Hezbollah’s military involvement in Syria against the mostly Sunni Syrian population 
resulted in the Salafist cleric Salim al-Rafi’i to call Sunnis to wage jihad against 
Hezbollah inside Syria (Alami 2014). In response, an approximately 200 Sunni fighters 
went to Syria to fight against the Syrian regime, Hezbollah and their allies (see Alami 
2014).    
3.2.4 Radicalisation of Sunnis as a Result of the Perceptual Absence of 
Sunni Leadership 
Hezbollah’s rising influence on Lebanon and the lack of credible and strong Sunni 
leadership to counter-balance Hezbollah contributed to Sunni disenchantment and 
frustration (Daher 2015; Zelin 2016). In addition, the self-imposed exile of Saad Hariri 
(the leader of the Future Movement) from Lebanon for security purposes in 2011 left 
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the Lebanese Sunnis feel abandoned and vulnerable to new perceptions and 
narratives (Daher 2015). These three factors primarily resulted in identity crisis among 
the Lebanese Sunnis and precipitated the emergence of radical Sunni groupings 
and  leaders who criticise the Future Movement’s failure to act and alternatively, 
introduce themselves as guardians of the Sunni community in Lebanon (Rougier 2015; 
Khashan 2015; Meier and Di Peri  2017). 
One of the research respondents from the League of Muslim Scholars (LMS1) indicates 
that the events of May 2008 strengthened the role of religious-based Sunni groupings 
in Lebanon because the Future Movement was unable to defend Sunnis. In his 
opinion, the events of May 2008 left Sunnis vulnerable to sectarian narratives and 
opened the door to the rise of Sunni radicalism and anti-statist narratives. Another 
respondent from the Future Movement (FM2) admits that as a result of Hezbollah’s 
dominance in Lebanon, some Sunnis have given up national moderate narratives and 
resorted to sectarianism and radicalism under the pretext of defending “Sunnism”. He 
indicates that the Future Movement has been able to control the Sunni arena. Yet, he 
suggests that Hezbollah’s continuous dominance over Lebanon might radicalise 
Sunnis. The views of the interviewees are shown below. 
LMS1 “The‎May‎events‎were‎shocking for the Lebanese Sunnis. They strengthened the 
role of Islamist Sunni movements because the Future Movement, the guardian of 
Sunnis was unable to do anything in the face of Hezbollah, this justified Islamist stance 
to play a greater role in the Sunni arena.” 
 FM2 “Some‎Sunnis‎have‎given‎up‎national‎postures‎and‎metamorphosed‎to‎sectarian‎
postures.‎We‎should‎control‎these‎sentiments‎before‎they‎turn‎into‎“a‎Sunni‎solidarity”‎
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in the face of Shias and the Lebanese state. Until now, the political leadership of the 
Sunni community the Future Movement managed to control the Sunni street to a great 
extent. But if the same condition exists for three, four, or five years, Sunnis will resort 
to‎armed‎activism.” 
 
The case of Ahmad al-Assir (see Rabil 2014; Zelin 2016; Wilkins 2016) exemplifies how 
Hezbollah’s dominance over Lebanon radicalised some Sunnis. The purpose of al-
Assir’s movement was to denounce Hezbollah’s military involvement in Syria and to 
criticise Iran’s growing influence on Lebanon (Zelin 2016; Meier and Di Peri 2017). Al-
Assir’s movement appealed to disfranchised Sunnis who had lost confidence in the 
ability of the Future Movement to defend Sunnis, to unify them and to counter 
Hezbollah politically and militarily (Meier and Di Peri 2017).  
 
In 2011, al-Assir’s struggle against Hezbollah was non-violent and mainly political. It 
focused on the demand for national consensus against Hezbollah’s intervention in 
Syria. Later on, his struggle turned violent as a result of the intense involvement of 
Hezbollah in Syria. In June, 2013, the city of Sidon, South Lebanon witnessed deadly 
clashes between Ahmad al-Assir’s movement, Hezbollah and the Lebanese army.  The 
Lebanese army in cooperation with Hezbollah entered ‘Abra (al-Assir’s stronghold) and 
defeated him.  Collectively, al-Assir’s movement has become a symbol of the Lebanese 
Sunni grievances which have been translated into political tensions and violent 
conflicts in order to be recognised and heard (Rabil 2014; Zelin 2016; Meier and Di Peri 
2017). 
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3.2.5 The Absence of Sunni Militias as a Result of the Moderate 
Approach to National Issues 
As part of its frame amplification strategies to appeal to Sunni and non-Sunni 
constituents, the Future Movement’s participants state that they are “unarmed 
organisation” and their leadership approach to national issues is “moderate”. In their 
opinion, neither the Future Movement nor the bulks of the Lebanese Sunnis are 
convinced about establishing a Sunni militia because of its negative impact on Sunnis. 
Moreover, the respondents indicate that Hezbollah’s armed activism is wrong but it is 
also wrong to respond by militarising Sunnis. The views of the respondents are 
presented below. 
FM2 “We‎are‎unarmed‎organisation.” 
FM1 “Firstly, neither we the Future Movement nor the bulk of the Lebanese Sunnis are 
convinced about establishing a Sunni militia. How can I throw people into destruction? 
Secondly, do not compare me with Hezbollah. Our rivals say: look at Hezbollah. If you 
are convinced about Hezbollah, join them! What Hezbollah is doing is wrong. So if I do 
exactly‎like‎them‎by‎creating‎a‎militia‎does‎it‎make‎it‎right?‎It‎is‎illogical.” 
One respondent from the Future Movement (FM1) admits that all seeds of frustration, 
extremism and hatred are growing amongst the Lebanese Sunnis because of Iran’s 
dominance in the region (Iraq, Syria and Lebanon). Yet, he claims that the number of 
the Lebanese Sunnis who supported or joined radical Sunni groupings is insignificant as 
opposed to Hezbollah, which sends thousands of people to fight inside and outside 
Lebanon. The view of the respondent is shown in the following excerpt.  
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FM1 “All‎ the‎ seeds‎ of‎ frustrations,‎ extremism‎ and‎ hatred‎ are‎ growing‎ amongst‎ the‎
Lebanese‎ Sunnis…‎ when‎ Sunnis‎ are‎ being‎ oppressed‎ for‎ the‎ last‎ 8‎ years;‎ Iran‎ has‎
dominated Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Yemen, Sunnis would resort to deadly 
options. Yet, we managed through our moderate approach to control the situation in 
Lebanon so far and the number of Sunnis who joined radical groupings is marginal 
unlike Hezbollah which sends thousands of people to fight inside and outside the 
Lebanese‎borders.” 
Collectively, the above narratives as constructed by the Future Movement are meant 
to convince the Sunni public that it was onlys through its “moderate approach” to 
national issues, the Sunni arena was controlled and Sunnis refrained from resorting to 
extremism, radicalism and armed activism. Some respondents are of the view that the 
strength of the Future Movement’s frames in the Lebanese politics lies in its ability to 
transcend religious affiliations. In their opinion, the Future Movement’s moderate 
narratives to national issues are essential for inter-communal co-existence in Lebanon 
because it puts national affiliation over religious affiliation. Other respondents agree 
with the Future Movement’s frames on the “de-militarisation” of Sunnis. They are of 
the view that resisting Hezbollah militarily is impossible due to Hezbollah’s power. 
One Shia religious leader (Non-Sunni5) indicates that the Future Movement’s 
leadership decision regarding the de-militarisation of Sunnis is not framed as a sign of 
“weakness” but rather as a sign of “wisdom” because the military confrontation with 
Hezbollah will lead to civil unrest in Lebanon and jeopardise the coexistence between 
Sunnis and Shias. Another respondent from the Haraki Salafists (Haraki Salafists1) 
claims that the militarisation of Sunnis is far from Saudi Arabia’s thinking and 
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accordingly, the Future Movement. In his view, Saad Hariri is “one of the most 
supportive” and “believers of state in the face of militias” despite his disagreement 
with the Future Movement’s approach to the Sunni politics. The views of the 
participants are presented in the following excerpts. 
FM3 “The power of the‎ Sunni‎ community‎ is‎ to‎ be‎ part‎ of‎ the‎ Lebanese‎ society…‎
therefore, on the national level, we identify ourselves as a Lebanese national no-
sectarian‎grouping.” 
FM1 “If the Future Movement had not been moderate, Sunnis would have resorted to 
deadly options.” 
FOMA1 “The Future Movement is a guarantor for Muslim Christian co-existence 
because‎its‎national‎affiliation‎prevails‎over‎its‎religious‎affiliation.”‎ 
Non-Sunni1 “Resisting‎Hezbollah‎was‎neither‎possible‎nor‎desirable.” 
Non-Sunni5 “What‎the‎Sunni‎community did was extremely wise in that they did not 
resort for confrontation, had confrontations occurred, we would have ended up like 
Iraq…‎ It‎ is‎ not‎ weakness,‎ because‎ weakness‎ would‎ have‎ occurred‎ if‎ they‎ had‎ been‎
drifted‎to‎a‎Sunni/Shia‎conflict.” 
Haraki Salafists1 “We have realised that militarising Sunnis‏ is very far from Saudi 
Arabia’s‎thinking‎and‎Hariri’s‎policy.‎Hariri‎has‎been‎one‎of‎the‎most‎supportive,‎most‎
believers‎of‎state‎in‎the‎face‎of‎militias.” 
Collectively, the above phrases show that as part of its frame amplification strategies, 
the Future Movement institutionalises its narrative techniques as a means to win 
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inter- and intra-communal public supports. These narratives are achieved through the 
movement’s advocacy of state legitimacy in the face of militias. They are also achieved 
through the movement’s construction of the “Lebanese-First” national identity, 
“moderation” and its repugnance to “sectarianism” and “militarisation”. It is on these 
wheels that the Future Movement frames its activities with the hope to move beyond 
religious rhetoric to the marketization of moderate narratives that can bring about 
national cohesion in Lebanon. 
3.2.6 Frame Resonance and Inadequate Trust for the Political Leadership 
of the Future Movement 
The use of “frame resonance” in this research enables the researcher to examine the 
effectiveness of the Lebanese Sunni leaders’ frames and the extent to which their 
framing construction “resonate” with targeted Sunni audience. Drawing on Snow and 
Benford (2000: 619-20), two interacting dimensions which account for resonance of 
frames have been identified: “credibility of the proffered frame” and “its relative 
salience”. In this section, the research examines the concept of frame credibility and 
how it is applied in this research. 
3.2.6.1 Frame Credibility  
 
The credibility in this context according to Snow and Benford (2000: 619-20) is 
affected by three factors: “frame consistency”, “credibility of frame articulators or 
claims makers” and “empirical credibility” (Snow and Benford 2000:619-20). Of 
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relevance to this section is the concept of “credibility of frame articulators or claims 
makers”.  
 
As the data (in 3.2.2) reveals, the Future Movement is the leading Sunni grouping in 
Lebanon. The research examines the credibility of the Future Movement frames on 
political issues pertaining to the Sunni public as perceived by their Sunni rivals and 
other Lebanese political actors. Clearly, these issues of frame credibility are 
contestable and open to debates and differential interpretations among the Lebanese 
political actors (Snow 2013). 
 
The credibility of Sunni leaders’ frames in Lebanon is contingent on their ability to 
unify Sunnis and to understand their grievances, problems and struggles (Einwohner 
2007:1310; Robenett 2013:690). Sunni leaders with close links to constituents and 
followers can generate frames that are credible to the Sunni population (Morris and 
Staggenborg 2007:184). 
 
In this research, two Sunni respondents from the Tawheed Movement (TAM1) and 
Haraki Salafists (Haraki Salafists1) indicate that the Future Movement’s frames are not 
credible. They hold the view that the Future Movement is not serving the interests of 
the Lebanese Sunnis. Rather, it uses them as a tool to serve its political interests. 
Another respondent from Hizb ut-Tahrir’s (HT1) indicates that the Future Movement is 
“in hostility with Islam” and it is false to frame it as a movement that represents the 
Lebanese Sunnis.  
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Collectively, all these respondents are of the view that that the Lebanese Sunnis have 
made a mistake when they trusted the Future Movement; and therefore, they appeal 
for a change in the political leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon.  The views 
of the respondents are shown in the following excerpts.  
 
Haraki Salafists1 “The‎Future‎Movement‎is‎secular‎par‎excellence…‎it‎does‎not‎want‎to‎
see religion‎outside‎the‎mosque…‎  it‎seeks‎to‎stay‎away‎from‎Islamists…‎and‎does‎not‎
deal‎with‎them‎except‎for‎what‎it‎serves‎its‎interests.” 
TAM1 “The‎Future‎Movement…‎wants‎to‎use‎the‎Sunnis‎majority‎to‎serve‎the‎interest‎
of its political project and not the interest of Sunnis. I swear to God, if their project had 
been‎based‎on‎serving‎people…‎ I‎would‎have‎had‎no‎problem.‎The‎project‎ is‎built‎on‎
the‎basis‎of‎investing‎in‎people‎for‎political‎purposes.” 
HT1 “The‎Future‎Movement‎is‎a‎secular‎current‎that‎is‎in‎hostility with Islam to a great 
extent. It is false to classify them as a grouping represents the Lebanese Sunnis. Those 
who are committed to Islam would believe that the Future Movement is far from 
Islam.” 
MP1 “Sunnis‎trusted‎the‎Future‎Movement‎but‎they‎were‎wrong. We need a change. 
We need to find out an alternative leadership to advance Sunnis and reject the current 
situation.” 
The above analysis shows that the Future Movement’s framers are often criticised for 
being totalitarian or driven by realpolitik, for using the sectarian card – Sunni in this 
case – as a means to achieve political gains (International Crisis Group 2010; Rabil 
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2014). For instance, the Future movement capitalised on Salafists’ anti-Hezbollah 
narratives and their ability  to mobilise Sunnis against Shias during its political struggle 
with Hezbollah (Abdel-Latif  2008). Salafists’ votes enabled the Future Movement to 
achieve decisive triumphs in the parliamentary elections in 2005 and 2009 (see Abdel-
Latif 2008; Abdel-Latif 2009; Rabil 2014). However, the problem is that some religious-
based Sunnis feel that they are being used by the Future Movement in its political 
conflicts with its rivals but when these Sunnis face problem with Hezbollah or the 
Lebanese state, the Future Movement abandons them or remains silent (Abdel-Latif 
2009). 
3.2.7 Declining Popularity of the Future Movement  
The Future Movement, as said earlier (see 3.2.2) is still the largest Sunni grouping in 
Lebanon. However, a comparison between the results of the last two parliamentary 
elections in 2009 and 2018 shows that the Future Movement lost over a third of its 
parliamentary seats. The number of the Future Movement MPs in the Lebanese 
parliament decreased from thirty-three (33) in 2009 to twenty-one (21) in 2018  (Perry, 
Bassam and Francis 07/05/2018) .  
Some respondents think that the declining popularity of the Future Movement is 
attributable to its perceptual unwillingness to cooperate with others. They claim that 
the Future Movement does not want to cooperate with other Sunni groups and rather 
seeks to monopolise the Sunni politics. This perception leads some Sunnis to think that 
the Future Movement’s frames are not credible. One Sunni respondent from the 
Fourteenth March Alliance (FOMA2) states that despite his support for the Future 
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Movement, the latter does not like to cooperate with other Sunni counterparts. In his 
view, for the Future Movement to maintain its leadership of the Sunni politics, it 
should “cooperate” with other Sunni groups and leaders. 
 
Similarly, one former Shia minister (Non-Sunni2) indicates that Saad Hariri does not 
seem to be interested in cooperating with other Sunnis especially religious-based 
Sunnis. In his view, the presence of religious-based Sunni groupings in Lebanon cannot 
be ignored, and therefore, he suggests that Hariri should back religious-based Sunni 
groupings in Lebanon to maintain his leadership of the Sunni community.  
 
These frames, however, are counter-framed by one respondent from the Future 
Movement (FM3) who states that “we *the Future Movement+ have never thought at 
any moment to monopolise the Sunni street”, and “those who want to compete 
against us can do so”. He further indicates that unlike Hezbollah, the Future 
Movement has no armed power to monopolise Sunni politics and abolish its rivals, and 
if the movement had monopolised the Sunni politics, Hezbollah would not have been 
able to drive Saad Hariri out of the government and bring his rival Najib Mikati as a 
prime minister in 2011. The responses of the respondents are shown below.   
FOMA1 “I‎had‎the‎impression‎that‎I‎could‎coordinate‎with‎the‎Future‎Movement‎and‎
be‎an‎ally‎with‎them‎because‎of‎Hariri’s‎legacy‎and‎the‎Future‎Movement’s‎policy‎line.‎
But what I found is that the Future Movement does not like to co-operate. Nowadays, 
if‎you‎want‎to‎lead‎the‎Sunni‎street‎you‎need‎to‎coordinate‎with‎other‎Sunnis.” 
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Non-Sunni2 “You‎cannot‎ignore‎in‎the‎presence‎of‎Islamists‎in‎Sunni‎scene…‎The‎main‎
support in the Sunni street is for Saad Hariri but Hariri does not seem to be interested 
in co-operation with other Sunnis. Hariri should back Islamist. If he did that, he would 
possess 90-95%‎of‎the‎Sunni‎street.” 
FM3 “we‎ have‎ never‎ thought‎ at‎ any‎moment‎ to‎monopolise‎ the‎ Sunni‎ street,‎ those‎
who want to compete against us can do so. I have neither armed nor political power to 
abolish others.  When Hezbollah drove us out of the government and brought Mikati as 
a‎Prime‎Minister.” 
The above analysis shows the concerns of Sunnis about consolidating their identity 
and unity in opposition to a recalcitrant self-image. It also shows that religious-based 
Sunni groups do not oppose the political leadership of the Future Movement per se, 
but they want the letter to be attached to the Sunni milieu and to cooperate with 
other Sunni groups and leaders in Lebanon.  
3.2.7.1 Frame Bridging between the Lebanese Salafists and the Future 
Movement 
Flowing from the above discussion (in 3.2.7), it seems that there are some religious 
Sunnis who are willing to engage in the process of “frame bridging” with the Future 
Movement. Frame bridging refers to “the linkage  of two or more ideologically 
congruent but structurally  unconnected frames regarding a  particular issue or 
problem” (Snow et al. 1986:467). The  effectiveness of frame bridging is synonyms with 
the ability of Sunni actors to act as brokers and to  bring together previously 
unconnected networks in order to generate new understandings and guide  collective 
actions (Snow et al. 1986; Goodwin and Jasper 2009:94).  
121 
 
As part of their frame bridging narratives, one Sunni leader from the Haraki Salafists 
(Haraki Salafists1) indicates that “it is not in the interest of the Lebanese Sunnis to 
“confront the Future Movement”. He further indicates that despite their considerable 
disagreements with the Future Movement, they will not miss any chance to 
“cooperate with them.” The views of the research respondent are shown in the 
following excerpt.  
Haraki Salafists1 “We‎still‎believe‎that‎it‎is‎not‎in‎the‎interests‎of‎the‎Lebanese‎Sunnis‎
to‎ confront‎ the‎ Future‎Movement…‎whilst‎ Iran‎ is‎ mobilising‎ against‎ Sunnis.‎ Despite‎
arrogance…‎which‎characterises‎some‎of‎the‎Future‎Movement’s leaders, we will not 
miss any chance‎to‎cooperate‎with‎them.” 
On several occasions, the Haraki Salafists expressed their willingness to cooperate 
with the Future Movement irrespective of their  ideological differences (Imad 2013; 
Rabil 2014). The cooperation is understandable, among other things, in the context of 
maintaining a collective Sunni identity and re-consolidating the Sunni rank under the 
leadership of the Future Movement (Abdel-Latif: 2009). The necessity of a 
united  Sunni defence against Hezbollah’s threat on the Lebanese Sunnis appeared to 
transcend ideological differences  between the Future Movement and Haraki Salafists 
(see Zald and McCarthy 1979:23-24). 
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3.2.8 Frame Consistency of Sunni Leadership  
The second factor which accounts for the credibility of framing construction is the 
concept of frame consistency (Snow and Benford 2000). In this research, the 
“consistency” between the Future Movement articulated claims, beliefs and their 
actions are examined. The research examines how the Lebanese political actors 
perceive the consistency of the Future Movement frames and whether or not there 
are contradictions between what it says and what it does.  
The usage of framing theory shows that the inconsistency between what the Future 
Movement believes or claims and what it actually does could possibly affect the 
resonance of its frames. The mobilising potency of frames is contingent on the 
congruency between the framers’ articulated beliefs and their actions (Snow and 
Benford 2000). In this research, some of the research respondents are of the view that 
the Future Movement’s cooperation with Hezbollah contradicts its anti-Hezbollah’s 
framing construction. They indicate that it is unacceptable for the Future Movement 
to take part in Lebanese governments which cooperate with Hezbollah, serve their 
interests and accuse Sunnis of terrorism. The responses of the respondents are 
provided in the following excerpts. 
FOMA2 “It is unacceptable to take part in governments that co-operate with Hezbollah 
and‎accuses‎Sunnis‎of‎terrorism.” 
MP1 “Why‎did‎ the‎Future Movement form a government with Hezbollah? Hezbollah 
kills the Syrians and brings terrorism to Lebanon. Sunnis in Lebanon are lost. They are 
waiting‎for‎a‎true‎leadership.” 
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Sunni framings came as a reflection of the Future Movement’s concessions to the 
Eighth March Alliance (EMA) by nominating their candidates (Suleiman Franjieh and 
Michel Aoun) in the presidential elections; by taking part in the Lebanese governments 
with Hezbollah; and by cooperating with the EMA in the municipal polls in Beirut and 
Tripoli (e.g. the AMAL Movement and al-Ahbash) (Rida 09/07/2016; nna-leb.gov.lb 
21/09/2016; Kechichian 30/05/2016; An-Nahar Neswpaper 30/05/2016). Similarly, in 
2005, Saad Hariri, the head of the Future Movement, accused Syria of the 
assassination of his father (see Milton-Edwards 2011, Najem 2012; Salamey 2014). Yet, 
in 2009, as part of the Saudi Arabian and Syrian reconciliation, Saad Hariri visited Syria 
and withdrew his accusations against them of having arranged the assassination of his 
father (Salamey 2014). The inconsistency between the Future Movement’s anti-Syria 
and anti-Iran articulated beliefs and its actual practises may affect the resonance of its 
frames and result in a sense of inauthenticity among its supporters (Gecas 2000).  
3.2.8.1 Hezbollah’s Cooperation with the Future Movement  
 
Hezbollah’s dominance over Lebanon together with the spill over of the war in Syria on 
Lebanon deepened Sunni and Shia tensions and constituted serious challenges to 
the Future Movement’s leadership and Hezbollah. These developments prompted the 
two parties to engage in mutual understanding and dialogue in order to mitigate 
sectarian Sunni and Shia tensions in Lebanon and to minimise the impact of the war in 
Syria on Lebanon (van Vliet 2016). One respondent from the Future Movement (FM1) 
indicates that despite its opposition to Hezbollah, it engages in a dialogue with them 
to maintain stability and coexistence in Lebanon. In his view, the dialogue with 
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Hezbollah helped Lebanon to avoid the worst case scenarios that the Lebanese people 
were afraid of. The view of the Future’s Movement respondent is shown below. 
FM1 “The‎ Future‎Movement‎ despite‎ opposition‎ to‎ Hezbollah,‎ engages‎ in‎ a‎ dialogue‎
with‎Hezbollah‎to‎maintain‎stability‎and‎coexistence‎in‎Lebanon…‎we‎took part at the 
current government with Hezbollah because we want stability and I think we 
succeeded‎because‎the‎worst‎scenarios‎that‎people‎were‎afraid‎of‎did‎not‎happen.” 
The Future Movement’s cooperation with Hezbollah has been linked to the new 
developments in the Sunni arena. On the one hand, the Future Movement feared that 
the rise of radical Sunni leaders and groupings in Lebanon in response to Hezbollah’s 
dominance in Lebanon may contest their monopolisation of the political leadership of 
the Sunni community in Lebanon (van Vliet 2016:98). On the other hand, Hezbollah 
acknowledged that they made a mistake in their approach with the Future Movement 
(Noe 2014). The displacement of Saad Hariri’s-led government in 2011 resulted in the 
weakness of the Future Movement and the rise of Sunni radicalism and anti-statist 
narratives. It also exposed Hezbollah to serious threats (Noe 2014). The cooperation 
between the Future Movement and Hezbollah was vital for ending years of sectarian 
tensions between the two sides (Wahlisch and Flesch 2016:7). 
This dialogue has been proven temporarily effective in maintaining political stability in 
Lebanon and preventing terrorist attacks from radical groups (Zelin 2016). Yet, Zelin 
(2016:62) argues that this cooperation “does not address the root causes of Sunni 
radicalisation and violence: the negative perception of Hezbollah’s “expansionism” 
and the assistance to the Assad regime in fighting radical Sunnis next door in Syria” 
(Zalin 2016:62). These issues are indeed important to be addressed in order to 
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maintain a long-lasting co-existence between Sunnis and Hezbollah. The Future 
Movement’s dominance of the leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon could 
be at stake as long as it is unable to craft a strategy to counter Hezbollah’s dominance 
in the Lebanese politics. 
3.2.9 The Religious Leadership of Dar al-Fatwa 
Sunni religious institutions and leaders often play an important role in Lebanon’s 
public life due to the nature of Lebanon’s confessional politics, where commitment to 
the Lebanese nation often comes after loyalty to one’s religion or sect (el-Husseini 
2004). Sunni religious leaders in this context have a great say on Sunni religious affairs 
and their role in the Sunni community in Lebanon is not restricted to religion but 
extended to politics (Skovgaard-Petersen 1996). 
 
The Sunni religious establishment in Lebanon has been officially represented by a state 
institute known as Dar al-Fatwa, which is recognised by the Lebanese state as the 
highest religious Sunni office in Lebanon for managing the Lebanese Sunni religious 
and legal affairs (Skovgaard-Petersen 1996; Rougier 2007:36). This institute is 
responsible for issuing formal legal and religious opinions (fatawa) relating to the 
Sunni community, overseeing religious Sunni scholars and mosques and providing 
Islamic teaching and guidance (Lefevre 2015). Dar al-Fatwa is led by the Grand Mufti of 
the Lebanese Republic, who is recognised as the main religious leader of the Lebanese 
Sunnis in Lebanon and their representative before the Lebanese state (Dar al Fatwa 
2015).  
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3.2.9.1 Influence of the Future Movement on Dar al-Fatwa 
 
An essential leadership skill is the ability  of  Dar al-Fatwa to articulate the multi-layered and at 
times opposed social and political interests of Sunnis in Lebanon (Morris and 
Staggenborg  2007:184; Mische 2003:272). One respondent from al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (JI1) 
frames Dar al-Fatwa as the “umbrella”, which protects and unifies the Lebanese Sunnis when 
they are divided. Yet, he indicates that Dar al-Fatwa should remain neutral regarding intra-
Sunni political contestations in Lebanon.  
The politicisation of Dar al-Fatwa, of being under the Future Movement’s sphere of influence 
has affected the credibility of its proffered frames. This is because not all of the Lebanese 
Sunnis are identified with the Future Movement. The narratives of Sunni participants attribute 
the weaknesses of Dar al-Fatwa to the influence of the Future Movement. One research 
participant from the Future Movement (FM1) admits that the movement has an influence on 
Dar al-Fatwa. Another research participant from Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT1) goes further to frame Dar 
al-Fatwa as an “echo” of the Future Movement. Collectively, these respondents are of the 
view that both the Mufti and Dar al-Fatwa are completely “under the control” of the Future 
Movement.  
Flowing from the above, it appears that some Sunni actors have the perception that 
the frames of Dar al-Fatwa are not credible. This is because they think that Dar al-
Fatwa in the articulation of its frames does not correspond to the expectations of 
Sunnis and would not be able to resonate with them as long as its framing activities 
are influenced by Sunni political leaders. The understanding of some participants is 
that the Hariri family selected a weak Mufti in order to maintain their influence on 
Sunni power dynamics. One respondent from the Eighth March Alliance (EMA1) 
indicates that the former Lebanese Mufti Mohammad Qabbani was a close ally with 
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Rafik Hariri and used to get his approval before making political statements. In his 
opinion, the Mufti Qabbani is not framed as the “Mufti of the Lebanese Sunnis” but 
rather as the “Mufti of the Future Movement”. The views of the participants are 
presented in the following excerpts.  
FM1 “The‎Future Movement has an influence on Dar al-Fatwa.” 
HT1 “Dar‎al-Fatwa is an echo of the Future Movement.” 
Haraki Salafists1 “Hariri’s‎dominance‎on‎Dar‎al-Fatwa‎is‎complete.” 
Non-Sunni2 “Dar‎al-Fatwa is under the control of Hariri. The Mufti is under the control 
of Hariri.” 
LMS1 “Dar‎al-Fatwa’s‎weaknesses‎are‎attributed‎to‎political‎dominance‎over‎the‎mufti‎
office. Dar al-Fatwa‎shall‎be‎an‎independent‎authority.” 
MP1 “Dar al-Fatwa should‎not‎be‎dictated‎by‎political‎leaders.” 
EMA2 “If‎the‎Mufti‎Qabbani‎wanted‎to‎make‎a‎statement, he would phone Rafik Hariri 
to get his blessing and approval. Qabbani was a close ally with Hariri.  Unlike the Mufti 
Khalid who did not allow the turban of the Mufti to be under the  influence of anybody 
even‎Syria…‎Qabbani‎was‎a‎close‎ally‎with‎Hariri…‎He‎used‎to‎be‎called‎the‎own‎Mufti‎
of the Future Movement instead of being  called the Mufti of the Lebanese Republic.” 
JI1 “Dar‎ al-Fatwa is the official religious Sunni institution. It is wrong when Dar al-
Fatwa‎takes‎part‎ in‎Sunni‎politics…‎it‎should not take sides in the intra-Sunni political 
affairs. Dar al-Fatwa‎is‎the‎umbrella‎that‎unifies‎Sunnis‎when‎they‎are‎divided.” 
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UP1 “Hariri,‎therefore,‎brought‎a‎weak‎Mufti,‎Muhammad‎Rashid‎Qabbani,‎in‎order‎to‎
maintain his influence on Dar al-Fatwa.” 
The weakness of Dar al-Fatwa is mainly attributable to the dominance of Rafik Hariri, 
who seemed to prevent the potential of electing a strong Mufti, who could challenge 
his power over the Sunni community (el-Husseini 2004; Skovgaard-Petersen 2004). Dar 
al-Fatwa had been under Rafik Hariri’s sphere of influence since Qabbani’s election in 
1996 until Hariri’s assassination in 2005 (Choucair 2015). During Hariri’s era, the role of 
Dar al-Fatwa was in line with Hariri’s policy line and it seems fair to suggest that the 
impact of the post of the prime minister as a Sunni authority exceeded that of the 
Mufti not only in politics but also in legal, administrative and financial affairs pertinent 
to the Sunni community in Lebanon. 
3.2.9.2 Influence of External Players on Dar al-Fatwa 
 
The impact of external players is another issue affecting the credibility of Dar al-
Fatwa’s frames. The data (in 4.2.1) shows that Iran broke through Dar al-Fatwa during 
the leadership of the former Mufti Mohammad Qabbani. In addition, the data (in 
4.4.2) indicates that following the assassination of the Mufti Hassan Khalid in 1989, 
Dar al-Fatwa was under the control of Syria until its withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia had an influence on the elections of the current Mufti of 
Lebanon Abdul Latif Derian (Lefevre 2015; Choucair 2015). The objective was to 
marginalise political Islam groupings (e.g. al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya) and to re-shape the 
role of Dar al-Fatwa to adopt a politically and religiously moderate discourse in the 
face of growing “radical” tendencies in the Sunni community in Lebanon (Lefevre 
2015; Choucair 2015).  
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3.2.9.3 Politicisation of Dar al-Fatwa’s Elections  
 
The weakness of Dar al-Fatwa has also been attributable by some participants to the 
dominance of current and former Sunni prime ministers on the elections of 
Muftis.  Two respondents from the League of Muslim Scholars (LMS1) and Haraki 
Salafists (Haraki Salafists1) indicate that the politicisation of Dar al-Fatwa’s elections 
weakened Dar al-Fatwa and made it susceptible to Sunni political leaders’ rivalry and 
interests. In their views, the election of Muftis should be democratic and religious 
leaders should be allowed to take part. The views of the interviewees are shown in the 
following excerpts. 
LMS1 “Dar‎al-Fatwa’s‎weakness‎ is‎ attributed‎ to‎political‎ dominance‎over‎ the‎mufti’s‎
elections…‎appointing‎a‎mufti‎is‎subjected‎to‎politicians.‎This‎would‎generally‎weaken‎
Dar al-Fatwa. The mufti shall be elected by people of religious knowledge not by 
politicians.” 
Haraki Salafists1 “The‎ selection‎of‎ the‎ current‎Mufti‎Derian‎was purely political. The 
League of Muslim Scholars tried very hard that there should have been a free 
choice/democratic elections... However, Sunnis leaders refused the request of the 
League‎of‎Muslim‎Scholars‎and‎insisted‎to‎select‎Derian.” 
The current Mufti of Lebanon Abdul Latif Derian was elected by an electoral body 
consisting of 109 members including (the Sunni prime minister, former Sunni prime 
ministers, Sunni ministers and Sunnis MPs) (Lefevre 2015). The election of Derian was 
criticised by some Sunnis due to the interference of Sunni political leaders in religious 
matters (Lefevre 2015).This means that if political rivalry within Sunni political leaders 
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exists, the process under which the Mufti is selected would be politicised and Dar al-
Fatwa’s autonomy would be at stake (el-Husseini 2012).  
3.2.9.4 Consequences of the Perceived Failure of Dar al-Fatwa to Oversee 
Sunni Affairs 
The failure of Dar al-Fatwa to manage Sunni religious affairs will give other Sunni 
groupings and leaders the opportunity to emerge, to grow up and to challenge the 
leadership of Dar al-Fatwa. One Sunni respondent (MP1) notes that Dar al-Fatwa’s 
responses on the problems facing the Lebanese Sunnis remains inadequate. He 
indicates that Sunnis are being detained by the Lebanese government and Dar al-
Fatwa is not able to end the injustices on them. Indeed, one respondent from Dar al-
Fatwa (DF) admits that Dar al-Fatwa was “absent” for approximately quarter a century. 
This is due to external interferences namely from Iran and Syria (see 4.2.1 and 4.4.2). 
In his opinion, the ability of Dar al-Fatwa to defend Sunnis will restore its role and 
minimise the role of its Sunni rivals. The views of the participants are presented below. 
Non-Sunni5 “When official religious institutions from all sects do not play their 
supposed role in guidance, religious education and overseeing religious affairs, Islamist 
parties‎will‎grow.”  
DF1 “The‎ absence‎ of‎ Dar‎ al-Fatwa or the inability of the Mufti to play his role for 
approximately 25 years, gave other parties roles to play. Now we have a new Mufti. So 
this does not mean that others Sunnis party will no longer play a role but their role will 
be‎minimised.”‎ 
MP1 “It is unaccepted that Dar al-Fatwa witnesses how the Lebanese Sunnis are being 
arrested and targeted‎while‎ its‎response‎remain‎ inadequate…‎instead‎it‎talks‎about…‎
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Christians’‎ rights‎ in‎ Iraq…‎ How‎ about‎Muslims‎ rights‎ in‎ Lebanon?‎ I‎ think‎ there‎ is‎ a‎
problem. The priority is to end the injustice of Sunnis who are detained in a suspicious 
manner.”  
The above analysis shows that the legitimacy of Dar al-Fatwa is counter-framed by 
some Sunnis, who see it as a subservient to the Future Movement. The weakness of 
Dar al-Fatwa left many Sunnis without a religious leadership to follow. In addition, Dar 
al-Fatwa has no supervision over all religious groupings and organisations in Lebanon 
(Rougier 2007; Lefevre 2014). Thus, Dar al-Fatwa, through its politicisation and weak 
leadership has been implicated in the emergence of more divided and radicalised 
Sunni groups and leaders in Lebanon (see Abdel-Latif 2008). 
3.2.10 The League of Muslim Scholars in the Leadership Struggle of 
Sunnis in Lebanon 
The League of Muslim Scholars emerged in response to the failure of Dar al-Fatwa to 
manage Sunni religious affairs. It is the embodiment of how the failure of Dar al-Fatwa 
to defend Sunnis contributes to the emergence of rival Sunni bodies, which claim to 
champion the Sunni cause. The external and internal interferences in Dar al-Fatwa’s 
leadership has not given the latter the opportunity to independently make decisive 
decisions on crucial issues facing the Sunni community in Lebanon (International Crisis 
Group 2010; Lefevre 2014; Rabil 2014). This includes the stance on Hezbollah, the 
issue of Islamic detainees in the Lebanese prisons and intra-Sunni contestations in 
Lebanon.  
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These developments led to some Sunnis to loose trust in their religious leadership, and 
equally importantly, gave the League of Muslim Scholars and similar Sunni 
organisations the opportunity to challenge the leadership of Dar al-Fatwa and to play a 
greater role in the politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon (Lefevre 2015). The 
League of Muslim Scholars seeks to fill in the vacuum left by Dar al-Fatwa at the 
national and Sunni levels and hopes to build a political identity that resonates with the 
Sunni community in Lebanon (Lefevre 2014:10).  
The League of Muslim Scholars has established itself as an important player in the 
Sunni politics. It was able to gain the trust of several Sunnis due to its close links with 
Sunni concerns and problems and its quest for finding solutions that would restore 
Sunni’s dignity and enhance their role in the Lebanese political system. The perceived 
autonomy of the League of Muslim Scholars of not being affiliated with political 
parties or funded by external forces (the LMS 2012a) has arguably strengthened the 
credibility of its frames (see 3.2.4). 
In this research, one respondent from the League of Muslim Scholars (LMS1) indicates 
that their presence in the Sunni arena is not welcomed by some Sunnis who think that 
they are competing with the Future Movement and Dar al-Fatwa over the leadership 
of the Sunni community in Lebanon. He also indicates that other religious communities 
in Lebanon do not welcome their presence on the ground that they are not secular but 
rather representing the actual mood of the Lebanese Sunnis. The respondent clarifies 
that the role of the League of Muslim Scholars is not to challenge Dar al-Fatwa but to 
“complement” it. He also clarifies that Dar al-Fatwa is the main institution for the 
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Lebanese Sunnis. However, in his view, the League of Muslim Scholars would only 
emerge when Dar al-Fatwa fails in its duties regarding the Lebanese Sunnis.  
Likewise, a Haraki Salafist research participant contends that if Dar al-Fatwa had 
played its supposed role in defending the rights of the Lebanese Sunnis, the League of 
Muslim Scholars would not have been established. He states that there are restrictions 
on Dar al-Fatwa because it is a politicised state institution and is linked with Sunni 
political leaders. However, the participant claims that, since its inception, the League 
of Muslim Scholars has committed itself to remain independent.  
Collectively, these respondents are of the view that the League of Muslim Scholars’ 
perceptual “scholarly” and “apolitical” nature enable it to operate more freely as 
opposed to Dar al-Fatwa, and this explains why its framing construction are credible 
and resonate with the Sunni public more than the Future Movement or Dar al-Fatwa. 
However, the respondents indicate that the League of Muslim Scholars’ articulated 
frames about the Sunni community in Lebanon shall be translated into actions (See 
JI1). The views of the respondents are shown in the following excerpts. 
LMS1 “The‎Future Movement thinks that the League of Muslim Scholars is competing 
with it. Dar al-Fatwa may see that the League is competing with it. Some Sunnis find 
the‎League’s presence undesirable because it is competing with them. In the non-Sunni 
arens, its presence is also undesirable because its expresses the Sunnis mood. The 
League of Muslim Scholars complements Dar al-Fatwa. The League would appear in 
case Dar al-Fatwa‎failed‎to‎fulfil‎its‎duties…‎Dar‎al-Fatwa is the main body.” 
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Haraki Salafists1 “Had‎Dar‎ al-Fatwa…‎done‎ their‎ duties,‎ there‎would‎ not‎ have‎ been‎
any need for the formation of the League of Muslim Scholars. People know that Dar al-
Fatwa failed to do their duties and this prompted the League to respond. There are 
restrictions on Dar al-Fatwa because it an official body and its linked with the political 
leadership…However,‎ the‎ League‎ of‎ Muslim‎ Scholars since the beginning has 
committed‎itself‎to‎be‎independent.” 
JI1 “Sunnis‎ look‎ for‎people‎who voice their demands. The League of Muslim Scholars 
can play this role because it is a scholarly body and not a political body. Therefore, it 
can articulate the anger of the Sunni street more freely than any other political 
groupings and this explains why the League of Muslim Scholars represent the mood of 
the Sunni community. That is true. However these postures shall be translated into 
political‎actions.” 
The League of Muslim Scholars consists of leaders from different backgrounds (e.g. 
Salafists and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya) and this may result in conflict of interests and lead 
to disagreements between its members (Zelin 2016). It thus remains to be seen 
whether the League of Muslim Scholars has the institutional ability and capacity to 
establish itself as a credible actor at the Sunni level (see Lefevre 2014:10; Zelin 2016). 
What is certain, nevertheless, is that its stance on issues pertinent to the Lebanese 
Sunnis is gradually gaining popularity, credibility and trust of the Lebanese Sunnis, and 
on several occasions, its influence on Sunni dynamics superseded that of Dar al-Fatwa 
(Lefevre 2014:10).  
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3.3 Situating the Sunni Politics in the Context of Supply and 
Demand   
The discussion in this chapter shows that in the process of framing their activities to 
gain public support and mobilise the masses in the Sunni community in Lebanon, Sunni 
groupings’ claims and articulations are projected in the organisational ideologies and 
slogans. Mobilising Sunnis for collective action is contingent on the availability of large 
pools of followers or constituents to the frames of Sunni groups and organisations 
(Edwards and McCarthy 2007:140). 
Successful mobilisation gradually brings supply and demand together. The 
metaphorical “supply and demand”, which Klandermans (2007) borrowed from 
economics is important for the context of this research as it helps to explain issues of 
movement participation in the context of framing theory. Demand in this research 
refers to the potential in a given community for protest (Klandermans 2007:360-1). A 
demand for change or protest often occurs when a given community feels a sense of 
moral indignation, injustice or frustration about some experiences, grievances or state 
of affairs (Klandermans 1997). Supply in this research refers to the opportunity staged 
by protest organisers (Klandermans 2007:361). Mobilisation in this sense is the process 
that bridges demand with supply by bringing “a demand for political protest that exists 
in a society together with a supply of opportunities to take part in such protest” 
(Klandermans 2007:361). 
In the Sunni context, demand or “diagnostic framing” refers to the attributions of the 
problems of the Sunni community in Lebanon to certain groupings or states and the 
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formation of collective Sunni identity (Snow and Benford 2000; Klandermans 2007). 
Supply or “prognostic framing” in the Sunni context refers to the framing construction 
and ideologies Sunni groupings and leaders in Lebanon stand for, and the kind of 
identifications they offer to the Lebanese Sunnis (Snow and Benford 2000; 
Klandermans 2007). 
The data in chapter three and four shows that Sunni actors are divided in terms of 
their understanding and attribution of Sunni problematized state of affairs in Lebanon. 
Some Sunni actors attribute Sunni grievances in Lebanon to the injustices practised on 
them by Iran (see 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3) and Syria (see 4.3, 4.4, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3 and 
4.4.4). In their framing construction, Syria and Iran are framed as “colonial powers” 
and “occupiers”, which seek to “divide-and-rule” the Sunni politics in Lebanon (see 
4.2.3 and 4.3). Other Sunni actors attribute Sunni disempowerment to the “declining 
Saudi Arabian’s support for the Lebanese Sunnis” (see 4.5); the “monopolisation of the 
Hariri family over the Sunni politics” (see 3.2.1 and 3.2.2); “the inability of the 
Lebanese state to impose its legitimacy over the whole Lebanese territory” (see 3.1.2); 
“the dominance of Hezbollah over Lebanon” and “the failure of the Future Movement 
to counter balance them” (see 3.2.3).  
The kind of identification or prognostic framing that Sunni groupings offer to the 
Lebanese Sunnis as a result of their perceptual gradual disempowerment varies. The 
variance in Sunni articulations of the proposed solutions to the problems facing the 
Lebanese Sunnis results in “frame disputes” within Sunni groups and organisations in 
Lebanon (Benford 1993a). For instance, the Future Movement’s frames focus 
attention on its “moderate approach” to national issues as a means to appeal to 
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Sunnis and to solve their problems. It describes itself as an “unarmed organisation”, 
whose identity is “Lebanon First”, whose ideology is “moderate”, and whose presence 
is essential to maintain inter-communal co-existence and to prevent Sunnis from 
radicalism and sectarianism (see 3.2.5). The strength of the Future Movement’s 
framing construction lies in its ability to craft national non-confessional narratives to 
the Lebanese public. 
On the contrary, some religious-based Sunni groupings in Lebanon refute the Future 
Movement’s prognostic framing to Sunni issues. They focus attention on the 
construction of sectarian religious narratives to win Sunni public support. As part of 
their framing strategies, these groups amplify the severity of Sunni problem as a result 
of the Shia dominance and the failures of the Lebanese state and Sunni leaders to 
counter them. They interpret the struggle with Hezbollah through sectarian terms, as a 
struggle between Sunnis and Shias by framing Hezbollah’s activities as “targeting the 
existence of Sunnis” (see 3.2.3). They call for Sunni “solidarity” (see 3.2.4) in the face 
of Shias; they identify themselves with the Sunni identity to “protect” (see 3.1.2) 
Sunnis from the perceived threats of Iran and Hezbollah; they criticise the Future 
Movement’s perceived detachment from the Sunni collectivity and their failure to 
provides prods to actions against Hezbollah (see 3.2.3); and finally, they call for “a 
change in the leadership” of the Sunni community to alter the perceived 
disempowerment of Sunnis (see 3.2.6). The identification of the struggle with 
Hezbollah through sectarian lenses serves as catalyst for recruitment, mobilisation and 
collective action frames.   
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Collectively, the above analysis shows that the dynamics of movement participation in 
the Sunni politics are noted to be built around three core factors. The first factor is 
“instrumentality”, which refers to the willingness of the Lebanese Sunnis to change 
their circumstances (see Klandermans 2007). The second factor is “identity”, which 
refers to the willingness of the Lebanese Sunnis to act as members of Sunni groupings 
or organisations to change their circumstances (see Klandermans 2007). The third 
factor is “ideology”, which refers to the willingness of the Lebanese Sunnis to join 
Sunni groupings or organisations in order to be able to express their feelings, emotions 
and views regarding the Sunni politics (see Klandermans 2007).  
National, pan-Arab and religious-based Sunni groupings in Lebanon supply the 
opportunity of leading the Sunni politics to fulfil these demands of members of the 
Sunni community in Lebanon for a strong and credible Sunni leadership. These Sunni 
groupings, irrespective of their political affiliations, claim that they can change the 
existing Sunni state of affairs to their benefits through their actions; hence, the 
enthusiastic demand for movement participation. Some Sunni groupings in Lebanon 
by their actions convey a certain understanding that they are an effective Sunni 
political force to reckon with. They do this by trying to frame the kind of identities they 
offer (pan-Arab, national or religious) and the kind of power alliances they have with 
external players (Syria, Iran or Saudi Arabia).  
After all, Sunnis are angry and morally outraged as a result of their disempowerment 
vis-à-vis Hezbollah. Sunni groupings provide the opportunity for Sunnis to 
communicate and express their feelings and emotions (Klandermans 2007:369). The 
link between ideological frames of the organisers of Sunni organisations and that of 
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participating members of the Sunni community could be constructed in order to 
generate a shared meaning of the situation and guide collective action frames 
(Klandermans 2007).  
3.4 Conclusion 
The main focus of this chapter was to examine how the Lebanese Sunni political actors 
understand, interpret and frame intra-Sunni political divides in Lebanon at the 
domestic levels. The findings of this chapter showed that the multiplicity of Sunni 
politicised and at times contested (pan-Arab, religious and national) identities are 
important for the understanding of intra-Sunni political divides in Lebanon at the 
domestic levels. In addition, the multiplicity of Sunni various ideological stances 
ranging from moderate to radical coupled with their opposing political affiliations 
ranging from pro-Syria, pro-Iran to anti-Syria, anti-Iran are also essential for the 
understanding of political divides within Lebanon’s Sunni demographic.     
Furthermore, the chapter showed that the political and religious leadership of the 
Sunni community in Lebanon constitute one of the main issues that split up the Sunni 
political front at the domestic levels. The Lebanese Sunni actors differ in their 
understanding of the political leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon as 
exemplified by the Hariri family and the Future Movement, and the religious 
leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon as represented by Dar al-Fatwa. The 
chapter showed how the inadequate trust for the political and religious leadership of 
the Sunni community in Lebanon resulted in a shift in Sunni perceptions and narratives 
and contributed to the emergence of rival radical Sunni groupings and leaders in 
Lebanon.  
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In the following chapter (chapter four), the research focuses on how the Lebanese 
Sunni political actors understand and frame the role of external players (Iran, Syria and 
Saudi Arabia) in the political division of the Sunni community in Lebanon. 
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Chapter Four 
Intra-Sunni Contestations: 
Understanding and Framing of the Role of External Players in 
Intra-Sunni Political Division in Lebanon 
4.0 Introduction  
In this chapter, the research presents the frames and understandings of the research 
participants regarding the role of external players: Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia in the 
political division of the Sunni community in Lebanon. The use of framing theory (see 
Snow and Benford 2000; Johnston and Noakes 2005; Snow et al. 2007) will enable the 
researcher to unmask contested frames and differential interpretations among the 
Lebanese Sunnis. It will also help him to look into how Sunni political actors 
understand, frame and narrate their political division in line with the external 
involvement in their political affairs. In the following, framing of Iran’s role in the Sunni 
politics is presented in line with the interpretations of the research participants.  
4.1 Framing of Iran’s Role in Intra-Sunni Political Division in 
Lebanon  
The ideological stance on the Islamic Republic of Iran (Shia) and its affiliated Shia and 
Sunni organisations in Lebanon constitutes one of the main issues that affect the 
relationship between Iran and the Lebanese Sunnis. These relationships draw Sunni 
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Muslims to either support or oppose the activities of Iran and its Shia and Sunni allies. 
Sunnis who are aligned with the Eighth March Alliance (EMA) support Iran and 
Hezbollah, whilst Sunnis who are aligned with the Fourteenth March Alliance (FOMA) 
oppose Iran and Hezbollah. The EMA developed their ideology and message on issues 
of Hezbollah’s resistance against Israel and the support for the Syrian’s presence in 
Lebanon (making them pro-Iran and pro-Syria), whereas the FOMA developed their 
ideology and message on opposing the Syrian’s role in Lebanon and calling for the de-
militarisation of Hezbollah (making them pro-Saudi Arabia and pro-West). The FOMA 
was developed mainly as a result of the assassination of the former Sunni Prime 
Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. Eventually, these two alliances successfully organised 
demonstrations for and against Iran and Syria’s influence on Lebanon. The struggle 
between the FOMA and the EMA defined the political order in Lebanon in the last 
decade. The following subheadings will support how the research participants frame 
the role of Iran in the Sunni political division in Lebanon1. 
4.1.1 Iran’s Perceived Role of Liberating Muslim Lands, Resisting Israel 
and Defending the Palestinian Cause 
In this research, ‏the understanding of some research respondents is that Iran has been 
able to  appeal to the Lebanese Sunnis and to break through the politics of the Sunni 
community in  Lebanon by the perceived activities of liberating the Muslims lands, 
                                                          
1
 The Eighth March Alliance is led by Hezbollah and consists of other political parties such as the Shia 
party AMAL and the Christian party the Free Patriotic Movement. It also includes Sunni groupings like 
the Tawheed Movement, the Islamic Action Front, the Union Party and the Popular Nasserite 
Organisation. In contrast, the Fourteenth March Alliance is led by the Future Movement, the largest 
Sunni grouping in Lebanon, and consists of other key parties in Lebanon such as the Christian Phalange 
Party and the Lebanese Forces and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party.  
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resisting Israel and defending the Palestinian cause. In their opinion, the strength of 
Iran and Hezbollah in the Sunni arena lies in their  ability to propagate these slogans in 
the one hand, and on the other hand, the inability of the  Arab Sunni states to defend 
the Palestinian cause or to counter-balance Israel. The  absence of an organised Sunni 
resistance against Israel enabled Iran and Hezbollah to  develop a resistance project 
that resonated with the Sunni street in Lebanon. Some  informants claim that Sunni 
states, unlike Iran, abandoned the Palestinian cause and engaged in  peace treaties 
with Israel. They indicate that when Iran carried out the postures of fighting  Israel, 
they were “credible”. Hezbollah fought different wars against Israel (e.g. in 2000 
and  2006) and in their opinion, Iran helped Lebanon to counter-balance Israel. The 
responses of the respondents are provided in in the  following excerpts.  
 
MP1 “Iran‎ would‎ use the postures of defending the Palestinian cause in order to 
attract‎Sunnis.‎Iran‎capitalises‎on‎Arabs‎impotence‎to‎defend‎the‎Palestinian‎cause…” 
FOMA1 “Iran‎used‎to‎say‎that‎they‎carry‎out‎the‎Palestinian‎flag‎after‎the‎Arabs‎threw‎
it following peace treaties‎with‎Israel...” 
UP1 “I‎do‎not‎blame‎ Iran.‎ I‎blame‎ourselves;‎our‎weakness‎and‎divisions‎which‎gave‎
them the chance to play a role in our communities. It is our mistake we are not trying 
to‎be‎united‎and‎protect‎ourselves.” 
UP2 “When‎ Iran‎ raised‎ postures‎ of‎ fighting‎ Israel,‎ some‎ people‎ claimed‎ that‎ these‎
were false postures but in reality Hezbollah were credible and achieved two important 
victories‎in‎2000‎and‎2006.‎These‎victories‎created‎a‎balance‎against‎Israel.”‎ 
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Non-Sunni3 ‏ “The‎ Iranians‎ used‎ the‎ rubric‎ “resistance”‎ to‎ appeal‎ to‎ the‎ Lebanese‎
Sunnis. When ‏you use the term resistance against Israel nobody would be able to 
challenge‎you…” 
Collectively, these research respondents are of the view that the Lebanese Sunnis 
should not blame Iran but rather  themselves and their Arab patrons for their 
impotence and bitter divisions which have offered Iran and its allies in Lebanon (most 
especially Hezbollah) the opportunity to break through the politics of the Sunni 
community in Lebanon. 
4.1.1.1 Frame Salience in the Context of the Iranian Role in Lebanon 
 
One important dimension that affects the resonance of frames is its “salience” to 
targets of mobilisation. Drawing on Snow and Benford (1988:205), three factors of 
frame salience have been identified: “centrality”, “narrative fidelity” and “experiential 
commensurability”. Contextually, the relevance of frame salience to this section is the 
“centrality” and “narrative fidelity” as they highlight how essential the values, ideas 
and beliefs associated with Sunni movement frames are to the lives of the Lebanese 
Sunnis.   
 
It is arguable that there are some sets of action-oriented meanings which are 
traditionally conceptualised as ideologies and are perceived to be central to the beliefs 
of some of the Lebanese Sunnis such as “support for the Palestinian cause”. The 
operationalisation of frame salience in this research demonstrates how the Lebanese 
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Sunni actors construct their narratives out of these meanings to mobilise their 
constituents and de-mobilise their antagonists.    
 
Hezbollah’s frequent engagement with Israel on different occasions enabled it to gain 
the support of various Sunni groupings and leaders who have the impression that Iran 
and Hezbollah are defending the dignity of Arabs and Muslims. One Sunni participant 
from the pro-Hezbollah’s Tawheed Movement (TAM1) holds the view that the 
movement “supports any resistance against Israel” irrespective of its ideological or 
religious affiliation, even if it belongs to their opponents the FOMA. 
Another Sunni participant from the pro-Hezbollah Union Party (UP1) denies that the 
party receives financial support from Iran and Hezbollah to be allied with them and 
insists that the party does not need financial support from anybody. He asserts that 
their alliance with Hezbollah is based on the principles of “resisting Israel” and 
“supporting Palestine”. In his opinion, the main enemy of the Lebanese Sunnis is 
“Israel” not “Iran”. The participant’s justification for siding with Iran, which is a Shia-
oriented state and not siding with Saudi Arabia, which is a Sunni-oriented state, is that 
Iran through its allies in Lebanon and elsewhere is fighting against Israel whilst Saudi 
Arabia is not fighting against Israel. He contends that the Union Party will not side with 
Saudi Arabia unless it fights against Israel. Collectively, these Sunni respondents are of 
the view that the Lebanese Sunnis, whether or not they agree with Hezbollah, cannot 
stand against them when they call for the resistance against Israel. The views of the 
participants are presented in the following quotes. 
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Non-Sunni3 “Some‎Sunnis‎support‎Iran‎because‎of‎Hezbollah’s‎role‎in‎fighting‎against‎
Israel. They keep supporting Hezbollah because they think that Hezbollah is honest in 
fighting‎against‎Israel.”‎ 
TAM1 “We‎are‎with‎ the‎ resistance‎against‎ Israel‎whether‎Palestinian,‎national,‎ pan-
Arab,‎ Islamic,‎ Sunni,‎ Shia‎ or‎ Christian…‎ even if it belongs  to the Fourteenth March 
Alliance...” 
UP2 “Our‎alliance‎with‎ the‎EMA‎ is‎based‎on‎principles:‎ that‎ is‎ the‎ resistance‎against 
Israel. You know that we do not need financial support from anybody. Let Saudi Arabia 
fight‎against‎Israel‎and‎I‎will‎definitely‎side‎with‎them…‎Our‎main‎enemy‎is‎Israel.‎Iran‎
shall‎not‎be‎our‎enemy.” 
Centrist1 “I‎cannot‎stand‎against‎Hezbollah‎when they call for the resistance against 
Israel...” 
The above excerpts show that there are certain frames that are resonant with the 
values, beliefs and ideas of the Lebanese Sunnis. These framing constructions include: 
“defending the Palestinian cause” and “supporting the resistance against Israel”. Sunni 
groupings and leaders in Lebanon notwithstanding their affiliation appreciate the fact 
that these “frames” are important to get them accepted as legitimate actors in the 
Sunni politics (see Williams 2007). The discourse of supporting Palestine and resisting 
Israel may not be fundamental to these groupings but it is an essential toolkit to 
attract Sunnis and to consolidate their presence in the Sunni politics (see Williams 
2007).  
147 
 
4.1.2 Iran’s Role in Interfering in the Lebanese politics and the Syrian 
Conflict  
Other research respondents, on the contrary, approve Hezbollah’s struggle against 
Israel but disapprove Iran and Hezbollah’s frequent interferences in the Lebanese 
politics and the Syrian conflict. They hold the view that resisting Israel and supporting 
the Palestinian cause do not compensate Iran’s involvement in the events of May 2008 
and their involvement in Syria against Sunnis.  
 
The events of May 2008 emanated from the Lebanese government’s decision to 
inspect Hezbollah’s communication network; and to dismiss the pro-Hezbollah’s 
director of security at Beirut International Airport (Salem 2011; Rabil 2014; Salloukh et 
al. 2015). Hezbollah blamed the Future Movement-led government for these decisions 
and interpreted them as a declaration of war against them (Najem 2011). In May 2008, 
Beirut, the capital city of Lebanon, witnessed deadly clashes between Hezbollah and 
the Lebanese Sunnis for the first time in  what was considered as the worst inter-
communal violent conflict in Lebanon since the civil war  (Wehrey et al. 2009; Najem 
2012). It was indicated that nearly a hundred people were killed before Hezbollah and 
their allies pulled back their fighters to enable the Lebanese army, which remained 
“neutral” in the conflict to enter the areas that they had attacked (Wehrey et al. 2009). 
 
In this research, some Sunni respondents indicate that the Lebanese Sunnis used to 
support Hezbollah but following their perceptual sectarian-inspired military attack on 
the Lebanese Sunnis in 2008 and their contribution to the killing of Syrian people in 
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the Syrian conflict; they lost their public appeal and were no longer framed by Sunnis 
as a “resistance” group. One Sunni leader from al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (JI1) indicates 
that the relations between Hezbollah and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya were strong and 
coordination between the two parties to fight against Israel continued, but when 
Hezbollah changed the direction of its struggle from fighting against Israel to fighting 
against Sunnis (i.e. to the domestic arena), the relations between the two sides 
deteriorated. 
 
Other research participants including a member of the Future Movement (FM1) and 
an anti-Iran Sunni MP (MP1) contend that the events of May 2008 exposed the “lie” of 
framing Hezbollah as a “resistance” group. They argue that Sunnis have done a 
mistake when they thought that Hezbollah is a Lebanese group. In their opinion, 
Hezbollah is a grouping whose loyalty is to Iran. Similarly, an anti-Hezbollah Haraki 
Salafist respondent (Haraki Salafists1) indicates that Sunnis used to stand with 
Hezbollah because they thought that the purpose of their weapons was to resist Israel 
but when Hezbollah suddenly turned their weapons in the face of the Lebanese Sunnis 
in 2008, they lost Sunni support. Collectively, all these respondents are of the view 
that the priority of the Lebanese Sunnis is to counter-balance Iran’s role in Lebanon. 
The responses of the respondents are presented in the following excerpts. 
 
JI1 “The‎  relations between Hezbollah and Al-Jama’a‎ al-Islamiyya were strong. 
Coordination between Hezbollah and Al-Jama’a‎ al-Islamiyya to  fight against Israel 
continued…‎ ‎When‎Hezbollah‎ changed‎ the‎ direction‎ of‎ its‎  struggle the gap between 
Hezbollah and the Al-Jama’a‎al-Islamiyya‎increased.” 
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FOMA1 “We‎all‎support the resistance against Israel. But now, what we observe is no 
longer a resistance. The resistance practically lost its appeal when Hezbollah entered 
Beirut‎ in‎ May‎ 2008.‎ Hezbollah’s‎ involvement‎ in‎ Syria‎ made‎ everything‎ clear.‎ You‎
cannot say to me that this is‎resistance.‎No,‎it‎is‎not.”  
FM1 “Let‎ us‎ look‎ at‎ 7‎ May‎ from‎ a‎ positive‎ point‎ of‎ view.‎ It‎ exposed‎ the‎ lie‎ of‎
Hezbollah...”  
MP1 “Sunnis‎have‎done‎a‎mistake‎when‎they‎had‎thought‎that‎Hezbollah‎is‎a‎Lebanese‎
party. Hezbollah is loyal to Iran and its decisions‎are‎taken‎by‎Iran…” 
Haraki Salafists1 “Hezbollah’s‎weapons,‎which‎ had‎many‎ Sunnis‎ stood‎with‎because‎
they‎thought‎it‎was‎for‎the‎purpose‎of‎Israel…‎suddenly‎turned‎in‎the‎face‎of‎the‎Sunni‎
community‎in‎Lebanon.”‎ 
The crisis of 2008 ended following the signing of the Doha Agreement in Qatar (Salem 
2011; Rabil 2014; Salloukh et al. 2015). The agreement was a victory for Hezbollah, as 
it enabled their allies (i.e. the Eighth March Alliance) to gain the veto power in the 
Lebanese  government, hence blocking any governmental decisions that may threaten 
their interests in Lebanon (e.g. disarmament of Hezbollah and the STL) (Salem 2011; 
Najem 2012; Rabil 2014; Salloukh et al. 2015).  
The significance of this agreement in Doha is that it cemented Hezbollah’s power 
position in the Lebanese political system (Najem 2012). The agreement ended the 
violent conflicts between Hezbollah and the Future Movement but resulted in 
confessional tensions between Sunnis and Shias in Lebanon. It also contributed to the 
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emergence of radical Sunni groupings and leaders who criticised the inability of the 
Future Movement to counter Hezbollah and to protect the Lebanese Sunnis. 
4.1.3 The Clash between Hezbollah and the Future Movement  
The clashes between Hezbollah and the Future Movement in May  ‏2008  and their 
attendant  impacts  ‏on  intra-Sunni dynamics in Lebanon and Sunni relations with Shias 
constitute one of  the  issues that divide the Lebanese Sunnis. Whilst these events 
occurred for political purposes,  the  bloodshed generated a sectarian climate between 
Sunnis and Shias in Lebanon, and  therefore, the Sunni “political” struggle 
against  Hezbollah shifted into a “sectarian” struggle. Some  participants claim that 
these events paved  the way for inter-communal divides between Sunnis  and 
Shias.  One Shia religious scholar (Non-Sunni3) indicates  that the events of May 2008 
are considered as a ‏ " black spot "  in ‏the relations between Sunnis and Shias .  He blames 
the Eighth March Alliance ‏ ( EMA )  for ‏the deterioration in the relationship between 
Sunnis and Shias in Lebanon . ‏‏The views are shown in the following quotes. 
Non-Sunni3 “The 7 May events deepened the Sunni-Shia tensions in particular. It was a 
slap‎on‎Sunni’s‎face‎by‎Iran‎and‎Hezbollah.”‎ 
FM2 “The‎invasion‎of‎May‎7‎was‎the‎basis‎of‎the‎Sunni‎Shia‎tension‎in‎Lebanon.” 
Non-Sunni5 “I‎feel‎the‎pain‎whenever‎I‎remember‎the‎events‎of‎7‎May.‎It‎was‎a‎black‎
spot in the history of the relations between Sunnis and Shias. It did not occur according 
to the will of Sunnis and Shia. It occurred because of the actions of the Eighth March 
Alliance.” 
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At the intra-communal levels, some Sunnis who are allied with Hezbollah did not 
endorse Hezbollah’s attack on Sunnis in May 2008 but still endorse their resistance 
against Israel. One Sunni respondent from the pro-Hezbollah Tawheed Movement 
(TAM1) indicates that what unify Sunnis with Hezbollah are two types of brotherhood: 
“Islam” and “resistance against Israel”. Yet, he indicates that the Tawheed Movement 
is against any weapon that is directed at the domestic arena even if it belongs to their 
ally Hezbollah.  
Other Sunni respondents, however, completely justified Hezbollah’s actions in May 
2008. Two respondents from the Eighth March Alliance (EMA1) and the Union Party 
(UP2) indicate that the Lebanese government wanted to dismantle Hezbollah’s 
communication network and that Israel wanted to take revenge against Hezbollah 
following the war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006. These Sunni respondents 
think that Israel feared a new defeat and therefore they resorted to groupings in 
Lebanon, some of them were Sunnis, to use them as a tool to weaken Hezbollah. 
Collectively, these Sunni respondents are of the view that dismantling Hezbollah’s 
network could have eliminated Hezbollah’s power against Israel and therefore, 
Hezbollah’s military actions against the Lebanese Sunnis were justifiable to protect 
their arms. These opinions are shown in the following claims of the respondents.  
TAM1 “What‎ unifies‎ the‎ Tawheed‎ Movement with Hezbollah is two types of 
brotherhood: first, religious,  because we consider all those who say that there is no 
God but Allah and Muhammad is  the messenger of Allah as Muslims; and second, 
resisting‎Israel…‎but‎we‎are‎against‎any‎ weapon that is directed to the domestic arena 
even‎if‎it‎belongs‎to‎Hezbollah.” 
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UP2 “The‎government‎wanted‎to‎dismantle‎Hezbollah’s‎communication‎network.‎The‎
Zionist enemy failed to take revenge against Hezbollah. It feared a new defeat. Hence, 
Israel resorted to Lebanese groupings from within the Sunni community to weaken 
Hezbollah.” 
EMA1 “Honestly,‎ what‎ happened‎ in‎ May,‎ 2008‎ should‎ have‎ happened‎ before.‎
The Future Movement was preparing to crack down Hezbollah. The Prime Minister 
Fouad Siniora was loyal to the United States…The‎Future‎Movement‎serves‎the‎interest‎
of‎the‎United‎States.‎The‎cabinet’s‎decision‎to‎dismantle‎Hezbollah’s‎network‎came‎as‎
a result of external command and was implemented to eliminate Hezbollah. Everybody 
knows‎that‎if‎you‎dismantle‎Hezbollah’‎network,‎you‎will‎eliminate‎Hezbollah.” 
UP1 “Hezbollah‎had‎to‎attack‎the Future Movement in‎order‎to‎protect‎its‎weapons...” 
The above explanations show that Sunnis who are aligned with Hezbollah seek to re-
frame the way in which the clashes between Hezbollah and the Future Movement is 
framed and narrated. For these Sunnis, they focus on Hezbollah being the only force in 
the Arab World to counter Israel (see Najem 2012; Khashan 2013). This was manifest 
in the Israeli-Hezbollah’s War in 2006 in which the latter claimed a “divine victory” 
despite heavy losses in human lives and infrastructures (Khashan 2013:70). As for the 
events of May 2008, these Sunnis do not frame it as an attack by Shias on the 
Lebanese Sunnis. Rather, they accuse the FOMA of attempting to weaken Hezbollah’s 
resistance against Israel by cooperating with the United States and Israel (Khashan 
2013:70). In their views, the Future Movement is “loyal” to and “servant” of the 
United States’ interests. 
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4.1.4 Perceived Killing of Sunnis in Syria by Shia Allies 
The impact of the civil war in Syria, which started in 2011, on Lebanon is enormous 
and devastating (Wahlisch and Felsch 2016; Fakhouri 2016). Hezbollah’s military 
involvement in Syria to support the Assad’s government together with the clashes 
near the Lebanese borders with Syria, internal divisions, sectarian tensions, political 
assassinations, refugee problems and suicide bombings gradually pulled Lebanon into 
the maelstrom of the war in Syria (Wahlisch and Felsch 2016:1).  
Hezbollah’s military involvement in Syria to support the Syrian government has 
worsened  security situation in Lebanon and intensified sectarian tensions between 
Sunnis and Shias in  Lebanon (Ranstorp 2016; Knudsen 2017). Besides, it caused 
frequent retaliatory car and suicide  bombing attacks by extremist groupings affiliated 
with the so called the Islamic State and the al- Qaeda in Shia areas in Lebanon. These 
militant  groupings vowed not to stop attacking Hezbollah’s stronghold until the latter 
pulls back its  combatants from Syria (Wahlisch and Felsch 2016). 
In this research, some research respondents think that Hezbollah is “killing Sunnis” in 
Syria and is being used by Iran as a tool to confront Sunnis in Lebanon and Syria. They 
indicate that the purpose of the Dissociation Policy (which was implemented by the 
Lebanese government in 2011) is to prevent the Lebanese political groupings from 
taking part in the Syrian conflict. Otherwise, the conflict would spill over to Lebanon. 
However, the realities on the ground were different. As the crisis in Syria has grown, 
the Lebanese religious communities were unable to dissociate Lebanon from the 
spiralling war in Syria (Knudsen 2017). The Lebanese religious communities did not 
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only side with their Syrian counterparts but rather covertly or overtly supported 
warring factions (Knudsen 2017). Hezbollah has been military involved in Syria, hence, 
violating the Dissociation Policy, which represents the official stance of the Lebanese 
government (Fakhoury 2016; Hazboun 2016; Wahlisch and Felsch 2016). 
Some Sunni respondents justify Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict on the 
ground that if Hezbollah had not intervened in Syria, extremist groupings would have 
entered Lebanon and destabilised its political system. Therefore, in their opinion, 
Hezbollah takes part in the Syrian conflict to protect the sovereignty and security of 
Lebanon. The views are presented in the following statements.  
Haraki Salafists1 “Iran‎intervened‎to‎back‎the‎Syrian‎regime‎and…‎Hezbollah‎went‎to‎
kill Sunnis‎in‎Syria.” 
HT1 “Hezbollah‎ has‎ been‎ used‎ as‎ a‎ tool‎ by‎ Iran‎ to‎ confront‎ Sunnis‎ in‎ Syria‎ and‎
Lebanon.” 
Centrist1 “I‎am‎against‎getting‎involved‎in‎conflicts‎outside‎Lebanon.” 
UP1 “Hezbollah‎has‎been‎to‎Syria‎to‎defend‎Lebanon.‎If‎Hezbollah‎had‎not‎intervened 
in‎Syria,‎extremist‎groups‎would‎have‎entered‎Lebanon.” 
The above excerpts show that some of the Lebanese Sunnis are divided in terms of 
their perceptions on the conflicts in Syria. Sunnis who are allied with the FOMA 
support the revolution against the Syrian government and hopes that its fall would 
help Lebanon to be independent from external duopoly, especially from Syria and Iran 
(Hazboun 2016; Wahlisch and Felsch 2016). By contrast, Sunnis who are allied with the 
EMA interpret the revolution against the Syrian government as an international ploy 
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targeting Syria for its support for Palestine and Hezbollah’s resistance against Israel 
(Wahlisch and Felsch 2016). 
4.1.4.1 Situating the Alliance between Iran and Syria in the Lebanese Context 
 
From 1980 to 2005, Iran’s influence on Lebanon was highly determined by the 
dynamics of its alliance with Syria (Najem 2012:114). The key strength of Hezbollah in 
the Lebanese politics has been attributable to the Syrian-Iranian alliance, which has 
provided substantial military and financial support for Hezbollah (Haddad 2013:18). 
With the support of Syria and Iran, Hezbollah was able to recruit fighters, to challenge 
Israel, to advance its ideological programme and to maintain its influence on the 
Lebanese politics (Salamey and Pearson 2007:432). The alliance between Iran and 
Syria has been based on strategic interests and interdependence (el-Husseini 
2010:811). Syria needed Iran and Hezbollah so as to retain its relevance in the Middle 
East region and to maintain its influence on the Lebanese politics, while Iran and 
Hezbollah relied on Syria for the transitions of the Iranian missiles to Hezbollah in 
Lebanon (el-Husseini 2010:811; Samaan 2017:161; Wiegand 2009: 671).  
The Syrian war, which began in 2011, re-emphasised the Iranian role in Lebanon. Iran’s 
proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, got militarily involved in the Syrian war against the 
mostly Sunni Syrian inhabitants in order to protect the interests of Iran and Syria. The 
survival of Syria has been essential for Iran. Iran’s fundamental reasons to get involved 
in the Syrian war have been to retain the influence of the “Resistance Axis” consisting 
of Syria, Iran and Hezbollah on the Middle East (Sullivan 2014 as cited in Wilkins 2016). 
For Iran, Syria has been considered as a key transient route for financial and military 
support from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and therefore, the fall of the Syrian 
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government may prevent Iran to easily transfer supplies to Hezbollah in the struggle 
against Israel (Wilkins 2016:158). It is also in the interest of Iran to preclude the rise of 
a Sunni-dominated leadership in Syria that could potentially undermine its interests in 
Syria and Lebanon (see Samaan 2013; Wilkins 2016; Sullivan 2014). 
4.2 Iran’s Role in Dividing Sunnis in Lebanon 
The respondents’ interpretive understanding of Iran’s role in dividing the Lebanese 
Sunnis can be highlighted under the following sub-headings. 
4.2.1 Iran’s Network with some Sunni Leaders and Organisation 
In the context of the Sunni politics, Iran has developed some networks with religious-
based and pan-Arab-based  Sunni movements and leaders in Lebanon. This has been 
one of the sources of the political Sunni division in  Lebanon. Iran is believed to be an 
influential actor in the politics of the Sunni community in  Lebanon (see Rabil 2014; 
Rougier 2015). Hezbollah, which is politically and ideologically affiliated with the 
Iranian state  created the Resistance Brigades (Saraya al-Muqawama), which includes 
some Lebanese  Sunnis (Rougier 2015). The Resistance Brigades are perceived as pro-
Iranian Sunni militias which have been used as  a tool to divide the Sunni community, 
whilst other frame them as a resistance grouping  backing Hezbollah in its struggle 
against Israel (see Rougier 2015). In Sidon, south Lebanon,  the Sunni cleric Maher 
Hammoud holds close relations with Iran and Hezbollah (Goodarzi  2009:146). He 
established an organisational body consisting of Shias and Sunnis  who embrace the 
Iranian ideology in Lebanon (Goodarzi 2009:146).  
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The research respondents were clear in their mind about the role of Iran, a key  allied 
of Syria, in dividing the Sunni political front in Lebanon. This form of division has been 
manifest in  breaking through Dar al-Fatwa during the leadership of the former Grand 
Mufti of the Lebanese  Republic Shaykh Muhammad Rashid Qabbani (Lefevre 2015). 
The Mufti Qabbani was initially an ally of the Future Movement but he had fallen with 
them over accumulating financial disputes in which he was accused of embezzlement 
from Dar al-Fatwa (Qassem 16/08/2012; Choucair 2015; Lefevre 2015). In order to 
retain his position, the Mufti Qabbani allied himself with Hezbollah. This resulted in a 
sharp split in Dar al-Fatwa between a faction close to the Future Movement, which 
oppose the mufti’s authority and a faction close to Hezbollah, which support 
Qabbani’s authority (Lefevre 2015). 
The disagreement undermined Dar al-Fatwa’s credibility and enabled Iran to break 
through the Sunni politics (Lefevre 2015). One respondent from the Future Movement 
(FM1) holds the view that the Mufti Qabbani was aligned with Iran. Another 
respondent from Dar al-Fatwa (DF1) admits that Hezbollah under the Iranian’s 
influence was able to break through Dar al-Fatwa and to take it over from the hands of 
the Future Movement. The responses of the respondents are shown in the following 
excerpts.  
FM1 “In‎ the‎ last‎ three‎ years‎ of‎ the‎ former‎ Mufti’s‎ term,‎ he‎ was‎ aligned‎ with‎
Hezbollah.” 
DF1 “Hezbollah‎– under the Iranian guidance – was able to penetrate DF and to take it 
from the hands of the Future Movement”. 
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Another form of dividing the Sunni front has been through Iran’s ideological, financial 
and  political supports for some religious and pan-Arab Sunni political organisations 
(e.g. the  Tawheed Movement, the Popular Nasserite Organisation, the Union Party and 
the Islamic Action Front) and Sunni political leaders and clergies (e.g. Abdul Rahim 
Mourad; Oussama Saad, Fathi Yakan and Saeed Shaaban) (see Shayya et al. 2009; Rabil 
2014; Rougier 2015). These Sunni groupings and leaders are politically affiliated with 
Iran and Hezbollah.  
4.2.2 Materialistic Interests for Sunni Political Alignment with Iran 
Some respondents frame Sunnis who are allied with Iran as “minorities”, claiming that 
the majority of the Lebanese Sunnis are politically against Iran. Moreover, these 
respondents hold the view that Sunnis who are allied with Iran know that they are 
wrong but are driven by materialistic interests. They receive money and salaries from 
Iran. The research participants believe that Iran is generous with its allies, albeit they 
are Sunnis, and does not mind to finance them as long as they serve its interests in 
Lebanon. In their opinion, pro-Iran Sunnis follow Iran blindly no matter whether or not 
their actions are against Sunnis. Their views are presented below. 
LMS1 “There‎ is‎ a‎ group‎ of‎ Sunni‎ clergies‎ and‎ politicians‎who‎ support‎ Hezbollah‎ but‎
they are a minority. They do not represent the standpoint of the majority of the 
Lebanese‎Sunnis.” 
Haraki Salafists1 “Sunnis‎ who‎ support‎ Iran‎ are‎ driven‎ by‎ interests.‎ Iran‎ has‎ been‎
paying their salaries since the eighties. They cannot go against Iran. They follow Iran 
blindly.”  
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Non-Sunni2 “Iran‎pays‎money‎ to‎ some Sunni political leaders. Do you think that the 
Krarami family do not get money from Hezbollah? Surely they get. Sunnis who support 
the Eighth March Alliance receive salaries. Iran is generous in this respect. What is 
important for Iran is to protect its‎influence‎on‎Lebanon.” 
Centrist2 “Sunnis‎who‎support‎the‎Eighth‎March‎Alliance‎are‎driven‎by‎interests.‎They‎
are tempted by money. Those Sunnis  know‎that‎they‎are‎wrong.” 
MP1 “Sunnis‎who‎support‎Hezbollah‎receive‎financial‎support  from‎them.” 
FOMA1 “When‎I‎see‎a‎Sunni‎supports‎Hezbollah,‎I‎would‎think‎of‎their‎bank‎account.” 
Collectively, these respondents are of the view that Sunni alliance with Iran is not 
based on  Hezbollah’s resistance against Israel. Rather, it is used as a means to counter 
the Hariri family’s perceived monopolisation of the Sunni politics (see 4.4.3), to solidify 
their  political status (see 4.1.1) and to serve their materialistic interests (4.2.2). This is 
how Iran breaks through the politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon.  
4.2.3 Iran’s Interests in Perpetuating the Division of the Lebanese Sunnis 
Some Sunni respondents frame Iran’s role in Lebanon in the same way they frame 
Syria’s role in  Lebanon (see 4.3). For these respondents, Iran’s role in Lebanon is based 
on “dividing communities”, and  creating problems within these communities. Iran is 
framed as a threat to the Lebanese Sunnis, an “ occupier” and a “coloniser”, which 
seeks among other things, to use some Sunni groupings, militias and  leaders to break 
through the Sunni politics. The pro-Iran Muslim Scholars Gathering (Tajammu’‎ al-
 Ulama’‎al-Muslimeen), which consists of Sunni and Shia clergies, is the epitome of how 
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Iran broke  through the Sunni politics in Lebanon (see Rabil 2014). In addition, pan-
Arab-based Sunni groupings (e.g. the Popular  Nasserite Organisation and the Union 
Party), whose pan-Arab ideology is at odd with the ideology of the  Islamic Republic of 
Iran are allied with Iran (see International Crisis Group 2010). These groups and 
leaders could  be employed by Iran to serve its interests at the expense of the unity 
and solidarity of the  Lebanese Sunnis. These claims by the participants are shown in 
the following excerpts. 
LMS1 “The‎role‎of‎Iran‎in‎Lebanon‎is‎occupation‎and‎colonialism.” 
Non-Sunni2 “Iran‎surely‎divides‎Sunnis.” 
Non-Sunni3 “The‎ Iranian‎project‎ is‎ based‎on‎dividing‎ communities,‎ creating‎problem‎
within these‎ communities…‎ Some Sunnis are marginalised in their communities. 
Hezbollah capitalise on this by either  recruiting‎them‎or‎financially‎supporting‎them.” 
MP1 “Iran‎ of‎ course‎ seeks‎ to‎ divide‎ the‎ Lebanese‎ Sunnis.‎ You‎ see‎ the‎ Resistance‎
Brigade,‎ the‎ Muslim‎ Scholars‎ Gathering…‎ they‎ are‎ all‎ tools‎ to‎ divide the Lebanese 
Sunnis‎as‎the‎Syrian‎regimes‎had‎done‎before.” 
Collectively, the above analysis shows that Hezbollah capitalises on  their popularity in 
the Sunni community as a resistance grouping to appeal to some Sunnis who are weak 
or marginalised in  their communities and therefore, Hezbollah either support these 
Sunnis financially, politically or recruit  them in the forms of militias under the guise of 
resisting Israel. 
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4.3 Framing of Syria’s Role in the Intra-Sunni Political Division 
in Lebanon 
In this research, the majority of Sunni actors in Lebanon were emphatic in their voice 
that Syria plays a major role in the political division of the Sunni community in 
Lebanon. They attribute intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon to Syria and describe 
its presence in Lebanon from 1976 to 2005 as “the worst thing” that Lebanon has ever 
experienced in its political history. Some respondents employ injustice frames to 
frame Syria as “a colonial power”, which seeks to “divide-and-rule” the Lebanese 
religious communities. Others go further in their framing construction to describe 
Syria as an “occupier” or an “oppressor”, which is accused of conspiring against the 
Lebanese Sunnis by “killing”, “imprisoning”, “persecuting” and “humiliating” them. The 
participants in this instance attribute the responsibility or the blame for Sunni 
problematized state of affairs to the perceptual injustices practised on them by Syria. 
The views of the participants are presented below. 
JI1 “Syria,‎which‎oppresses‎ its‎own‎nations, will not hesitate to oppress the Lebanese 
nation.‎Syria‎dealt‎with‎us‎as‎a‎colonial‎power.” 
Haraki Salafists1 “Syria‎implemented‎a‎divide-and-rule‎policy‎in‎Lebanon.”  
Non-Sunni4 “The‎ worst‎ thing‎ that‎ Lebanon‎ had‎ ever‎ witnessed‎ in‎ its‎ ancient‎ and‎
recent‎history‎was‎the‎Syrian‎dominance‎over‎Lebanon.” 
FOMA1 “Syria‎occupied‎Lebanon,‎persecuted,‎ imprisoned‎and‎killed‎Sunnis.‎Syria‎ laid‎
the‎foundation‎for‎the‎political‎division‎in‎the‎Sunni‎community‎in‎Lebanon.” 
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DF1 “Lebanon‎would‎have‎no‎longer‎existed‎had‎Syria‎remained‎in‎Lebanon.” 
LMS1 “Syria‎ was‎ an‎ oppressor.‎ They‎ were‎ unjust‎ with‎ all‎ Lebanese‎ parties.‎ They‎
humiliate their opponents. Everyone was looking forward to the day when they get rid 
of‎Syria.” 
Flowing from the above quotes, it can be argued that Syria was concerned about the 
socio-political and religious dynamics of the Sunni community in Lebanon and was 
apprehensive about any Sunni-based Islamic activism that could jeopardise its rule in 
Lebanon (Rabil 2014). It was in the interests of Syria to divide the Lebanese Sunnis in 
order to maintain its influence on Lebanon (see Rabil 2014). Syria’s relations with the 
Lebanese Sunnis were primarily shaped by its interests in Lebanon (Osoegawa  2013). 
When Syria realised that the behaviour of Sunnis  challenged its interests, it sought, 
through its allies in Lebanon to weaken and/or to divide them.  
4.3.1 Contextualisation of Syria’s Presence in Lebanon 
The main reason for Syria’s troops to remain in Lebanon in the post-civil war period 
was understood in the context of its struggle with Israel and its aim to regain its 
territories (i.e. the Golan Heights), which it had lost to Israel in the Six Days War in 
1967 (Hinnebusch 1998; Najem 2012:55; Osoegawa 2013). It is in this context Syria 
sought to exert it is complete influence on Lebanon, especially in the realms of politics, 
security and defence (Najem 2012:55). Syria’s influence on Hezbollah (an ally of Syria), 
enabled it to “play the Lebanese card” (Osoegawa 2013:96) as a bargaining chip in the 
struggle against Israel. Hezbollah, in return for Syria’s backing of its armed presence in 
Lebanon, tailored its operations to serve Syria’s interests in its struggle with Israel 
(Hinnebusch 1998; International Crisis Group 2017).  
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Syria’s influence on Lebanon broke when Rafik Hariri was assassinated in February 
2005 (Wieland 2016). Hariri’s assassination was largely blamed on Syria (Milton-
Edwards 2011). In April 2005, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed the 
resolution 1595, which called for the formation  of an Independent International 
Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) to assist the Lebanese state in its investigation in 
the Hariri’s killing (Salamey  2014:65). The UNSC 1595 reiterated the demand for the 
respect of Lebanon sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity under the 
exclusive and sole authority of the Lebanese state (Salamey 2014). Syria’s troops, 
under international  pressure and massive domestic anti-Syria’s protests, withdrew 
from Lebanon in April  2005. Syria withdrew its army but its intelligence apparatus have 
remained active in Lebanon since (see Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008:71; Salem 
2011; Salamey 2014). Syria’s role in Lebanon was retained through its Lebanese allies, 
especially the EMA under the leadership of Hezbollah and Iran.  
4.4 Syria’s Role in Dividing Sunnis 
The respondents’ interpretive understanding of Syria’s role in dividing the Lebanese 
Sunnis can be highlighted under the following sub-headings. 
4.4.1 Al-Ahbash as an Implant of Syria in the Sunni Politics    
From 1990 to 2005, Lebanon was under the Syrian’s sphere of  influence.  Syria was 
able to control all major appointments and  decisions in the Lebanese state from  the 
President down through the Prime Minister, the  Council of Ministers, and the various 
army and  security branches (Salem 1998; el-Khazen 2003). Freedom of political parties 
in Lebanon  was restricted and indeed, political parties were  compelled to co-operate 
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with the Syrian  regime in order to be represented in the cabinet or the  parliament. 
Otherwise, they could be banned from actively taking part in the political  process ‏
(Salem 1998; el-Khazen 2003).  
In this research, one respondent from the Haraki Salafists (Haraki Salafists1) indicates 
that during Syria’s role in Lebanon, it was difficult to witness the emergence of an 
influential Sunni grouping in Lebanon unless it is linked with Syria. He further states 
that Sunnis used to be suspicious about Sunni leaders and groups which were allowed 
to freely operate in Lebanon during Syria’s role in Lebanon. The views of the 
respondent is shown below 
Haraki Salafists1 “When‎ Syria‎ ruled‎ Lebanon,‎ it‎ was‎ impossible‎ to‎ witness‎ the‎
emergence of powerful Sunni groupings. We used to be suspicious about any Sunni 
faction that would be allowed to freely practise its activities during the Syrian presence 
in Lebanon. A clear example of this is al-Ahbash.” 
Syria used some Sunni groupings in Lebanon as a tool to counter other Sunni 
groupings and to create  intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon. The relationship 
between the Sufi-oriented Sunni grouping al-Ahbash and Syria epitomises how the 
latter broke through the politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon. The movement 
capitalised on the political opportunity structure of Syria being the main player in 
Lebanon and constructed its narratives in line with Syrian policies in Lebanon. It 
established deep connections with the Syrian intelligent agency (Nassif 2001; el-
Husseini 2012) and was classified by Rougier (2007:117) as Syria’s party in Lebanon.  
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Al-Ahbash’s Sufi-oriented brand of Islamism, which was perceived as moderate, plural 
and tolerant, appealed to the interests of the Syrian regime (Hamzeh 1997). In general, 
this Sufi-oriented grouping, i.e. al-Ahbash, (unlike al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, Hizb ut-
Tahrir, the Lebanese Salafists and the Tawheed Movement), did not constitute a threat 
to Syria because al-Ahbash and some other Sufi-oriented groupings are often 
portrayed as “politically quietist”; hence serving Syria’s interests in Lebanon (Jansen 
1986 as cited in Hamzeh and Dekmejian 1996:218).  Al-Ahbash, in this instance did not 
call for the establishment of an Islamic rule in Lebanon. The movement’s postures 
were not built on the basis of confronting the confessional political system in Lebanon 
so as to Islamise Lebanon; rather, it endorses the confessional system in Lebanon and 
asserts that any political changes should be attained from within the political system 
and not imposed from outside (Hamzeh 1997; Imad 2006; Rabil 2011). 
4.4.1.1 Counter-Framing al-Ahbash’s pro-Syria’s Frames  
 
In this research, some research respondents indicate that al-Ahabsh have “deceived” 
Sunnis under the guise of “Sufism”. In their opinion, al-Ahbash is not framed as a Sufi 
grouping but rather as a “tool”, used by the Syrian intelligence to “divide-and-rule” 
Sunnis and to “stab” them in the back. They are disliked among mainstream Sunnis, as 
one research participant from Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT1) indicates, due to their affiliation 
with Syria. Some participants go further to deny that al-Ahbash’s identity is Sunni and 
rather frame them as a group used by Syria to counter Sunni institutions and 
groupings in Lebanon especially Dar al-Fatwa, al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya and the Lebanese 
Salafists. The views of the respondents are shown below. 
LMS1 “Syria‎used‎al-Ahbash‎as‎a‎knife‎to‎stab‎Sunnis‎in‎the‎back.” 
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Non-Sunni1 “Al-Ahbash’s‎ are‎ linked‎with‎ the‎ Syrian‎ intelligence.‎ It was a Syrian tool 
inside the Sunnis community. They are said to be Sufis. I cannot see Sufism reflected in 
their‎behaviour…‎Al-Ahbash‎is‎not‎seen‎as‎a‎Sunni‎movement.”‎ 
Non-Sunni2 “Al-Ahbash became part of the Syrian intelligence. Al-Ahbash grouping are 
gangs.‎They‎deceive‎people…‎Al-Ahbash was created by Syria to face Sunni groupings 
that‎oppose‎Syria.” 
Centrist2 “Syria‎was‎worried‎about‎the‎presence‎of‎the‎JI.‎Syria‎was‎also‎worried‎about‎
the rise of Salafism. They therefore, backed al-Ahbash against these‎groupings.” 
HT1 “Al-Ahbash sees anyone who is not with them to be against them. Al-Ahbash is still 
disliked‎among‎mainstream‎Sunnis.” 
FM2 “Syria‎put‎al-Ahbash mainly to infuriate DF. They put them as a threat to DF and 
this happened in Beirut. They took over several mosques that belong to DF and they 
were‎protected‎by‎the‎Syrian‎intelligence‎at‎that‎time.” 
Some respondents deny that the struggle between al-Ahbash and Sunni groups in 
Lebanon is an intra-Sunni struggle and rather frame it as a “struggle between Syria and 
the Sunni community”. Al-Ahbash, in this instance, is employed by Syria as a tool in the 
struggle against the Lebanese Sunnis. Unlike mainstream Sunnis whose main 
opponents are Shias, al-Ahbash’s main opponents are “Sunnis who oppose Syria”.  
Some respondents think that al-Ahbash is more hostile toward Sunni counterparts 
(e.g. the al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya and Salafists) and less hostile toward non-Sunni 
counterparts (e.g. Hezbollah and Amal) reflecting the ambiguity of its political and 
religious formation. The views of the participants are shown below. 
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JI1 “It‎is‎a‎grouping‎used‎by‎the‎Syrian‎intelligence…‎We‎cannot‎say‎that‎the‎existence‎
of al-Ahbash is seen as a Sunni-Sunni struggle. It is a struggle between Sunnis and the 
Syrian intelligence.” 
Non-Sunni4 “Al-Ahbash was created by Syria. Al-Ahbash’s‎postures‎were‎not‎directed‎
against‎Christians,‎Druze‎or‎Shias.‎Sunnis‎are‎against‎Shias…‎Their‎main‎enemy‎is‎Shias.‎
Al-Ahbash, however, wanted to create problems in the intra-Sunni scene but they also 
failed.” 
Collectively, all of these respondents are of the view that the political presence of al-
Ahbash was “orchestrated” by Syria to justify the fears of other religious communities 
in Lebanon that if the Lebanese Sunnis cannot co-exist with each other, how could 
they be able to co-exist with other religious communities in Lebanon? The 
understanding of some respondents regarding Syria’s role in the Sunni politics is that 
Syria, through its support for al-Ahbash, sought to break through the Sunni politics and 
to discredit the Lebanese Sunnis in the eyes of other religious communities in 
Lebanon. 
4.4.1.2 First Intra-Sunni Violent Conflict in Lebanon 
 
Flowing from the excerpts presented (in 4.4.1), it can be said that Syria managed to 
employ al-Ahbash as a tool to counteract other Sunni movements, to weaken the 
internal Sunni arena and to keep it in a perpetual conflict so as to tighten its grip over 
the Lebanese Sunnis and to prevent any potential anti-Syrian camp emerging from 
within the Sunni community to challenge its influence on Lebanon (see Nassif 2001; 
Rougier 2015). The contentions between al-Ahbash and its Sunni counterparts reached 
168 
 
a climax when in August 1995; the political leader of al-Ahbash Nizar al-Halabi was 
assassinated in Beirut. It was said that the culprits were a radical Sunni Salafist 
grouping known as the League of Partisan (Usbat al-Ansar) (Pall 2013). In this research, 
two respondents are of the view that the struggle between the Lebanese Salafists and 
al-Ahbash is desribed as “the first violent intra-Sunni contestation” in Lebanon.  They 
were emphatic about this assertion in the following excerpts.  
 
FM2 “The‎intra-Sunni division turned into a violent one in the case of the contestation 
between the Salafists and al-Ahbash. Apart from that, Sunni disagreements were under 
control.” 
Non-Sunni1 “The‎ presence‎ of‎ al-Ahbash marked the first violent intra-Sunni 
contestation.” 
The above analysis shows that intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon has the 
potential to lead to violent conflicts resulting in loss of life and properties. It also 
shows that the Sunni politics is characterised by political tensions, which might be 
significant enough to lay the foundation for intra-Sunni violence (see Oberschall 1997; 
Diani 2013). Collectively, intra-Sunni political divides, which are the focus of this 
research, could lead to assassinations. The dire consequence associated with these 
developments is worrisome hence the need to find appropriate means of dealing with 
political issues associated with violence or assassinations.  
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4.4.2 The Activities of Syria and the Weakening of Dar al-Fatwa 
Syria’s policy in Lebanon, led by the Syrian intelligence focused on co-opting 
individuals, groupings and parties in exchange for political and/or economic gains (see 
Rabil 2014). If co-optation did not work, then assassination of opponents was carried 
out (see el-Husseini 2012; Pall 2013; Rabil 2014). Moreover, Syria did not only seek to 
divide and weaken the Lebanese Sunnis. They sought to weaken and divide other 
religious communities in Lebanon (Osoegawa 2013). The main point here is that Syria 
made almost all religious communities in Lebanon to serve its interests in Lebanon. 
Syria would support the unity of the religious communities in Lebanon as long as they 
are allied with Syria. Otherwise, Syria would divide or at least weaken these 
communities so that they would not be able to challenge it influence on Lebanon (see 
el-Husseini 2012; Salamey 2014). The research respondents indicate Syria considers 
individuals and communities in Lebanon as its enemy if they challenge its rule in 
Lebanon. For instance, one Sunni MP (MP1) claims that Sunni leaders who challenged 
Syria’s role in Lebanon were assassinated. The views of the respondents are shown in 
the following excerpts. 
TAM1 “Syria‎made‎almost‎all‎the‎Lebanese‎sects‎serve‎their‎interests.” 
FOMA2 “Syria‎ classified‎ people‎ into‎ allies‎ and‎ enemies;‎ you‎ are‎ either‎ an‎ agent to 
Syria‎or‎an‎enemy.” 
Non-Sunni3 “If‎you‎are‎with‎Syria,‎then‎Syria‎would‎back‎the‎unity‎of‎your‎community‎
as a whole. If Syria suspects that you are not loyal to them, they would prevent the 
unity‎of‎your‎community.” 
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Haraki Salafists1 “To‎be‎honest, Syria did not only divide the Sunni community. They 
created‎divisions‎in‎all‎sects.” 
FM2 “Syria‎ divided‎ Sunnis‎ that‎ is‎ correct.‎ They‎ also‎ supported‎ some‎ Christian‎
groupings against other Christian groupings. They supported some Shia groupings 
against‎other‎Shia‎groupings.‎We‎shall‎be‎precise.” 
LMS1 “As‎for‎Syria,‎it‎is‎either‎you‎are‎loyal‎to‎them‎or‎you‎are‎their‎enemy.” 
MP1 “Syria‎would‎kill‎ those‎who‎do‎not‎abide‎by‎ its‎orders.‎We‎know‎who‎killed‎ the‎
mufti‎Hassan‎Khalid.”‎ 
The above excerpts showed one of Syria’s strategies to deal with its opponents in 
Lebanon. Syria aimed at co- opting Dar al-Fatwa, the highest religious Sunni office, 
which oversees Sunni religious and legal affairs in  Lebanon. However, Dar al-Fatwa, 
under the leadership of the Grand Mufti of the Lebanese Republic  Hassan Khalid did 
not cooperate with them (el-Husseini 2012). In May 1989, the Mufti  Hassan Khalid was 
assassinated. The understanding of some participants is that the Mufti Hassan  Khalid 
was assassinated because of  his political stance against the Syrian influence on 
Lebanon. In their  opinion, the assassination of Khalid occurred in series of 
assassinations that deliberately targeted anti- Syria  Sunni political and religious leaders 
(e.g. shaykh Subhi al-Salih, shaykh Ahmad Assaf and the  MP  Nazim al-Kadri), who 
carried out national postures and called for the withdrawal of Syria’s  troops  from 
Lebanon.  The views of the participants is shown in the following quotes. ‏ 
Non-Sunni3 “Hassan‎ Khalid‎was‎ assassinated‎ because‎ of‎ his‎ political‎ stance‎ against‎
Syria.” 
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Non-Sunni1 “Both‎Hassan‎Khalid‎and‎Subhi‎al-Salih were known for their critical stance 
against the Syrian influence on Lebanon and this may be the cause of their 
assassination.” 
MP1 “Khalid’s‎ role‎ infuriated‎ Syria.‎ They‎ were‎ worried‎ of‎ the‎ Sunni‎ influence.‎ They‎
wanted‎a‎weak‎mufti‎who‎does‎what‎they‎wanted.” 
LMS1 “Khalid‎opposed‎the‎Syrian‎regime.” 
DF1 “Syria‎killed‎political‎and‎religious‎Sunni‎leaders…”  
Syria during its presence in Lebanon was in control of Dar al-Fatwa (Gambil 2007).  One 
respondent from Dar al-Fatwa (DF1) indicates that in the aftermath of the 
assassination of Hassan Khalid, Dar al-Fatwa was unable to play an active role in 
defending Sunnis due to Syria’s presence in Lebanon. Likewise, one Sunni respondent 
from the Fourteenth March Alliance (FOMA2) indicates that during Syria’s role in 
Lebanon, some Sunni religious clergies were appointed by Syria. The views of the 
participants are shown in the following quotes. 
Non-Sunni5 “The‎inability‎of‎Dar‎al-Fatwa to play its role in guidance and overseeing 
religious‎affairs‎will‎give‎Islamist‎parties‎the‎chance‎to‎grow.”   
DF1 “The‎ inability‎of‎the‎Mufti‎ to‎play‎his‎role‎ for‎approximately 25 years during the 
Syrian presence gave other parties roles to play. Syria put pressure on Dar al-Fatwa.” 
FOMA1 “The‎ Syrian‎ intelligence‎ during‎ its‎ presence‎ in‎ Lebanon‎ used‎ to‎ appoint‎
religious clergies and to create different religious groupings.” 
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Collectively, Dar al-Fatwa holds a substantial importance in the Sunni community in 
Lebanon due to its  position as the highest religious office for the Lebanese Sunnis 
notwithstanding their  political affiliations. However, due to its lack of grassroots 
popularity – in comparison  with religious-based and national-based Sunni groupings - 
Dar al-Fatwa built up  closer relations with Sunni political leaders and external players; 
hence it has become - to some extent -  affected by their interests (International Crisis 
Group 2010). This, again, had an influence  on its position as an arbiter between Sunni 
groupings because theoretically, Dar al-Fatwa  is supposed to be non-aligned. The 
failure of Dar al-Fatwa to challenge Syria has given other religious-based Sunni 
groupings in Lebanon the opportunity to proliferate and to challenge Dar al-Fatwa’s 
leadership (see Rougier 2007; Abdel-Latif 2008). Hence, Syria, through weakening Dar 
al-Fatwa, contributed to intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon. 
4.4.3 Syria’s Tactics of Countering Rafik Hariri 
Rafik Hariri’s ability to promote Lebanon as a hub for banking, tourism and 
investments was contingent on political stability in Lebanon (Salem 2011). Syria’s 
influence on Lebanon together with Hezbollah’s frequent clashes with Israel in South 
Lebanon weakened Hariri’s ability to fully achieve his objectives. In 1998, tensions 
between Syria and Rafik Hariri started to surface (International Crisis Group 2010). This 
was attributable to Hariri’s rising political and financial power. In Salem’s (2011:540) 
view, Hariri “had gone well beyond his businessman profile to emerge as the most 
influential political leader in Lebanon” (Salem 2011:540). This development infuriated 
the Alawi regime in Syria, which feared the rise of a Sunni leadership in Lebanon that 
may counter its influence on Lebanon (Salamey 2014). Therefore, in November 1998, 
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Syria arranged the election to the Lebanese presidency of the pro-Syria head of the 
Lebanese army Emile Lahoud (International Crisis Group 2010; Salem 2011; Salem 
2012). Lahoud placed himself in direct opposition to Hariri, and therefore, the latter, 
was pushed out of government (Salem 2011:540). 
In 2000, tensions between Syria and Hariri reached an alarming level following Hariri’s 
overwhelming triumph in the parliamentary elections, which enabled him to return to 
the Prime Minister’s Office (International Crisis Group 2010; Salem 2011). This 
development deepened the political tension between Hariri in the one hand, and Syria 
and Lahoud in the other hand (Salem 2011). In 2003, Rafik Hariri, under Syria’s 
pressure, was compelled to form a mostly pro-Syria government and soon later the 
Lebanese parliament extended Emile Lahoud’s presidential term in what was 
considered as a violation of the Lebanese constitution (International Crisis Group 
2010). In Hariri’s view, this was a turning point that pushed him to resign from the 
Lebanese government and join anti-Syria Lebanese opposition (see International Crisis 
Group 2010:5). 
In the context of this research, one respondent from the Future Movement (FM2) 
indicates that Syria did not want Rafik Hariri to dominate the politics of the Sunni 
community in Lebanon. Syria, in as much as they needed Hariri’s economic and 
political capital to re-build Lebanon, they feared his rising influence on the Lebanese 
politics may threaten their rule over Lebanon. The respondent further indicates that 
Syria did not only rely on leaders from other religious communities to counter Hariri. 
Rather, they resorted to leaders from within the Sunni community in Lebanon such as 
Abdul Rahim Mourad and Omar Karami to counter-balance Hariri. Syria, through its 
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support for Mourad and Karami did not only seek to weaken Hariri. It also sought to 
deepen intra-Sunni political division among Sunni leaders, hence affecting the 
solidarity and cohesion of the Sunni community in Lebanon. One Sunni MP (MP1) 
indicates that it was in the interest of Syria to prevent unity between Sunni leaders. 
The views of the participant are shown in the following excerpts. 
FM1 “Hariri’s‎ dominance‎would‎ not‎ serve‎ Syria’s‎ interests‎ in‎ Lebanon.‎ This‎ explains‎
why Syria supported al-Ahbash and other Sunnis such as Abdul Rahim Mrad and 
Ossama‎Saad‎to‎weaken‎Hariri‎or‎to‎counterbalance‎him.” 
FM1 “If Syria was unhappy with Hariri, they would not resort to Christians to counter 
him; there are other groupings from within the Sunni community, which hold good 
relations‎with‎Syria‎that‎could‎irritate‎Hariri.” 
MP1 “I‎remember‎one‎day,‎I‎told‎one‎of‎the‎former‎PM‎Omar‎Karami’s‎advisors:‎why‎
do not PM Rafik Hariri and PM Omar Karami unify with each other? He said: Syrians 
would‎not‎accept‎that.‎It‎serves‎their‎interests‎to‎keep‎Sunnis‎divided.” 
Syria’s tactics in countering Rafik Hariri were felt in its support for his Sunni rivals. For 
instance, Omar Karami, a former Sunni Prime Minister and head of the Arab Liberation 
Party, was an opponent of Rafik Hariri and a close ally with Syria (International Crisis 
Group 2010; Osoegawa 2013; Lefevre 2014). The Karami family are considered as one 
of the few Sunni families who are aligned with Syria (Osoegawa 2013). This is 
attributable to the long-standing relationship between the Karami family in Lebanon 
and the Assad family in Syria (Osoegawa 2013). Abdul Rahim Mourad, a former Sunni 
minister and head of the Union Party is a rival of Rafik Hariri and one of Syria’s key 
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Sunni allies in Lebanon (see International Crisis Group 2010:6). Syria backed Mourad in 
the face of Rafik Hariri in order to constrain the Hariri family’s perceived over-
monopolisation of the politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon.  
4.4.4 Frame Salience of Syria’s perceived pan-Arab Stance 
The role of Syria in Lebanon is not always framed in the context of its manipulation to 
divide and rule the Lebanese religious communities. For some Sunnis, they do not 
focus on Syria’s perceptual role of divide-and-rule in Lebanon. Rather, they focus on 
what they think a Syrian’s contribution to the end of the civil war and stability of 
Lebanon. 
Pan-Arab based Sunni groupings in Lebanon such as the Popular Nasserite 
Organisation and the Union Party are allied with Syria (International Crisis Group 
2010). For these Sunnis, Syria is framed as a “supporter of the Palestinian cause” and a 
“resistance force” whose alliance with Iran and Hezbollah helped Lebanon to counter-
balance Israel (see also a Pamphlet Published by the Popular Nasserite Organisation 
2014). Similarly, Syria’s depiction of itself as a “pan-Arab” state, or more accurately, as 
“the beating heart of Arabism” (Hinnebusch 2001), seems to resonate with the 
narratives of the pan-Arab Sunni groups. The views of the respondents are shown 
below.  
UP1 “We‎maintain‎ good‎ relations‎with‎ Syria…‎ Syria‎ ended‎ the‎ civil‎war‎ and‎ re-built 
state institutions. The stability of Lebanon is contingent on maintaining good relations 
with Syria. Lebanon should have good relations in Syria. This is stipulated in the Taif 
Accord.” 
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UP2 “We‎find‎in‎Syria‎a‎pan-Arab resistance leadership. Syria supported Palestine and 
created‎a‎resistance‎force‎against‎Israel.” 
The ability of pan-Arab Sunnis to strike the Sunni public as legitimate actors or to 
neutralise oppositions is contingent on the resonance between their ideology, frames 
and actions (see Williams 2007:105). The resonance between pan-Arab Sunni frames 
and the existing cultural narratives within the Sunni milieu is important for 
mobilisation and collective actions. The Lebanese Sunnis are generally supportive of 
the Palestinian cause and the idea of supporting Palestine and resisting Israel is central 
to the beliefs and values of various Sunnis. Similarly, Syria’s evoking of pan-Arabism 
resonates with the cultural narration of various Sunnis who aim at the unity of the 
Arab states. Hence, pan-Arab Sunni groupings, by using salient frames to the Lebanese 
Sunnis such as “defending Palestine”, “resistance against Israel” and “pan-Arabism”, 
they make their message meaningful in the eyes of their Sunni followers. 
4.5 Framing of Saudi Arabia’s Role in Intra-Sunni Political 
division in Lebanon 
Some Sunni respondents indicate that the Lebanese Sunnis have always relied on 
Saudi Arabia to protect them against several internal threats. In their opinion, the 
Sunni community in Lebanon has been loyal to Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia is 
framed as “the guardian for the Lebanese Sunnis”. One Sunni political leader 
(Centrist1) indicates that “as the prayer direction of all Muslims is to the city of Mecca 
in Saudi Arabia, the political direction of all the Lebanese Sunnis is to Saudi Arabia”. 
Some respondents go further to assert that the influence of Sunni political leaders and 
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groups on the politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon is dependent on having 
good relationship with Saudi Arabia. This shows the impact that Saudi Arabia has on 
the Lebanese Sunnis. It also shows how some Sunni political leaders are craving for 
external patronage to solidify their political positions. Even pro-Syria, pro-Iran Sunni 
leaders in Lebanon, who disagree with Saudi Arabia’s policy line, acknowledge the 
importance of Saudi Arabia, as a Sunni state, for the Lebanese Sunnis. They have no 
options but to at least co-operate or maintain a moderate discourse regarding Saudi 
Arabia to maintain their leadership in the Sunni community in Lebanon. The views of 
the participants are shown in the following excerpts. 
FM1 “We‎Sunnis‎feel‎like‎we‎are‎loyal‎to‎Saudi.” 
Centrist3 “Saudi‎became‎the‎guardian‎for‎the‎Lebanese‎Sunnis.” 
FOMA1 “If‎you‎want‎to‎be‎a‎Sunni‎leader,‎you‎have‎to‎be‎an‎ally‎with‎Saudi.” 
Centrist1 “As‎the‎prayer‎direction of all Muslims is to Mecca, the political direction of 
all‎the‎Lebanese‎Sunnis‎is‎to‎Saudis.” 
UP2 “We‎are‎not‎opponents‎of‎Saudi‎Arabia.” 
Saudi Arabia has established a long-standing relationship, not only with the Lebanese 
Sunnis, but with all the Lebanese religious communities including the Lebanese 
Christians, Druze and Shias. Saudi Arabia’s financial support for Lebanon has not been 
limited to the Lebanese Sunnis. Rather, it has been extended to include other religious 
communities as well as state institutions (e.g. the Lebanese army and the Lebanese 
Central Bank). Saudi Arabia’s key role as a mediator between the warring factions in 
the Lebanese civil  war increased its impact on the Lebanese politics (el-Husseni 2004; 
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Salamey 2014). In 1989, Saudi Arabia  hosted the Taif Accord which ended the civil war 
in Lebanon (el-Husseini 2004). The accord solidified Saudi Arabia’s political presence in 
Lebanon but its influence on the  Lebanese power dynamics remained limited as 
compared with Syria, which dominated the  Lebanese politics until its withdrawal from 
Lebanon in 2005 (Berti 2012; Najem 2012).  
Non-Sunni1 “Saudi‎Arabia‎established‎relations‎with‎all‎the‎Lebanese‎people‎not‎only‎
with Sunnis but with Christians, Druze, and even‎with‎Shias.” 
LMS1 “In‎fact,‎most‎of‎Saudi‎Arabian’s‎spending‎went‎to‎non-Sunnis. Saudis were very 
generous‎with‎Christians‎and‎the‎Lebanese‎army.” 
MP1 “The‎Lebanese‎Shias,‎Christians‎and‎Druze‎benefited‎from‎Saudi‎Arabia’s‎support.‎
We appreciate that.”  
From 1990 to 2005 the role of Saudi Arabia in the Lebanese politics was felt through its 
funding to  the re-construction of post-war Lebanon and its financial and political 
support for the Hariri  family (Salamey 2014). Saudi Arabia’s support to Lebanon was 
channelled through its main Sunni ally in  Lebanon the former Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri (Perti 2012; Perti 2016). The close relations  between the Hariri family and the 
Saudi royal family have become an essential factor for  explaining the role of Saudi 
Arabia in the Lebanese politics (Berti 2012). It is in this context that  Saudi Arabia 
maintained its influence on Lebanon during the 1990s whilst trying not to upset 
or  challenge the Syrian’s influence on Lebanon (Perti 2012; Perti 2016).  
In 2005, the assassination of Rafik Hariri shocked and infuriated Saudi Arabia (Berti 
2012). Saudi  Arabia saw that the assassination of Hariri was a strike against its main 
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representative in Lebanon  and therefore it insisted that the Lebanese state should 
work hard to unfold the truth behind  Hariri’s assassination (Safa 2006; Osoegawa 
2013). Saudi Arabia suspected that Syria was behind the  assassination of Hariri and 
therefore, it pushed for the withdrawal of Syria’s troops from  Lebanon (Berti 2012; 
Osoegawa 2013). It is therefore unsurprising to note that Saudi Arabia supported the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC)  1559, which demanded the Syrian’s troops to 
withdraw from Lebanon (Safa 2005). Saudi Arabia began to  explicitly abandon its 
endorsement of the Syrian role in Lebanon and gradually started, along  with United 
States and France to put pressure on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon (Berti 2012).  
The withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon enabled Saudi Arabia and Iran to deepen their 
involvement in  the Lebanese politics (Osoegawa 2013). The rising influence of Iran on 
the Lebanese politics  worsened the Iranian-Saudi Arabian relationship and 
alternatively strengthened the Syrian-Iranian  alliance (Osoegawa 2013). Saudi Arabia’s 
involvement in Lebanon was understood in the context of  countering its main regional 
rivals in Lebanon: Iran and Syria. Saudi capitalised on its shared  religious Sunni identity 
with the Lebanese Sunnis and increased its funding for non-state Sunni  actors such as 
the Lebanese Salafists and the Future Movement in order to counter the  influence of 
Iran, Syria and Hezbollah on the Lebanese politics (see Aarts and van Duijne 
2009;  Lefevre 2014).  
However, the current situation of Saudi Arabia regarding their influence on Lebanon as 
compared to Iran is discouraging for some Sunnis. Some research participants think 
that it is not enough for Saudi Arabia to support Lebanon financially in order to 
counter-balance Iran. Rather, they think that for Saudi Arabia to safeguard its 
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influence on Lebanon it should combine its financial investments with political 
investments. The views of the research respondents are shown below. 
Haraki Salafists1 “Why‎does‎Saudi Arabia leave the Lebanese Sunnis struggling against 
Iran? For Saudi to safeguard its influence and interests in Lebanon, aids shall also be 
accompanied‎with‎political‎investment”. 
Saudi Arabia, which is considered as the main supporter of the Lebanese Sunnis, has 
decreased its financial and political support for its main Sunni allies in Lebanon (e.g. 
the Future Movement), while Iran financially, ideologically and politically supports its 
Shia and Sunni allies in Lebanon. For instance, the 2009 financial crisis of the Future 
Movement was attributable by the research respondents to the lack of Saudi Arabia’s 
financial support. Indeed, two respondents form the Future Movement (FM1) and 
(FM3) admit that Saudi Arabia has curtailed its support for the Future Movement 
regardless of the Future Movement alliance with Saudi Arabia. Another respondent 
from Dar al-Fatwa (DF1) indicates that Sunnis are surprised about Saudi Arabia’s 
reluctance to support the Lebanese Sunnis. This might be attributable to the fact that 
Saudi Arabia’s support to the Future Movement did not enable Saudi Arabia to 
counter Iran’s dominance over Lebanon. However, the participant indicates that Iran is 
playing a role in the Lebanese politics and it is not expected from Saudi Arabia to 
decrease its support for the Lebanese Sunnis while Iran is heavily supporting its allies 
in Lebanon. The views of the respondents are shown below 
FM1 “We‎generally‎agree‎with‎Saudi’s‎policy‎line.‎Saudi‎used‎to‎support‎Sunnis‎most‎of‎
the time. However, in recent years‎Saudis‎have‎stopped‎to‎assist‎us.” 
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FM2 “The Future Movement is politically in line with Saudi. Saudi still trusts the Future 
Movement. As for financial issues, Saudi has curtailed its financial support to the 
Future Movement since‎2009.” 
Centrist2 “The‎current‎financial‎crisis‎in‎the‎Future Movement is because of the lack of 
the‎Saudi’s‎support.” 
DF1 “We‎ are‎ surprised‎ about‎ Saudi’s‎ reluctance.‎ Saudi‎ did‎ not‎ explain‎ to‎ us‎ why‎ it‎
stopped financial support. They may think that their project in Lebanon has not been 
completely successful. Saudi has been neutral in a time neutrality is unacceptable 
because‎Iran‎is‎playing‎a‎role‎in‎the‎Lebanese‎arena.” 
Non-Sunni1 “The‎Future Movement has‎been‎recently‎deprived‎from‎Saudi’s‎support,‎
whilst Iran ideologically,‎politically‎and‎financially‎supports‎Hezbollah.” 
Some participants think entirely in sectarian terms in that they criticise Saudi Arabia 
for not helping Sunnis to counter Iran. In their views, Iran has a clear and consistent 
long-term ideology, which is aiming to achieve in Lebanon. Iran seeks to abolish the 
nation-state Lebanon through de-confessionalising the Lebanese political system and 
establishing an Islamic order in line with the Shia interpretation of Islam (Haddad 
2013:18). For Iran, the establishment of Islamic order in Lebanon represents the 
realisation of the “Shia Crescent” campaign to convey the message of the Iranian 
Islamic revolution and the adherence to the Khomeni’s conceptualisation of the notion 
of “wilayat al-faqih” guardianship of the jurist (Norton 2007; Shanahan 2008:45).  
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According to the research respondents, Iran knows how to choose reliable Shia and 
Sunni allies in Lebanon in order to export its ideology in Lebanon. Since the 1980s, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran has been considered as Hezbollah’s main patron (Najem 2012). 
Iran supported Hezbollah’s rise from a disorganised faction to an irregular power 
capable of challenging states’ military powers through providing all category of help 
that countries can offer to non-state actors (DeVore and Stähli 2015:  350-351).  
  
On the contrary, some research respondents claim that Saudi Arabia seeks to protect 
the nation-state Lebanon and assist the legitimacy of the Lebanese state. They indicate 
that Saudi Arabia does not aim at establishing a theocratic Sunni Islamic rule in 
Lebanon. However, the respondents note that Saudi Arabia’s policies toward the 
Lebanese Sunnis are “ambiguous” and “inconsistent” and its role and influence on 
Lebanon cannot match that of Iran. In their views, Saudi Arabia’s Sunni allies in 
Lebanon are weak, unreliable, and are unable to counter-balance Iran. The ambiguity 
and inconsistency of Saudi Arabia’s policies regarding the Lebanese Sunnis weaken the 
power position of Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis Iran and pave the way for an increasing Iranian 
influence on Lebanon. The responses of the research respondents are shown in the 
following excerpts. 
  
UP1 “The‎Iranians‎know‎well‎how‎to‎choose‎their‎allies,‎unlike‎the‎Arabs.‎Iran‎not‎only‎
built alliances, they built strategic relations with their allies. Saudi dealt with Sunni 
allies‎but‎those‎allies‎are‎weak‎and‎unreliable.‎That‎is‎why‎Iran‎succeeded.” 
183 
 
Non-Sunni1 “Whoever‎ observes‎ Saudi’s‎ policy‎ toward‎ Sunnis‎ in‎ Lebanon‎ would‎ feel‎
buzzled.‎There‎is‎ambiguity‎and‎inconsistency...” 
Non-Sunni3 “Saudi‎ Arabia‎ as‎ compared to Iran did not have the interest to build a 
Sunni‎rule‎in‎Lebanon…” 
Non-Sunni2 “Saudi‎ assists‎ the‎ Lebanese‎ state‎ whilst‎ Iran‎ assists‎ militias.‎ Saudi‎ role‎
seeks to protect nation-state‎while‎Iran’s‎goal‎is‎to‎abolish‎nation-state.” 
The Syrian war, which began in 2011, signalled a shift in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in 
Lebanon. Saudi Arabia’s infuriation of Iran’s dominance over Lebanon and its 
involvement in Syria to support the Assad regime led to Saudi Arabia to reduce its 
political presence and support for Lebanon (Bahout et al. 2016; Bernard 02/03/2016). 
For example, in 2016, Saudi Arabia decided to cancel billions of dollars of aid to the 
Lebanese official army (Hannah 2016). The Saudi state urged its Saudi citizens to avoid 
travelling to Lebanon and declared Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation (Bernard 
02/03/2016).  
In addition, Saudi Arabia reduced its financial support for the Future Movement 
(Vloeberghs 2015). The declining Saudi Arabian support for the Future Movement 
resulted in the failure of the latter to craft a truly convincing vision that responds to 
Sunni socio-economic and political needs (Vloeberghs 2015). It also resulted the 
weakening of the Future Movement’s patronage of its Sunni constituency (Vloeberghs 
2015). 
The disempowering of Saudi Arabia’s main Sunni ally in Lebanon (i.e. the Future 
Movement) resulted in the rise of rival radical Sunni political leaders, who contested 
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the Future Movement political leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon and its 
inability to counter Hezbollah. It also increased Iran’s political and financial influence 
on Lebanon, because Iran, on different occasions, has offered to support the Lebanese 
army. In addition, Iran provided its ally Hezbollah with various forms of financial, 
ideological and political assistance, which proved invaluable for the party’s 
development (DeVore and Stähli 2015:351). These development further undermined 
Saudi Arabia’s influence on Lebanon in comparison with Iran (Perti 2016). 
4.5.1 Saudi Arabia’s Role in Dividing Sunnis 
Some Sunni respondents frame Saudi Arabia’s role in Lebanon as “unifying”, indicating 
that Saudi Arabia does not seek to divide the Lebanese Sunnis but rather seek to 
strengthen them and unify them. Saudi Arabia’s shared Muslim “Sunni” religious 
identity with the Lebanese Sunnis has played a key role in the former’s willingness to 
unify the Sunni political front in Lebanon irrespective of their affiliations and political 
alignments. The involvement of Saudi Arabia in the Sunni politics is understandable in 
the context of backing the stability of Lebanon, strengthening the solidarity of Sunnis 
and countering the influence of Iran on the Lebanese politics. Therefore, it would be in 
the interest of Saudi Arabia to have a unified political Sunni front than a divided one.  
Haraki Salafists1 “Saudi‎does‎not‎want‎to‎divide‎Sunnis.‎It‎is‎not‎in‎Saudi’s‎interests‎to‎
divide‎Sunnis.‎They‎want‎the‎Lebanese‎Sunnis‎to‎be‎strong.” 
FOMA2 “The‎role‎of‎Saudi‎in‎Lebanon‎is‎unifying.‎Saudis‎invited‎me‎to‎and‎I‎met‎with‎
King‎Salman.‎I‎went‎alone‎and‎I‎did‎not‎feel‎that‎the‎role‎of‎Saudi‎was‎exclusionary.” 
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FM2 “Saudi‎ Arabia‎ does‎ not‎ play‎ a‎ role‎ in‎ dividing‎ the‎ Lebanese‎ Sunnis.‎ On‎ the‎
contrary, they try to unify opposed Sunnis grouping the Future Movement and the 
Union Party.” 
MP1 “Saudi‎Arabia‎does‎not‎play‎a‎role‎in‎dividing‎the‎Lebanese‎Sunnis.‎Its‎role‎was‎to‎
unify‎Sunnis.‎There‎was‎a‎Saudi‎tendency‎to‎unify‎Sunnis‎and‎not‎to‎exclude‎anybody” 
Centrist2 “Saudi‎Arabia‎does‎not‎seek‎to‎divide‎the‎Lebanese‎Sunnis…‎on‎the‎contrary‎
what‎ I‎ have‎observed‎ from‎Saudi‎Arabian’s‎ sayings‎and‎actions‎ is‎ that‎ that‎ they‎are‎
concerned‎about‎the‎unity‎of‎the‎Sunni‎community...”‎‎‎ 
Saudi Arabia’s support for Sunni leaders who are in leadership positions (i.e. the 
Future Movement) is an issue of  concern for the participants. The Future Movement is 
Saudi Arabia’s main Sunni ally in Lebanon (see International Crisis Group 2010; 
Khashan 2013; Rougier 2015). Yet, Saudi Arabia’s relations with the Sunni community 
in Lebanon are not restricted to a particular Sunni grouping or a leader. Saudi Arabia 
holds good relationship with other Sunni political leaders and organisations in Lebanon 
notwithstanding their various ideological orientations (e.g. the centrist former Prime 
Minister Najib Mikati, the pro-Syria former Minister Abdul Rahim Mourad, the leader 
of the pan-Arab-based Union Party and the anti-Syria, anti-Iran former Minister of 
Justice Ashraf Rifi). The research participants note that Saudi Arabia adopted the 
Future Movement because its policies were in line with Saudi Arabia’s interests in 
Lebanon and they do not mind adopting other Sunni leaders or groups as long as they 
support Saudi Arabia’s policies in Lebanon. The views of the research respondents are 
shown in the following excerpts.  
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Centrist2 “Saudi‎ Arabia‎ adopted‎ Rafik‎ Hariri.‎ After‎ Hariri’s‎ death,‎ Saudi‎ Arabia‎
adopted Saad Hariri. But it is clear and I heard this directly from the Saudi officials that 
Saudi does not restrict‎its‎relations‎in‎Lebanon‎to‎a‎particular‎Sunni‎grouping…” 
FM2 “Within the‎Sunni‎community‎in‎Lebanon,‎Saudi’s‎relations‎are‎not‎confined‎to‎the‎
Hariri family. They hold good relations with Najib Mikati. They also have some sort of 
relations‎with‎Abdul‎Rahim‎Mourad…” 
On the contrary, three Sunni participants including a Sunni member of the parliament 
(MP1), a Haraki Salafist (Haraki Salafists1) and a member of the League of Muslim 
Scholars (LMS1) counter-frame the narratives that Saudi Arabia supports all Sunni 
groups in Lebanon. They claim that Saudi Arabia does not support any Sunni groupings 
other than the Future Movement. Moreover, they doubt that the current Saudi 
Arabian’s policies in Lebanon would lead to the unification of the Lebanese Sunnis. In 
their opinion, Saudi Arabia has limited their support for the Lebanese Sunnis to the 
Future Movement regardless of the perceived inability of the latter to empower the 
Lebanese Sunnis. These participants further claim that the Future Movement is not 
doing anything for the sake of Sunnis. The views of the respondents are shown below. 
HarakiSalafists1 “Does‎Saudi‎Arabia’s‎ policy‎ in‎ Lebanon‎unify‎ Sunnis?‎ I‎ doubt‎ it.‎We‎
would have wished that the Hariri family has led Sunnis to ensure their power, dignity 
and‎to‎really‎become‎influential‎ in‎Lebanon…‎we‎disagree‎with‎the‎Sunni‎ leaders‎and‎
their backers Saudi in that the Hariri family and the Future Movement are doing 
nothing for Sunnis sake. We appeal to Saudi to re-consider its options. Does that option 
serve‎the‎interest‎of‎the‎Sunnis?” 
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LMS1 “Saudi‎ Arabia‎ as‎ a‎ state‎ with‎ respect‎ to‎ supporting‎ Sunnis‎ only‎ supports the 
Future Movement.‎Saudi‎Arabian‎supports‎Sunnis‎through‎the‎Hariri‎family.”‎ 
MP1 “Politically‎ speaking,‎ the‎Future Movement is the only Sunni grouping that gets 
support‎from‎Saudi‎Arabia.”‎‎ 
The perceptions that Saudi Arabia limits its support for the Lebanese Sunnis to the 
Future Movement lead to “intra-Sunni political division”. This is mainly because there 
are some Sunnis, who disagree with the policies of the Future Movement. Collectively, 
some Sunni respondents indicate that Saudi Arabia needs to re-consider its support for 
the Future Movement, and more importantly, to clarify whether or not its support for 
the Future Movement serves the interests of Saudi Arabia as well as the interests of 
the Lebanese Sunnis.  
4.6 Situating the Frames of Alliance-Building in the Context of 
the Sunni Politics  
In this part, alliances between external state actors specifically (Iran, Syria and Saudi 
Arabia) and its attendant impact on the politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon is 
examined with the hope of exploring potential challenges that have explicit or implicit 
implications on the unity of the Lebanese Sunnis. These state actors as the data has 
revealed (see 4.1, 4.4 and 4.5) built these alliances with the Lebanese Sunni groupings 
with the possibility of exporting their ideological standings to Lebanon and maintaining 
political influence on Lebanon. These external state actors, by exporting their 
ideologies, have weakened the sovereignty and autonomy of the Lebanese state and 
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generated tensions and conflicts at the inter- and intra-communal levels to the point 
of drawing Lebanon to the risk position of a failed state. 
Contextually, Iran became the main player in the Lebanese politics to replace Syria as 
the leading force in Lebanon  and to continue to employ Hezbollah as a key tool in its 
struggle for power against its main rivals in the  Middle East region: Israel and Saudi 
Arabia (Wiegand 2009: 671). The rise of the Iranian influence on  Lebanon worsened 
the Iranian-Saudi Arabian relationship and consolidated the Syrian-Iranian alliance 
(Osoegawa 2013). The configuration of power dynamics between these key regional 
states Saudi  Arabia, Syria and Iran has influenced the Lebanese politics and nurtured 
sectarian tensions, domestic  polarisation and violent conflicts (see Osoegawa 2013; 
Wahlisch and Felsch 2016). Saudi Arabia, in this  context, considered the strength of 
the Sunni community in Lebanon as an echo of its influence on the  Middle East region 
(Osoegawa 2013). On the other hand, Iran, likewise Syria, considered the strength  of 
the Shia community in Lebanon as an echo of their influence on the Middle East region 
(Osoegawa  2013). The relationship between these regional powers (i.e. Saudi Arabia, 
Syria and Iran) and Lebanon  was not limited to the state level but was extended to 
include relations with non-state sectarian- based Lebanese actors (Osoegawa 2013). 
For example, Saudi Arabia’s support for the Future  Movement and the Lebanese 
Salafists was understood in the context of countering the Syrian-Iranian  influence on 
Lebanon, whilst Iran’s support for the Hezbollah was understood in the context 
of  countering Saudi Arabia’s influence on Lebanon and the Middle East (Osoegawa 
2013). 
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It is understandable that a set of state and non-state actors within shared aims solidify 
their position when cooperating or allying their activism or even joining coalitions or 
forces (Rucht 2007:202). This is true in the case of the Sunni politics in Lebanon. This 
research suggests that there are instances where Sunni organisations and leaders form 
alliances with governments, regional states and international agencies to pursue social 
change objectives and advance their interests. The data of the research are indicative 
of the fact that some Sunni groupings and leaders in Lebanon build ideological 
alliances with regional state actors (e.g. Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia). These external 
actors often share the same religious ideology or political agenda with these Sunni 
movements in Lebanon. It is believed that the development of these relations could 
serve as catalyst for socio-economic development of the Lebanese state and hence 
serving Lebanon’s national interests but could also be used to serve the political 
interests of Sunni movements to counter-mobilise and to counter-frame their 
Lebanese Sunni opponents. In this sense, the reliance on external powers may not 
bring about solidarity between Sunni movements; rather, it could threaten national 
cohesion and nurture intra-Sunni political divides. 
For Sunni movements and leaders in Lebanon, it is believed that alliance-building is 
often a costly and risky operation (Diani 2003:118). It implies the recognition of 
commonalities and points of convergence between actors with distinct agendas, often 
competing, and sometimes positively distrustful of each other (Hathaway and Meyer 
1994; Melucci 1996; Rochon and Meyer 1997). In this context, the risky nature of 
alliance-building between Sunni movements in Lebanon and external actors is 
manifested in the forms of conflict, tensions and distrust between Sunni movements 
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and leaders. The issues promoting these kinds of challenges are based on 
commonalities and divergences  between these organisations and external actors: 
Saudi Arabia (Sunnis), Iran (Shias) and Syria (Alawis). The different and sometimes 
opposing ideological standings of Sunni movements are manifest in the Lebanese case.  
The transnational movement Hizb ut-Tahrir, for instance, seeks to re-establish the 
Islamic state of the caliphate  (see 3.1.5), al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s ideology is influenced 
by the school of thought of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was established in Egypt in 
1928 (see 3.1.3), al-Ahbash’s ideology is influenced by the Rifaiyya Sufi order and is 
politically affiliated with Syria (see 4.4.1), the pan-Arab Sunni groupings the Popular 
Nasserite Organisation and the Union Party are ideologically affiliated with pan-
Arabism in its Nasserite form and consider themselves as pan-Arab first and Sunni 
second (see 3.1.7), the national Sunni grouping the Future Movement is politically 
affiliated with Saudi Arabia (4.6) and the Lebanese Salafists have arguably advocated 
three ideological positions in Lebanon ranging from “purist” apolitical, to “haraki” 
political and to “jihadist”, and have been influenced by different Salafist school of 
thoughts in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait and elsewhere (Pall 2013; Rabil 2014). 
In this context, some of the Sunni movements in their framing and counter-
framing  activities claim to be more Sunnis than the others (see 4.4.1). What is more 
worrying is the fact that the claims of some Lebanese Sunnis that some of the Sunni 
movements and leaders in Lebanon are not Sunnis because of their affiliation with Iran 
(a Shia state) and their affiliation with Syria (an Alawi state). The data in (4.4.1) shows 
that some Sunni actors deny that al-Ahbash’s identity is Sunni and rather frame it as a 
“tool” used by Syria to divide the Lebanese Sunnis. Likewise, the data in (3.2.6) 
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indicates that some Sunni actors think that it is false to classify the Future Movement 
as a grouping that represents Sunnis. The negative aspect of ideology is that it may 
help to sustain the self, but sometimes at the expense of intra-Sunni tolerance, 
understanding and solidarity (see Gecas 2000: 99). 
The tensions associated with these claims and counter-claims regarding ideology and 
ideological importation may not end soon if serious efforts are not taken in order to 
secure the future of Lebanon. This research explores the possibilities of ending these 
intra-Sunni political tensions that seem to threaten the Lebanese national cohesion 
and democratic credentials. The ability of Sunni movements in Lebanon to transcend 
their ideological differences and to coordinate is therefore critical to their potential for 
success in achieving national goals and improving the lives of their constituents. 
Alliance-building is also expected to arise from the necessity of coordinating with a 
monopolistic or powerful financial provider (Zald and McCarthy 1979). The data from 
the field demonstrates that Hezbollah’s frequent engagement with Israel on different 
occasions has served as a source of interest for some Sunni groupings and leaders (e.g. 
the Tawheed Movement, al-Ahbash, the Popular Nasserite Organisation, the Union 
Party, the Arab Liberation Party and the Islamic Action Front), which think that Iran 
and Hezbollah are defending the dignity of Arabs and Muslims (see 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 
4.1.3). Hezbollah is perceived as the most influential player on the Lebanese politics. 
Therefore, these Lebanese Sunni movements capitalised on the political opportunity 
of Hezbollah being the arbitrator of the Lebanese politics and built an alliance with 
them in order to be able to actively take part in the politics of the Sunni community in 
Lebanon.  
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The above analysis is suggestive of the fact that alliance-building is influenced by 
environmental circumstances in that it has the potential to be built when either 
political threat or opportunities emerge (Staggenborg 1986). When Sunni movement 
organisations sense that environmental conditions are suitable for achieving their 
goals, they may share the willingness in joining forces in order to be able to gain 
victory (Zald and Ash 1966; Zald and McCarthy 1979 as cited in Staggenborg 1986). 
Similarly, when Sunni movement organisations are in crisis or when they face a hostile 
counter-movement, coalitions and alliances are likely to be built (Staggenborg 1986). 
 
The data (in 4.5) shows how some Sunni actors are craving for an alliance with Saudi 
Arabia in order to counter-balance Iran and to solidify their political status. They frame 
Saudi Arabia as “the guardian of the Lebanese Sunnis” and indicate that the Lebanese 
Sunnis are “loyal” to Saudi Arabia (see 4.5). In addition, the data (in 4.5) shows how 
some Sunni actors encourage Saudi Arabia to increase its financial and political 
support for the Lebanese Sunnis in order to challenge Iran (see 4.5).  
 
Core state actors like Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia may intervene in the domestic 
political process so as to support groupings that are favourable to their ideological and 
economic interests (Smith 2007:313). These activities are usually legitimated or 
justified on the ground that those core states are helping to support the processes of 
democratic development in the country in question (Smith 2007:313). The data from 
the field are indicative of the fact that the Future Movement receives external funding 
from Saudi Arabia (see 4.5). The data also reveals that the former Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri was supported by Saudi Arabia, France and the United States, which contributed 
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to his dominance in the Sunni politics (see 3.2.1). The reliance on external support may 
result in these Sunni groupings and leaders to be influenced by external actors whose 
policies may affect Sunni unity. It could also weaken Sunni autonomy and 
independence because decision-making, in the case, may be imposed from external 
actors. These decisions may serve the interests of the core states but not necessarily 
the interest of Sunni movements or the Lebanese state at large.     
The analysis in this section has revealed that these external alliances have led to 
polarisation, tensions, conflicts and sometimes political turmoil in Lebanon. The idea 
that resources are extended to Sunni movements in Lebanon for purposes of 
mobilisation and de-mobilisation of Sunni movements, adherents and activities goes 
far beyond mere support to mobilising special movements and movements’ leaders to 
creating a fertile ground for their ideological positions and to have an influence on 
Lebanon. These kinds of positions do not benefit Lebanon as a state. Lebanon has the 
potential and leaders to carry out their religious activities without relying on external 
agents; home grown ideas and resources can help minimise these tensions and 
conflicts.  
4.7 Framing the Competition between Sunni Movements and 
Leaders in Lebanon  
In this section the competition between Sunni movements and leaders in Lebanon 
which has been generated by the activities of the external players to gain influence on 
Sunni power dynamics in Lebanon would be the focus of the analysis. The struggle to 
gain greater influence on Lebanon by the external players (i.e. Iran, Saudi Arabia and 
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Syria), which this research has argued (in 4.7), has generated conflicts, tensions and 
affected national cohesion and unity in Lebanon. These kinds of challenges as the data 
has revealed (in 4.1, 4.3 and 4.5) partly emanated from this kind of competition. My 
analysis is not against democratic competition or diversity as they are the hallmark of 
the political realm in Lebanon (Grzymala-Busse 2007; Jones 2013) but it examines the 
extremist tendencies and the kind of competitions, created by external players, which 
are generating tensions in Lebanon and are potentially affecting Sunni’s unity, national 
cohesion and democratic credentials of Lebanon.  
The establishment of party competition is essential for effective governance and 
democratic consolidation (Grzymala-Busse 2007; Jones 2013). A long-standing 
conviction in the fields of politics suggests that competition “hinders elite opportunism 
and the seeking of excess to profits or private benefits” (Grzymala-Busse 2007:91). It is 
associated with greater levels of service providing, accountability, transparency in 
governance and lower levels of corruption. The existence of various competing 
political actors is likely to enhance representation, “both by encompassing wider 
constituencies and by providing all voters with alternatives to the government 
program” (Grzymala-Busse 2007:92). The analysis in this section considers competition 
amongst Sunni movements in Lebanon in the context of the framing theory. This 
research argues that diversity, pluralism and healthy competition are required 
amongst movements in order to achieve the goals of democratic development and 
democratic competition in Lebanon.   
The Sunni politics in Lebanon is characterised by the existence and coexistence 
between various pan-Arab, national and religious Sunni leaders in Lebanon. These 
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leaders differ in their social bases, political orientations, external links, political 
experiences and strategic preferences (Rucht 2007). Sunni leaders often engage in 
framing and counter-framing activities to appeal to the Sunni public and to gain 
control of the Sunni masses. The case of the Sunni Prime Ministers Saad Hariri and 
Najib Mikati is the epitome of competition between Sunni political leaders in Lebanon 
over the leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon (see 3.2.2). As part of their 
framing activities, Saad Hariri adherents frame Najib Mikati as a “pro-Syria” and an 
“ally with Hezbollah” in order to de-mobilise his supporters (see 3.2.2). On the 
contrary, as part of their counter-framing activities, Najib Mikati’s adherents accuse 
Saad Hariri of seeking to “monopolise” the political leadership of the Sunni community 
in Lebanon (see 3.2.2).  Collectively, the above framings and counter framings are 
suggestive of the fact that the Sunni politics in Lebanon is diverse and is not 
monopolised by the Hariri family, regardless of their prominence in the Sunni milieu. 
There are several Sunni leaders, with various backgrounds, who compete against each 
other for the leadership of the Sunni politics in Lebanon (see 3.2.2).   
Competition between movement organisations is the pursuit of outcomes and 
rewards in a mutually exclusive way (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:216; Tilly and Wood 
2013:135). In the Sunni context, competition often inhibits the pursuit of control of 
Sunni groupings over the Sunni politics, governmental activities and financial 
resources. Even though Sunni movements in Lebanon could be perceived to share the 
same general gaol(s), it is clear in this research that they may have different 
ideological and organisational needs which may contribute to differences over certain 
tactics as well as competition for resources (Staggenborg 1986:388). The level to which 
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Sunni movements would compete or cooperate with each another is indeed 
problematic.  
Many Sunni movement organisations in Lebanon in their attempt to fund their 
activities resort to external players for external support. Smith (2007:320) argues that 
“we increasingly find that national groups are participating in more informal 
transnational networks or coalitions as they discover that achieving their 
organizational aims requires engagement at the transnational level” (Smith 2007:320) 
but noted that building transnational alliances is more costly and difficult than 
localised activism (Smith 2007:324). Sunni movements in Lebanon resorted to regional 
states, which are ideologically opposed to each other, as it is the case between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, to gain their support (see 4.5). The external support by these 
regional powers may not be used as a means of ensuring a healthy competition 
between these Sunni movements in Lebanon, as they pursue their goals in improving 
the democratic credentials of the Lebanese state. Rather, this support by regional 
powers may increase their influence on Sunni power dynamics. These Sunni 
movements are likely to be influenced by their supporters to engage in regional 
conflicts and ideological rivalry (e.g. between Saudi Arabia and Iran) on the Lebanese 
ground, in which they may explicitly or implicitly serve the agenda of their regional 
supporters at the expense of Lebanon’s national interests. This kind of unhealthy 
competition may therefore affect the loyalty of Sunni movements to the Lebanese 
state, lead to political unrest and fuel sectarian tensions between the Lebanese 
religious communities.  
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The struggle among these Sunni movements in Lebanon for support from external 
players could be a source of competition and means of counter-framing the activities 
of their competitors in this context. Survival among Sunni movement organisations in 
Lebanon in this context is contingent on their financial viability. As Zald and McCarthy 
(1979:4-5) suggest, movement organisations need financial resources if they seek to 
pursue their control more than the localised context, in others words, movement 
organisations “must appeal for support” to survive (Zald and McCarthy 1979:5). This 
kind of competition between Sunni movements in Lebanon is fiercely increasing as a 
result of the declining availability of resources (see 4.5) and the increasing external 
intervention in Sunni political affairs. The data in chapter fours shows how the 
Lebanese Sunnis compete against each other to gain the attention and trust of 
external players (Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria). It is arguable that these Sunni 
movements are competing for the same Sunni audiences hence the need to increase 
their resources, mobilisation strategies and framing and counter-framing techniques. 
In this context, as this research has argued above that localised resources could better 
serve the need of these Sunni movements and reduce conflicts. Lebanon as an 
independent state must be supported to carry out activities as an independent 
democratic sovereign state devoid of external control and influence; Lebanon must be 
managed by the Lebanese.  
4.8 Conflicts as an Attendant Consequence of Intra-Sunni 
Competition in Lebanon   
In any democratic political processes competition cannot be avoided. However, the 
concern of this research has been that existing intra-Sunni political divisions coupled 
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with the struggle to gain influence on Sunni power dynamics in Lebanon by external 
players (Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia) turned competition between Sunni actors into 
violent conflicts and political tensions, and therefore, weakened unity and national 
cohesion among them. As Rucht (2007:207) puts it “competition can easily turns into 
conflict when the interests of the allied partners diverge or the alliance faces a 
bifurcation that does not allow for a compromise". Diversity in Sunni public opinion in 
Lebanon is a healthy development that enhances the democratic credential of the 
Lebanese state. The Sunni community in Lebanon is free to have its own judgement on 
issues pertinent to the politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon and have the right 
not to comply with any particular standing point in Lebanon whether pan-Arab, 
religious or national (Jensen-Lee 2004:553-554). What is crucial, nevertheless, is to 
keep potentially divisive and controversial issues out of Sunni interactions and 
organisational agenda (Jensen-Lee 2004: 553-4) in order to avoid political tensions and 
violent conflicts. 
 
Conflicts are introduced as key element for the conceptualisation of movement 
organisations in which frame articulators get involved in religious or political claims 
which have the potential to either oppose or promote social change (della Porta and 
Diani 2006 as cited in della Porta 2013:357). What is worrying about conflicts in the 
context of the Sunni politics in Lebanon is that Sunni actors in Lebanon tend to seek 
monopoly, whether religious, political or economic over the politics of the Sunni 
community in Lebanon, and in the process, they make negative claims of other Sunni 
counterparts, which if realised, would possibly damage the interests of these Lebanese 
Sunni actors (see della Porta and Diani 2006 as cited in della Porta 2013:357). 
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The internal struggles between various ideological tendencies within the Sunni milieu 
ranging from moderate to radical could have the potential for intra-Sunni political 
conflicts (Hamzeh 1997; Imad 2006). The politicisation of Sunni pan-Arab, national and 
religious identities could lead to intra-Sunni split ups, factionalism and infighting. 
Conflict in the Sunni context could also emerge from theological-cum-ideological 
struggles over claims, power, values and resources, in which the aims of conflict 
groupings are not to gain the desired ends but to injure, neutralise and to eliminate 
their Sunni rivals (Coser 1967 as cited in Oberschall 1997:39). 
The data (in 4.4.1) reveals that the struggle between the Lebanese Salafists and al-
Ahbash exposed the fissures within the Sunni community in Lebanon. It signalled the 
first violent intra-Sunni contestation in Lebanon in that it resulted in the assassination 
of the political leader of al-Ahbash shaykh Nizar al-Halabi in 1995 and led to further 
fractures in the Sunni arena (see 4.4.1). These worrying developments cannot be 
ignored as they show that framing and counter-framing activities in Lebanon are 
serious enough to the extent that they  could lead to violent conflicts, hence 
threatening national cohesion and security of Lebanon.  Competition is not only 
restricted to Sunni groupings in Lebanon internally, it also applies to competitive 
relations with external actors which has been one of the sources of tension sometimes 
violence and political turmoil in Lebanon.  
This research does not only involve how Sunni movements and counter-movements 
issues have influenced the process of framing and counter-framing activities but also 
their effect on the unity of the Lebanese Sunnis. The concern of this research has been 
the political division in the Sunni community in Lebanon and its attendant tensions and 
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conflicts and the overall impact of these happenings on the political stability in 
Lebanon. Indeed, this research has confirmed my concern and apprehension to be the 
reality in Lebanon hence the need for this research. 
4.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the analysis focused on how Sunni political actors understand, narrate 
and interpret the role of external players (Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia) in the political 
division of the Sunni community in Lebanon. Sunni political actors in Lebanon have 
various political affiliations with external players and hence, the linkage between these 
Sunni actors and external players could affect the way in which they frame and 
perceive the political division of the Sunni community in Lebanon. In addition, the 
chapter showed the interrelations between external and domestic factors in shaping 
intra-Sunni political dynamics in Lebanon. The involvement of external players in the 
Sunni politics is essential for the understanding of domestic issues such as political 
affiliations, rival religious and political leadership and multiplicity of Sunni politicised 
pan-Arab, religious and national identities.  
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Chapter Five 
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, the summary, conclusion and recommendations are presented. The 
main goal of this research is to examine how the Lebanese Sunni political actors 
understand, frame and interpret issues of intra-Sunni Muslim political divides in 
Lebanon. These issues were examined through the operationalisation of framing 
theory concepts such as frame alignment processes, frame resonance, frame 
credibility, frame consistency and injustice frames (Snow and Benford 2000). The data 
analysis in chapter three (3) and chapter four (4) laid the foundation for the last 
chapter, chapter five (5), which contextualises the findings of this research in relation 
to the formulated research question. In addition, this chapter seeks to explore 
avenues for reducing intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon and promoting unity 
among the Lebanese Sunni groupings and leaders. In the following section (5.1), the 
research provides a summary of the main findings of this research.  
5.1 Summary of the Key Findings of the Research  
The data were collected from the field in Lebanon through the use of semi structured 
interviews with twenty three (23) research respondents including (Sunni groups’ 
representatives, political and religious leaders, rank-and-file members, Lebanese 
ministers, members of the Lebanese parliament, journalists, academics and lawyers). 
Yet, the researcher did not only draw on interviews to examine the politics of the 
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Sunni community in Lebanon. Other sources including (secondary literature, press 
materials and documents) published by Sunni groupings and leaders in Lebanon were 
consulted to widen the scoop of the research, contextualise the responses of the 
research respondents and support the researcher’s own argument and reasoning. The 
use of interview materials and analysis of documents was important to help the 
researcher gain a better understanding of how the Lebanese Sunni political actors 
frame and articulate intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon. In the following, the 
research presents a summary of the main findings of this research in accordance with 
the research question.   
 How do the Lebanese Sunni political actors frame intra-Sunni political 
division in Lebanon?   
This research question aimed at “understanding” not “explaining” intra-Sunni political 
divides in Lebanon. It sought to interpret the ways in which the Lebanese Sunni 
political actors frame, understand and narrate issues of intra-Sunni political divides in 
Lebanon at the internal and external levels. The focus was not on the validity of their 
narratives when they frame the Sunni politics in a particular way. These issues are 
summarised in the following headings:  
Identity Transformation 
I. The data of this research shows that the Lebanese Sunnis exhibit different 
identities (pan-Arab, religious and national). The belonging to one or more of these 
identities could shape the way in which the Lebanese Sunnis construct their 
narratives on issues of intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon (see 3.1). The 
multiplicities of the Lebanese Sunni identities could be a reflection of irreconcilable 
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ideological divides but they could also be a reflection of Sunni understanding of the 
politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon as a “game”, in which their identities 
and frames maybe be shifted or manipulated in line with the prevailing political 
circumstance (see 3.1).  
 
II. It emerges from the data analysis (in 3.1) that the politicisation of Sunni identities 
in Lebanon could lead to “identity transformation” within the Sunni composite 
from embracing national identities to embracing religious identities and vice versa. 
In addition, the perceptions that Sunnis are under threats from internal or external 
actors could be considered as a significant factor pushing some Sunnis towards 
embracing religious identity in the name of protecting Sunnis and maintaining their 
solidarity (see 3.1.2). On the whole, understanding the existing political context in 
Lebanon is important for interpreting the frames and narratives of Sunni groupings 
and leaders on the political division of the Sunni community in Lebanon. 
 
The Ambiguity of Lebanon’s National Identity      
I. The findings of the research show that the multiplicities of politicised Sunni 
identities could result in disagreements among the Lebanese Sunnis regarding 
which identities they would like to embrace (see 3.1.1). These identities include 
pan-Arab identity (e.g. the Union Party and the Popular Nasserite Organisation), 
religious identity (e.g. Salafists, Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Tawheed Movement) and 
national identity (e.g. Dar al-Fatwa and the Future Movement). The construction of 
these kinds of identities was identified through the operationalisation of frame 
alignment processes (frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extensions and 
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frame transformation or re-framing) as theoretical and methodological tools of 
analysis.    
Islamisation of the State of Lebanon  
I. The findings (in 3.1.5) show that intra-Sunni framing disputes on the nation state 
Lebanon are not only confined to the category of pan-Arab, religious and national 
Sunni groupings. They are also manifest within each Sunni category especially 
religious-based Sunni groupings. For example, the Tawheed Movement and al-
Jama’a al-Islamiyya engaged in frame transformation processes or “re-framing”, to 
transform their old frames from the call for the establishment of an Islamic rule in 
Lebanon (prior to and during the civil war period) to the call for full adaptation and 
engagement in the Lebanese confessional political system (in the post-civil war 
period). In contrast, Hizb ut-Tahrir, through engaging in frame amplification 
processes, disregarded the state of Lebanon and alternatively called for the re-
establishment of the Islamic state of the caliphate as a means to regain Muslims’ 
glories (see 3.1.6).   
 
Participation in the Lebanese Confessional Political System   
I. The analysis of the data (in 3.1.5 and 3.1.6) reveals that there is a disagreement 
among the Lebanese Sunnis on how they perceive the Lebanese confessional 
political system, which distributes institutional and political power proportionally 
among the Lebanese confessional communities. Whilst some religious-based Sunni 
groupings in Lebanon (e.g. the Tawheed Movement, the Lebaense Salafists, and al-
Jama’a al-Islamiyya) accept to participate in the Lebanese confessional system 
although it is not ruled in conformity with Islam, other Sunni groupings (e.g. Hizb 
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ut-Tahrir) reject to participate in the Lebanese confessional political system except 
under very strict conditions (see 3.1.6).  
The Leadership of the Former Sunni Prime Minister Rafik Hariri  
I. It emerges from the data (in 3.2) that the political leadership of the Hariri family 
(Rafik Hariri and his son Saad) constitutes one of the issues that divides the 
Lebanese Sunnis at the domestic levels. The pro-Hariri camp is classified as being 
aligned with Saudi Arabia, France and the United States. The anti-Hariri camp is 
classified as being aligned with Syria, Iran and Hezbollah (see 3.2.1). This 
classification is important for the conceptualisation of the “framing” and “counter-
framing” activities of the Sunni actors regarding the political leadership of the 
Hariri family. The data (in 3.2.1) reveals that the framing activities of the anti-Hariri 
camp focus on Rafik Hariri’s perceptual “exclusion” of traditional Sunni zuama, his 
“monopolisation” of the Sunni politics and his “alliance with the West”, especially 
the United States and France. This camp frames Hariri’s policies as “dividing” the 
Sunni front and “serving” the interest of the United States and Israel, hence 
contradicting the Sunni ethos (see 3.2.1). Conversely, the narratives of the pro-
Hariri camp focus on Hariri’s “cooperative politics” with Sunni rivals and his 
alliance with external players as being in favour of Lebanon’s national interests.  
 
Rivalry in the Political Leadership of the Sunni Community in Lebanon 
I. The findings (in 3.2, 3.2.1 and 3.2.2) show that the Sunni politics in Lebanon is not 
solely led by the Hariri family, or by the Future Movement, irrespective of the fact 
the Future Movement is the largest Sunni grouping in Lebanon by virtue of the 
last three parliamentary elections in 2005, 2009 and 2018. The data (in 3.2.2) 
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shows that the Future Movement possess approximately 60% of the Sunni street. 
It also shows that the Sunni community in Lebanon is not homogenous but rather 
multi-directional. The data (in 3.2.2) indicates that “diversity” and “rivalry” 
characterise the political leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon. The 
Sunni politics consists of various leaders with various political affiliations. These 
Sunni leaders compete against each other for the political leadership of the Sunni 
community and do not want to operate under the umbrella of the Hariri family 
(see 3.2.2). 
 
II. The data (in 3.2.2) shows that the rivalry between the Prime Ministers Najib 
Mikati and Saad Hariri over the political leadership of the Sunni community in 
Lebanon is one of the issues that divide the Lebanese Sunnis at the domestic 
levels. As part of their framing activities, Saad Hariri’s adherents frame Najib 
Mikati as a “pro-Hezbollah”, “pro-Iran” and “pro-Syria” leader in order to de-
legitimise and counter-mobilise his adherents, whereas pro-Najib Mikati, as part 
of their counter-framing activities, perceive Saad Hariri as a power-hungry leader, 
who seeks to “monopolise” the Sunni politics. This shows an aspect of how Sunni 
political actors frame their divides at the domestic levels. 
 
Inadequate Trust for the Political Leadership of the Future Movement 
I. The operationalisation of “injustice frames” (see 3.2.3) as constructed by the 
research respondents shows that some of the Lebanese Sunni political actors 
attribute Sunni problematized state of affairs to Hezbollah’s dominance on 
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Lebanon and the failure of the Future Movement to defend Sunnis in the face of 
Hezbollah.  The Future Movement is the most dominant Sunni party in Lebanon. 
 
II. Regarding “frame credibility”, the narratives of some Sunnis, especially religious 
based Sunnis show that the Future Movement is not serving the interest of Sunnis 
but rather uses them as a tool to serve its political interests (see 3.2.6). What is 
worrying is that some Sunnis invoke strong phrases such as “hostility with Islam” to 
encapsulate the Future Movement (see 3.2.6). Some go further to indicate that 
Sunnis have made a mistake when they thought that the Future Movement’s 
frames were credible; hence, the emotional appeal for collective actions against 
the political leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon (see 3.2.6).  
 
III. In line with the findings (in 3.2.6), the data (in 3.2.7) demonstrates that the 
popularity of the Future Movement in the Sunni politics has declined. A 
comparison between the results of the Future Movement in the last two 
parliamentary elections shows that the number of the Future Movement MPs in 
the Lebanese parliament decreased from thirty-three (33) in 2009 to twenty-one 
(21) in 2018 (see 3.2.7). The understanding of some Sunnis is that the declining 
popularity of the Future Movement is attributable to the Future Movement’s 
“monopoly” of the Sunni politics and its unwillingness to “cooperate” and 
“communicate” with other Sunni groupings and leaders in Lebanon (see 3.2.6).  
 
IV. The Future Movement dispels these claims by insisting that it has no armed or 
political power to monopolise the politics of the Sunni community in Lebanon (see 
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3.2.7). It constructs itself as a non-sectarian and non-armed organisation. 
Moreover, the movement criticises Hezbollah’s armed activism but indicates that it 
would not react by militarising Sunnis. Clearly, all seeds of frustration, extremism 
and hatred are growing amongst the Lebanese Sunnis because of Iran’s   
dominance in the region (Iraq, Syria and Lebanon). Yet, The Future Movement 
claims that its “moderate” approach to national issues led to the control of the 
Sunni arena and prevented a large number of Sunnis from resorting to extremism, 
radicalism and armed activism (see 3.2.5). 
 
V. Regarding “frame consistency”, the research establishes the “inconsistency” 
between the Future Movement’s articulated beliefs and its actual actions. The 
findings (in 3.2.8) show that the Future Movement’s cooperation with Hezbollah 
and its allies in the Lebanese government as well as in the presidential, 
parliamentary and municipal elections encapsulates the pragmatic nature of the 
movement and contradicts its anti-Hezbollah’s frames. The ability of the Future 
Movement’s to resonate with Sunnis is contingent on the “consistency” and 
“credibility” of its proffered frames. The operationalisation of “frame consistency” 
and “frame credibility” helps to unmask key aspects of Sunni disagreements with 
the Future Movement.  
 
Radicalisation of the Lebanese Sunnis 
I. The narratives constructed by the research participants (in 3.2.3 and 3.2.4) show 
that the rising influence of Hezbollah on state machinery following the 
assassination of the Sunni leader Rafik Hariri in 2005; Hezbollah’s takeover of 
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Beirut in May 2008; and the overthrow of the Saad Hariri-led government in 2011 
by Hezbollah and its allies triggered the emergence of different kinds of “injustice 
frames” amongst the Lebanese Sunnis. Hezbollah’s involvement in the killing of 
Sunnis in Syria and the perception that the Lebanese state is either silent, 
implicated or at least, unable to prevent Hezbollah from killing Sunnis, has given 
the latter the impression that they are being treated unfairly by the Lebanese 
state.  
 
II. Moreover, the lack of strong Sunni leadership to counter-balance Hezbollah and to 
voice Sunni concerns before the Lebanese state has created a division within the 
Sunni community and given the impression that Sunni leaders are unable to 
defend Sunnis. All these factors left the Lebanese Sunnis vulnerable to new 
discourses and opened the doors for the rise of Sunni radicalism and anti-statist 
narratives (see 3.2.3). The findings (in 3.2.4) reveal that as a result of Hezbollah’s 
gradual dominance in Lebanon, some Sunnis have given up national “moderate” 
narratives and resorted to “sectarian” and “radical” narratives under the pretext of 
maintaining a Sunni solidarity in the face of Hezbollah.   
 
 The Religious Leadership of the Sunni Community in Lebanon 
I. The politicisation of Dar al-Fatwa (the highest religious Sunni office in Lebanon) of 
being under the control of the Future Movement, affects the “credibility” and 
“resonance” of its frames. This is because not all of the Lebanese Sunnis agree with 
the Future Movement’s leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon. The 
findings (in 3.2.9) suggest that Dar al-Fatwa in its current status does not 
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correspond to the expectations of Sunnis and would not be able to represent them 
so long as its frames are influenced by the interests of Sunni political groupings or 
leaders. The influence of external players (Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia) on Dar al-
Fatwa on different occasions has been another issue undermining the resonance of 
Dar al-Fatwa’s frames (see 3.2.9).  
 
The Emergence of the League of Muslim Scholars 
I. The analysis of the data (in 3.2.10) shows how the absence of credible religious 
Sunni leadership resulted in the emergence of rival Sunni bodies, which claim to 
champion the Sunni cause.  The League of Muslim Scholars was able to gain the 
trust of several Sunnis due to its attachment with Sunni problems and its desire for 
enhancing their role in the Lebanese political system. The narratives of the 
research respondents (in 3.2.10) indicate that there is a framing dispute within the 
Lebanese Sunni actors regarding the way in which they understand the rise of the 
League of Muslim Scholars. The presence of the League of Muslim Scholars is 
unwelcomed by some Sunnis, on the ground that the league might be competing 
against the Future Movement and Dar al-Fatwa for the leadership of the Sunni 
community. On the contrary, some Sunnis indicate that the League of Muslim 
Scholars would not have been established had Dar al-Fatwa played its role in 
defending Sunnis.  
 
Framing of Iran’s Role in the Politics of the Sunni Community in Lebanon 
I. The findings (in 4.1) show that the narratives constructed by the Sunni actors on 
the role of Iran and Hezbollah (the Shia-oriented organisation) are ones that 
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project the political division of the Sunni community in Lebanon. This stance draws 
the Lebanese Sunni actors to either support or oppose the activities of Iran and 
Hezbollah. Sunnis who are allied with the Eighth March Alliance (EMA) support Iran 
and Hezbollah, whereas Sunnis who are allied with the Fourteenth March Alliance 
(FOMA) oppose Iran and Hezbollah. The pro-Iran, pro-Syria EMA and the pro-Saudi 
Arabia, pro-West FOMA were developed mainly as a result of the assassination of 
the former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. The EMA, as part of its framing 
activities, supports Hezbollah’s militarisation and endorses Syria’s military 
presence in Lebanon, whereas the FOMA, as part of its framing activities, opposes 
Syria’s role in Lebanon and calls for the de-militarisation of Hezbollah. This 
classification is significant for the contextualisation of Sunni frames and narratives 
regarding the role of Iran and Hezbollah in the political division of the Sunni 
community in Lebanon.   
 
II. The usage of frame salience (in 4.1.1) show that Iran and Hezbollah have been able 
to break through the Sunni politics by the activities of “liberating the Muslim 
lands”, “resisting Israel” and “defending the Palestinian cause” (see 4.1.1). These 
frames have been central to the beliefs of large number of Sunnis. It is on this 
wheel that some Lebanese Sunni actors justify their alliance with Iran and 
Hezbollah (see 4.1.1). The findings (in 4.1.1) reveal that the strength of Iran and 
Hezbollah in the Sunni milieu lies in their ability to stand by the slogans of resisting 
Israel and defending the Palestinian cause on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, the failure of the Arab states, collectively or individually to defend Palestine 
or to counter-balance Israel (see 4.1.1). This is demonstrated by Hezbollah’s 
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frequent engagement with Israel on different occasions, which enabled it to gain 
the support of various Sunnis who have the impression that Iran and Hezbollah are 
defending the dignity of the Arabs and Muslims.   
 
Iran’s Perceived Role in Dividing the Lebanese Sunnis 
I. The narratives of the Sunni respondents (in 4.2.1) show the role of Iran in dividing 
the Sunni political front in Lebanon. This has been manifested by the activities of 
the pro-Iranian Sunni militias “the Resistance Brigades”, which have been used as a 
tool by Iran to divide the Sunni community in Lebanon (see 4.2.1). Moreover, Iran’s 
role in dividing Sunnis has been manifested in breaking through Dar al-Fatwa, the 
highest religious Sunni office in Lebanon, during the leadership of the Mufti 
Muhammad Rashid Qabbani (see 4.2.1). Another form of dividing the Lebanese 
Sunnis has been through Iran’s financial and political support for some religious 
and pan-Arab Sunni organisations (e.g. the Tawheed Movement, the Islamic Action 
Front, the Popular Nasserite Organisation and the Union Party) and leaders (e.g. 
Abdul Rahim Mourad; Oussama Saad, Fathi Yakan and Saeed Shaaban) (see 4.2.1). 
 
II. It emerges from the findings (in 3.2.3) that some Sunni actors frame the role of 
Iran (and Hezbollah) in the Sunni politics through sectarian lenses as a struggle 
between Sunnis and Shias. These Sunnis see in Iran an existential threat to the 
Lebanese Sunnis, an “occupier”, and a “coloniser", which seeks to use some Sunni 
groupings, militias and leaders to break through, divide and weaken the Lebanese 
Sunnis (see also 4.2.2 and 4.2.3).  Collectively, these Sunnis frame “other” Sunnis 
who are allied with Hezbollah as “minorities”, claiming that the bulk of Sunnis are 
213 
 
anti-Iran. In their understanding, Sunnis, who are allied with Iran, are driven by 
materialistic interests and are not concerned about Hezbollah’s resistance against 
Israel (see 4.2.2).  
 
Framing of Hezbollah’s Involvement in Internal and External Conflicts 
I. The findings (in 4.1.2 and 4.1.3) show that the stance of the Lebanese Sunni 
political actors on Hezbollah’s involvement in domestic and foreign conflicts can be 
classified into three categories. The first category consists of Sunnis, who approve 
Hezbollah’s military struggle against Israel but disapprove its military involvement 
in domestic conflicts (see 4.1.2). The second category consists of Sunnis, who used 
to support Hezbollah but following their military attack on Sunnis in 2008, they lost 
their public appeal and were no longer considered as a resistance grouping (see 
4.1.2).  The third and final category consists of Sunnis, who endorse Hezbollah’s 
violent attack on the Lebanese Sunnis in 2008. This category does not interpret the 
clashes between Hezbollah and the Future Movement through sectarian lenses as 
a struggle between Sunnis and Shias. Rather, they interpret it in political terms as a 
legitimate reaction made by Hezbollah against the Future Movement’s attempt to 
dismantle its communication network.  
 
II. Regarding the conflicts in Syria, the data (in 4.1.4) shows that the Lebanese Sunni 
actors differ in the way in which they frame Hezbollah’s military involvement in the 
Syrian’s conflict. Sunnis who are allied with the Fourteenth March Alliance (FOMA) 
support the revolution against the Syrian government and hopes that its fall would 
help Lebanon to be independent from external influence, especially from Syria and 
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Iran (see 4.1.4). They are of the view that Hezbollah is “killing Sunnis” in Syria and 
is being used by Iran as a tool to confront Sunnis in Lebanon and Syria. By contrast, 
Sunnis who are allied with the Eighth March Alliance (EMA) interpret the 
revolution against the Syrian government as an international ploy targeting Syria 
for its support for Palestine and Hezbollah’s resistance against Israel (see 4.1.4). 
They are of the view that Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict is 
justifiable on the ground that if Hezbollah had not intervened in Syria, extremist 
Sunni groupings would have entered Lebanon and destabilised its political system 
(see 4.1.4).  
 
Framing of Syria’s Role in the Politics of the Sunni Community in Lebanon  
I. The majority of the Lebanese Sunni actors were emphatic in their assertion about 
Syria’s key role in the political division of the Sunni community in Lebanon. The 
data (in 4.3) reveals that on several occasions, the role of Syria in the Sunni politics 
has been framed in the same way as the role of Iran in the Sunni politics. The Sunni 
actors, in many instances, employed the same exact phrases to frame Syria and 
Iran’s role in the Sunni politics. For example, the data (in 4.3) indicates that Syria is 
framed as a “colonial power”, which seeks to “divide-and-rule” the Lebanese 
religious communities. Moreover, the empirical research (in 4.3) indicates that 
some Sunni actors attribute the blame for Sunni problematized state of affairs to 
the perceptual injustices unleashed on them by Syria.   
    
II. The findings (in 4.4.1) indicate that Syria used some Sunni groupings as a tool to 
counteract other Sunni groupings in Lebanon in order to keep the Sunni arena in 
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perpetual conflicts and to prevent the emergence of anti-Syrian camp from within 
the Sunni milieu to challenge its role in Lebanon. The relationship between Syria 
and the Sunni grouping al-Ahbash exemplifies how Syria broke through the Sunni 
politics in Lebanon. Al-Ahbash was associated with the Syrian intelligence and used 
to inform them about the activism of anti-Syria Sunni organisations and leaders in 
Lebanon. Moreover, the data (in 4.4.1) shows that the struggle between the 
Lebanese Salafists and al-Ahbash signalled the “first violent intra-Sunni conflict” in 
Lebanon as it led to the assassination of the political leader of al-Ahabsh shaykh 
Nizar al-Halabi by a radical Salafist grouping known as Usbat al-Ansar in 1995.  
 
III. The data (in 4.4.2) shows that the former Mufti of the Lebanese Republic Hassan 
Khalid was assassinated because of his opposition to Syria’s role in Lebanon. He 
was an influential Sunni leader whose call for the withdrawal of foreign 
intervention from Lebanon infuriated Syria. The findings (in 4.4.2) reveal that the 
assassination of Hassan Khalid occurred in series of assassination that deliberately 
targeted anti-Syria Sunni religious and political leaders. The purpose of these 
assassinations was to weaken Sunni political and religious leaders and to prevent 
the emergence of powerful Sunni leaders who may challenge Syria’s role in 
Lebanon (see 4.4.2). Indeed, the assassination of the Mufti Hassan Khalid 
weakened Dar al-Fatwa and led to the opening up of the occupants of Dar-al-
Fatwa’s leadership to external pressures and internal influences. 
 
IV. It emerges from the narratives (in 4.4.3) that Syria did not only rely on leaders 
from other religious communities to counter Rafik Hariri’s leadership of the Sunni 
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politics in Lebanon. Rather, they relied on leaders from within the Sunni 
community to counter him. The empirical research (in 4.4.3) reveals that Syria 
supported the pan-Arab Sunni leaders Abdul Rahim Mourad, Omar Karami and 
Ousama Saad to counter Rafik Hariri and to prevent unity between Sunni political 
leaders in Lebanon. Syria, in this instance, hit two birds in one stone: it did not only 
seek to weaken Rafik Hariri, the strongest Sunni leader in Lebanon. It sought to 
deepen the political division among Sunni leaders, hence weakening the solidarity 
of the Lebanese Sunnis.   
 
V. The operationaliation of frame salience (in 4.4.4) reveals that there are some 
Sunnis who are still allied with Syria. These Sunnis do not frame Syria’s role in 
Lebanon in the context of weakening or dividing the Lebanese Sunnis. Rather, they 
frame Syria as a “supporter of the Palestinian cause”, a “pan-Arab advocate” and a 
“resistance force”, whose alliance with Iran and Hezbollah served Lebanon’s 
national interests and enabled it to counter balance Israel. Hence, pro-Sunni 
organisations and leaders in Lebanon, by invoking these frames, they justify their 
alliance with Syria and make their messages resonant and meaningful in the eyes 
of their Sunni followers (see 4.4.4).  
 
Framing of Saudi Arabia’s Role in the Politics of the Sunni Community in Lebanon 
I. The data (in 4.5) reveals that Saudi Arabia’s shared Sunni identity with the 
Lebanese Sunnis coupled with its position as one of the main players in Lebanon 
and the Middle East, have an impact on the way in which the Lebanese Sunnis 
construct their narratives on Saudi Arabia’s role in the Sunni politics. Sunnis, who 
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are allied with the Fourteenth March Alliance (FOMA) frame Saudi Arabia as “the 
guardian of the Lebanese Sunnis” and consider the Lebanese Sunnis as “loyal” to 
Saudi Arabia (see 4.5). Yet, Sunnis, who are allied with the Eighth March Alliance 
(EMA), are wary in their criticism of Saudi Arabia. They acknowledge the 
importance of Saudi Arabia’s role in the Sunni politics and consider that the 
influence of Sunni political leaders on the Sunni politics is contingent on 
maintaining good relations with Saudi Arabia.    
 
II. It emerges from the data (in 4.5) that the current situation of Saudi Arabia 
regarding its influence on the Lebanese politics as compared with Iran is 
discouraging. The narratives of some Sunni actors show that it is not enough for 
Saudi Arabia to support Lebanon financially in order to counter-balance Iran. For 
Saudi Arabia to safeguard its interests in Lebanon; it has to combine its financial 
investment with political investment (see 4.5). These narratives show that some 
Sunni actors think entirely in sectarian terms in that they criticise Saudi Arabia 
(Sunnis) for not adequately helping the Lebanese Sunnis to counter Iran and 
Hezbollah (Shias). It also shows that some of the Lebanese Sunni actors are craving 
for external support from Saudi Arabia and have no apparent regard for Lebanon’s 
sovereignty or autarky.  
 
III. The analysis of data (in 4.5) shows that Saudi Arabia, which is considered as the 
main patron of the Lebanese Sunnis, has decreased its financial support for its 
main Sunni allies in Lebanon (e.g. the Future Movement), while Iran financially, 
ideologically and politically supports its Shia and Sunni allies in Lebanon. This might 
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be attributable to the fact that Saudi Arabia’s Sunni allies in Lebanon are “weak”, 
“unreliable”, and “unable to counter-balance Iran” (see 4.5). Nevertheless, there is 
a counter-narrative among some Sunni actors that Saudi Arabia’s policies toward 
the Lebanese Sunnis are “ambiguous” and “inconsistent” and this explains the 
weakness of Saudi Arabia’s allies in Lebanon as compared with Iran’s allies (see 
4.5). 
 
IV. The findings (in 4.6) shows that it would be in the interest of Saudi Arabia, as a 
Sunni state, to have a unified Sunni front than a divided one. Yet, some of the 
Lebanese Sunni actors doubt that the current Saudi Arabian’s policies in Lebanon 
lead to the unity of the Lebanese Sunnis (see 4.6). The understanding of some 
Sunni actors is that Saudi Arabia does not support any Sunni grouping other than 
the Future Movement (see 4.6). They have the impression that Saudi Arabia has 
limited their support for the Lebanese Sunnis to the Future Movement regardless 
of the perceived inability of the latter to empower the Lebanese Sunnis. This issue 
has led to intra-Sunni political division in Lebanon because there are other Sunnis 
who disagree with the policies of the Future Movement and think that the 
movement is incapable of serving the interest of Sunnis. 
5.2 Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis is to understand how the Lebanese Sunni political actors frame 
the political division of the Sunni community in Lebanon. The thesis’ approach draws 
on Max Weber’s interpretivist lens of understanding (Versthen), which ontologically 
denotes that reality is socially constructed. The thesis does not offer a causal 
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explanation of intra-Sunni political contestations in Lebanon but aims at 
understanding it from the standpoint of the Lebanese political actors involved in the 
Sunni politics in Lebanon. Epistemologically, the thesis seeks to interpret the 
subjective understandings and socially constructed ideas articulated by the Lebanese 
political actors on intra-Sunni political contestations in Lebanon. The thesis’ theoretical 
orientation relies on framing theory. The operationalisation of framing theory enables 
this thesis to understand better how the Lebanese Sunni political actors construct 
their narratives on the political division of the Lebanese Sunnis.   
The research shows that there are issues of political agreements and issues of political 
disagreements within Lebanon’s Sunni political demographic. The main focus of this 
research, however, is on the issues of political disagreements or the issues that 
politically divide the Lebanese Sunnis, externally and internally, during the period from 
2005 to 2016, and how they are constructed, framed and manifested by the Lebanese 
political actors. The research deploys framing theory concepts such as “frame 
alignment processes”, “frame resonance” and “counter-framing” to understand how 
internal and external dynamics associated with the Sunni politics are seen from the 
standpoint of the Lebanese Sunni political actors. The operationalisation of “injustice 
frames”, “supply and demand” and “collective action frames” is instrumental for 
understanding how the Lebanese political actors differ in attributing the blames for 
Sunni problematized state of affairs and the collective actions required for unifying 
and empowering Sunnis.   
The findings of this research suggest the interpenetration between domestic factors 
and external factors in shaping Sunni frames, understandings and perceptions on the 
220 
 
political division of the Sunni community in Lebanon. It is difficult to examine internal 
Sunni dynamics such as political affiliations, contested Sunni identities and rival 
religious and political Sunni leadership without taking into consideration external 
dimensions. The role and influence of external players, most especially (Iran, Syria and 
Saudi Arabia) on Lebanon, coupled with the ideological rivalry between Saudi Arabia 
on the one hand, and Syria and Iran on the other hand, are essential for 
contextualising Sunni narratives on intra-Sunni political divides in Lebanon. The 
interpretivist lens of understanding (Verstehen) aided an understanding of how the 
politics of representation among Sunnis shape the ways in which they frame their 
political contestations in Lebanon internally and externally.   
At the internal levels, the empirical research shows that identity-based Sunni 
groupings in Lebanon are classified in terms of theirs affiliation into three categories 
(pan-Arab, religious and national). The multiplicities of Sunni identities (pan-Arab, 
religious and national) could be a reflection of irreconcilable ideological divides but 
they could also be a reflection of Sunni understanding of the politics of the Sunni 
community in Lebanon as a “game”, in which their identities and constructed 
narratives maybe be shifted or manipulated in line with the prevailing political 
circumstance. This research concludes that understanding the prevailing political 
context in Lebanon is important for interpreting the frames and narratives of the 
Lebanese Sunnis on the political division of the Sunni community in Lebanon. 
 
As the research reveals, the Future Movement, the largest Sunni grouping in Lebanon 
considers the identity of the Lebanese Sunnis to be firstly Lebanese as the slogan 
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“Lebanon First” portrays.  The adoption of the slogan “Lebanon First” demonstrates 
the prevalence of the Future Movement’s national identity over its religious Sunni or 
pan-Arab identity. Yet, the ideological stance of religious-based Sunni political actors 
(e.g. Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Tawheed Movement, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and the Lebanese 
Salafists) and pan-Arab-based Sunni groupings (e.g. the Union Party and the Popular 
Nasserite organisation) constitute a challenge to the “Lebanon-First” slogan as framed 
by the Future Movement. The duality of the ideological stance of some of the 
religious-based and pan-Arab based-Sunni actors, of being affiliated with Lebanon, and 
at the same time, of being affiliated with transnational ideologies, states or social 
movements could affect their narratives on the Lebanese national identity, their 
framing construction and their political activities.   
 
The research shows that the Lebanese Sunni actors differ in their frames on the 
Lebanese confessional political system in Lebanon. Whilst some religious-based Sunni 
groupings in Lebanon (e.g. the Tawheed Movement, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and the 
Lebanese Salafists) accept to take part in the Lebanese confessional political system, 
other Sunni groupings (e.g. Hizb ut-Tahrir) reject to take part in the confessional 
political system except under strict conditions. Regarding the Islamisation of Lebanon, 
the bulk of religious-based Sunni groupings (e.g. al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and the 
Lebanese Salafists) have expressed a receptive attitude to the state of Lebanon and 
realised the difficulty of establishing an Islamic rule in Lebanon but other Sunni 
groupings in Lebanon like Hizb ut-Tahrir do not recognise the Lebanese state. The only 
state they recognise is the Islamic state of the caliphate, which they seek to re-
establish. Thus, this research concludes that intra-Sunni framing disputes on the 
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nation state Lebanon are not only confined to the category of pan-Arab, religious and 
national Sunni groupings. They are also manifest within each Sunni category especially 
religious-based Sunni groups, which differ in their framing construction of Lebanon as 
a state and accordingly the role of the Sunni community in the Lebanese confessional 
political system.  
 
The research reveals that another critical issue that divides the Lebanese Sunnis is the 
religious leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon. The politicisation of Dar al-
Fatwa, the highest religious Sunni office in Lebanon, of being under the influence of 
foreign and domestic players, has undermined the resonance of its frames. It has 
paved the way for the emergence of rival religious Sunni bodies, which claim to 
champion the Sunni cause. For example, the League of Muslim Scholars was able to 
gain the trust of several Sunnis due to its attachment with Sunni problems. Moreover, 
the perceived independence of the League of Muslim Scholars, of not being under the 
sphere of influence of Sunni political leaders or organisations in Lebanon, has given 
the impression that it is able to operate more freely as opposed to Dar al-Fatwa, and 
this explains why its frames are credible and resonant with the Sunni public more than 
Dar al-Fatwa. 
 
As for the political leadership, Some Sunni actors are of the view that the Future 
Movement’s leadership of the Sunni politics is essential for preventing Sunnis from 
radicalism and sectarianism. This is due to its advocacy of national identity, 
moderation and its reluctance to sectarianism and militarisation. However, other 
Sunni actors are of the view that the Future Movement is not serving the interest of 
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Sunnis but rather using them to serve its political interests. They attribute Sunni 
disempowerment and problematized state of affairs to the failure of the Future 
Movement to craft a strategy to empower Sunnis and to counter-balance Hezbollah. 
This research therefore concludes that the absence of strong and credible Sunni 
leadership that represents Sunnis, communicates with them and identifies with their 
problems may result in the Lebanese Sunnis to give up moderate narratives and to 
resort to radicalism, sectarianism and anti-statist narratives. 
The stance on Hezbollah is one of the main issues that fracture the Sunni politics in 
Lebanon. Hezbollah’s frequent military engagements with Israel on different occasions 
enabled it to gain the support of various Sunnis who have the impression that 
Hezbollah is defending the dignity of the Arabs and Muslims. Yet, following Hezbollah’s 
military takeover of Beirut in 2008, Sunni frames of Hezbollah have changed. First, 
there are Sunnis, who still approve Hezbollah’s struggle against Israel but disapprove 
its involvement in domestic conflicts. Second, there are Sunnis, who used to support 
Hezbollah but following their attack on Sunnis in 2008, they lost their public appeal 
and were no longer considered as a resistance grouping. Third, there are Sunnis, who 
endorse Hezbollah’s attack on Sunnis in 2008. These Sunnis do not frame the clashes 
between Hezbollah and the Future Movement through sectarian lenses as a struggle 
between Sunnis and Shias. Rather, they frame it in political terms as a legitimate 
reaction made by Hezbollah against the Future Movement’s attempt to dismantle its 
communication network. 
At the external levels, the research further reveals that Iran has been able to break 
through the Sunni politics by promoting the slogans of “liberating the Muslim lands”, 
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“resisting Israel” and “defending the Palestinian cause”, which are central to the 
beliefs of various Sunnis. Yet, there are Sunnis who are of the view that Iran (a Shia-
oriented country) and an ideological ally of Hezbollah in Lebanon is in existential 
struggle with Sunnis and is responsible for their division and weaknesses. The creation 
of pro-Iranian Sunni militias (e.g. the Resistance Brigades), the breakthrough of Dar al-
Fatwa and the financial and political support for various pan-Arab and religious Sunni 
groups and leaders in Lebanon exemplifies Iran’s role in dividing Sunnis. 
The research reveals that the standpoint on Syria is another issue of concern among 
the Lebanese Sunni political actors. For some Sunnis, Syria used some Sunni groupings 
(e.g. al-Ahbash) to counter other Sunni groupings (e.g. Salafists) so as to keep the 
Sunni arena in perpetual conflicts and to prevent the emergence of anti-Syrian camp 
from within the Sunni milieu to challenge its role in Lebanon. Another form of dividing 
Sunnis, as constructed by the narrative of research respondents, has been the 
perceived role of Syria in killing Sunni leaders, weakening Dar al-Fatwa and preventing 
unity among Sunni leaders. Yet, for other Sunnis, Syria is framed as a supporter of the 
Palestinian cause, a pan-Arab advocate and a resistance force, whose alliance with Iran 
and Hezbollah helped Lebanon to counter-balance Israel. 
Drawing on the findings, the thesis concludes that it would be in the interest of Saudi 
Arabia, as a  Sunni  state, to have a unified Sunni front than a divided one. There is a 
growing perception among the ‏Lebanese Sunni political actors that Saudi Arabia does 
not support any Sunni grouping other than the Future  Movement. This  has led to intra-
Sunni political division in Lebanon because there are other Sunnis  who  disagree  with 
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the policies of the Future Movement and think that the movement is 
weak,  unreliable,  and not  ‏credible.    
5.3 Recommendations (Exploring Avenues for Reducing Intra-
Sunni Political Tensions in Lebanon) 
Drawing on the analysis presented in chapter three and chapter four; this section 
explores avenues for reducing intra-Sunni political divides and promoting solidarity 
among the Lebanese Sunnis. The data of this research shows that protracted political 
tensions between Sunni organisations and leaders in Lebanon factionalise the Sunni 
politics, destroy trust among Sunni actors, invite external intervention and bring to 
leadership and power positions radicals, extremists and hard-liners. The research 
therefore calls for the Lebanese Sunni movements and leaders to quickly engage in an 
intra-Sunni dialogue that puts national interests over self-interests. The following 
points are critical in reducing political tensions among Sunni organisations in Lebanon. 
5.3.1 Solidarity as a Means of Reducing Political Tensions and Violent 
Conflicts 
In a bid to contribute to reducing these political tensions between Sunni organisations 
and leaders in Lebanon, a sense of group “solidarity” or commitment is essential for 
overcoming political dissents. The fostering of a deep persistent commitment to the 
unity of the Lebanese Sunnis is likely to exist when Sunni actors overcome their 
differences and identify with the problems of the Lebanese Sunnis. Solidarity is an 
essential ingredient of Sunni collective identity and its absence from Sunni narratives 
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in Lebanon may deepen intra Sunni political divisions and conflicts. Collective Sunni 
identity that unifies Sunnis in the forms of a shared definition of their cause emanates 
from their solidarity, experiences and interests. In this sense, a culture of Sunni 
solidarity (Roth 2000:302) is important to exist in order to develop not only a collective 
Sunni identity but also a political consciousness, which enables Sunni actors to realise 
the negative impact of their political tension on their unity, role and influence on the 
Lebanese politics (Gamson 1992a; Owens and Aronson 2000; Passy and Giugni 2000; 
Taylor 2000). 
5.3.2 Managing Intra-Sunni Political Dissensus 
The concept of “Political dissensus” should not be considered as a conflict of different 
opinions, interests or values, but rather as a “manifestation of a gap”, which 
constitutes the “essence of politics” (see Rancière 2010). In this research, a key 
challenge that Sunni groupings and leaders in Lebanon face is to find out a strategy 
that enable unity amid diversity. In this context, it is incumbent for Sunni leaders and 
institutions in Lebanon to function as unifying and guiding forces without repressing 
differences or opposing commonalities and connectedness between the Lebanese 
Sunnis. This implies that recognising dissensus and differences within the politics of 
the Sunni community in Lebanon should not lead to intra-Sunni contestations. Rather, 
when employed effectively, dissensus and differences might become valuable tool for 
re-alignment and renewal within Sunni political leaders and organisations in Lebanon 
(see Painter-Morland 2002; Rancière 2010). 
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5.3.3 Effective Laws and State Institutions to Reduce Political Tensions 
and Conflicts 
The following recommendations focus on establishing and strengthening national 
institutions in Lebanon so as to deepen the democratic credentials and national 
cohesion of the Lebanese state. It is hoped that it would make the state of Lebanon 
the shining example of a democratic state in the Middle East. The discussion is done 
under the following headings: 
5.3.3.1 Independent Electoral Commission in Lebanon 
 
An independent electoral commission is required in Lebanon so as to make elections 
more credible. This independent electoral commission the research recommends is to 
be made up of five or seven commissioners and shared by one of these five or seven 
people. A parliamentary committee made up of all the political parties is to be 
established to appoint credible Lebanese men and women to serve as commissioners 
of this commission. The appointment needs to be guaranteed by the constitution and 
cannot be revoked unless death or stated misconduct is established on the part of 
these commissioners, which contravenes provisions in the constitution of the 
Lebanese Republic or the commissioners leave office upon mandatory retirement. 
These commissioners are appointed because of their professional credentials and 
autonomy with the understanding that irrespective of their partisan sympathies or 
ideological orientations, once selected, they should act with impartiality and fairness. 
In addition, this independent electoral commission should consist of a balanced 
228 
 
representation in that it should represent all the major political groupings and 
religious communities in Lebanon (see Schedler 2000; Hartlyn et al. 2008). 
This research recommends that the establishment of a credible and independent 
electoral commission in Lebanon is important to strengthen state institutions and 
deepen the democratic credentials of the Lebanese state (Graham 2006; Koopman 
2007; Kriesi 2007). This commission should have the ability to oversee the electoral 
process and to propose electoral laws that truly represent the Lebanese people (El 
Mashnouk 2017). The establishment of this commission would arguably lay the 
foundation for the emergence of a form of rule of law in the electoral realm which is 
essential for strengthening state institutions in Lebanon (see; Makulilo 2009; Magaloni 
2010; Nwatarali and Dim 2015).  
Electoral independent commissions are often considered as the “cornerstone of 
representative democracy” (Hyson 2000:174). They are believed to be especially 
significant in condition of low administrative state capacity where there is a high 
potential of distrust among political actors and few, if any, alternative mechanisms to 
help ensure honest and impartial elections (see Hartlyn et al. 2008). This is often the 
case in Lebanon. Hence, the function of electoral commissions is to achieve complex 
administrative and regulatory activities, propose fair electoral laws, oversee 
relationships with political groupings in a balanced manner, adopt an image of 
professionalism, efficiency and neutrality and adjudicate political tensions and violent 
conflicts fairly. This research therefore believes that electoral commissions in Lebanon 
should have their budget approved and funding voted directly to them by the 
legislative assembly (parliament) in Lebanon. 
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5.3.3.2 Prohibition of Foreign Funding of Political Parties and Leaders in 
Lebanon 
 
This research recommends drawing on the views of the research respondents that 
foreign funding of Sunni movement organisations and leaders in Lebanon affect Sunni 
solidarity, ideological standings and framing activities. If these foreign funding issues 
are not checked, Sunni political parties and movement organisations’ involvement in 
political activities will always be associated with sectarianism, political tensions and 
violent conflicts. One of the means of checking these funding issues is to standardise 
accounting practises within Sunni organisations. Sunni movements in Lebanon should 
be made to have corporate accounts, and their books audited periodically to check 
their incomes and expenditure status. This is essential for determining the source of 
funding and how the money was utilised. It would also encourage Sunni movements in 
Lebanon to seek funding from their members or constituency in the forms of 
contributions, which can help broaden mass participation in their political activities. 
5.3.3.3 Enactment of Laws Disbanding Political Parties Forming and Contesting 
Elections on Confessional Interests 
 
Another issue that is of concern as the data suggests is confessionalism. It is clear that 
the Lebanese religious communities live in a state where institutionalised 
confessionalism obstructs all possible efforts to genuine political reforms. However, 
The Taif Accord, which has ended the Lebanese civil war, provides solutions to some of 
these historically un-democratic institutionalised characteristics of the Lebanese 
constitution. The spirit and the latter of the accord were intended to abolish the 
politics of confessionalism, which in fact is the current issue affecting the Sunni politics 
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and the Lebanese politics as a whole. The research believes in this direction that for a 
stable and credible democratic future of Lebanon, immediate steps should be taken to 
end political confessionalism, therefore, saving the democratic credentials and future 
of Lebanon. The Lebanese leaders are encouraged to propose institutional reforms in 
compliance with the Taif Accord in order to liberate parliamentary elections from 
confessional affiliations. 
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Appendix One 
Interview Questions 
 
1. Which identity do Sunnis prefer in Lebanon? 
2. What is your perception regarding Lebanese Sunnis loyalty to the Lebanese state? 
3.  What is your opinion on the confessional political system in Lebanon?  
4. When did the political division of the Sunni community begin and why? 
5. Do you think that the Future Movement represent Sunnis in Lebanon?  
6. What is your opinion on the political leadership of Sunnis as represented by the Future 
Movement and the religious leadership of Sunnis as represented by Dar al-Fatwa? 
7. In May 16th, 1989, the Grand Moufti of Lebanon Hassan Khaled was assassinated? Was 
he assassinated because he was a Sunni? Was the assassination meant to silence and 
weaken Lebanese Sunnis? 
8. The post-Taif Accord era witnessed pronounced intra-Sunni divides, what was the 
reason behind the emergence of various Sunni groupings in Lebanon at that time? 
9. What is your stance on Hezbollah? 
10. Why do some Sunni groupings support Hezbollah? 
11. What impact have the events of 2008 had on the Lebanese Sunnis? 
12. It is noted that some Sunni groupings and clerics support the Eighth March Alliance? 
Are those Sunni allies or followers? Do they receive funding from Hezbollah? Is their 
support to Hezbollah driven by interests or principles? If Saudi Arabia backed them, 
would they shift their alliance with Hezbollah? 
13. How do you evaluate the Syrian’s involvement in the Lebanese political affairs? 
14. What impacts have the Syrian presence had on the Sunni community in Lebanon? Was 
there any intention to weaken or divide the Sunni community in Lebanon? 
15. What is the role of Iran in the political division of the Sunni community in Lebanon? 
16. Has Iran supported some Sunni groupings in Lebanon against other Sunni groupings?  
17. Do you think that the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005 marked a decline in the 
power of Sunnis in Lebanon? 
18. How do you evaluate the Saudi Arabian role in Lebanon? 
19. What is your opinion on Lebanon’s relations with Saudi Arabia? What are the cost 
and/or benefit of this relation? 
20. Is the Future Movement the only channel through which Saudi Arabia supports 
Sunnis? Why? 
21. Does Saudi Arabia influence the Sunni discourse in Lebanon? 
22. Which project does Saudi Arabia adopt for Sunnis in Lebanon? Which political Sunni 
grouping(s) does Saudi Arabia support? Does Saudi Arabia support religious groupings 
(e.g. Salafist groupings) 
23. What is the role of Saudi Arabia on the political division of the Sunni community in 
Lebanon? 
24. Has Saudi Arabia supported certain Sunni groupings? 
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